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Отчет DSB 13.10.15: MH17 Crash Appendices A-U

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A1389/14 NOTAM
Q) UKXX/QRTCA/IV/BO /W /210/260/4805N03533E197
A) UKBV UK DV UKFV UKOV
B) 1407010000 C) 1407282359
E) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA BOUNDED BY COORDINATES: 511400N 0342700E
504942N 0341300E 502043N 0335720E 501000N 0335500E 491900N 0334000E
485800N 0332500E 484118N 0324431E 483620N 0324010E 483128N 0323605E
482300N 0323900E 480730N 0325324E 474600N 0325000E 474400N 0330300E
464600N 0325300E 460730N 0325430E 455700N 0331937E 454600N 0333000E
453840N 0344305E 452840N 0350317E 445612N 0363636E 450418N 0363418E
451218N 0363200E 451442N 0363542E 451824N 0363524E 452242N 0364100E
452700N 0364100E 463424N 0372206E 463930N 0372518E 464700N 0373000E
465400N 0370500E 472200N 0363900E 475542N 0355136E 473846N 0353706E
472442N 0351749E 473100N 0350455E 474943N 0345125E 474907N 0344411E 481312N
0340735E 482257N 0340608E 484200N 0341000E 485800N 0344500E 484000N
0353900E 481520N 0360510E 490600N 0365000E 494030N 0364948E 492000N
0361400E 492000N 0352200E 495600N 0353000E 502218N 0353848E
THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT 511400N 0342700E CLOSED.
F) FL210 G) FL260
A1492/14 NOTAM
Q) UKDV/QRTCA/IV/BO /W /260/320/4822N03807E095
A) UKDV
B) 1407141800 C) 1408142359EST
E) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA INSTALLED WITHIN FIR DNIPROPETROVSK
BOUNDED BY COORDINATES : 495355N 0380155E 485213N 0372209E 480122N
0370253E 471352N 0365856E 465018N 0374325E 465900N 0382000E
470642N 0381324E
THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT 495355N 0380155E.
RESTRICTION NOT APPLIED FOR FLIGHTS OF STATE ACFT OF UKRAINE.
F) FL260 G) FL320)
A1493/14 NOTAM
Q) UKDV/QARLC/IV/NBO/E /260/320/4820N03716E119
A) UKDV
B) 1407141800 C) 1408142359EST
E) SEGMENTS OF ATS ROUTES CLOSED:
T242 NALEM MASOL M996 ABUGA GUKOL
G476 MASOL OLGIN W533 TOROS KUBIR
L32 NALEM KW P851 LS NESLO
A83 LS DIMAB L980 GANRA TAMAK
W538 GANRA FASAD W633 LUGAT MAKAK
L69 LAMIV GONED W644 DON GETBO
M70 BULIG TAMAK B493 PODOL FASAD

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L984 BULIG FASAD W531 KOVIL PW
M136 MEBAM DON M995 OLGIN PENAK
L140 KOVIL FASAD.
FM FL260 UP TO FL320

https://a.radikal.ru/a12/1907/4f/5ba61359dac6.png
Table 4: UkSATSE NOTAMs issued after the crash.

Свернутый текст

A1507/14 NOTAM
Q) UKDV/QRTCA/IV/BO /W /320/660/4822N03807E095
A) UKDV
B) 1407171500 C) 1408172359EST
E) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA INSTALLED WITHIN FIR DNIPROPETROVSK
BOUNDED BY COORDINATES :
495355N 0380155E 485213N 0372209E 480122N 0370253E
471352N 0365856E 465018N 0374325E 465900N 0382000E
470642N 0381324E THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT 495355N
0380155E.
RESTRICTION NOT APPLIED FOR FLIGHTS OF STATE ACFT OF UKRAINE.
F) FL320 G) UNL
A1517/14 NOTAM
Q) UKXX/QRTCA/IV/BO /W /000/660/4801N03731E117
A) UKDV UKFV
B) 1407180005 C) 1408172359
E) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA BOUNDED BY COORDINATES:
495428N 0380202E 490600N 0365000E
481520N 0360510E 475542N 0355136E
460809N 0370518E 464700N 0373000E
465900N 0382000E 470642N 0381324E
THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT 495428N 0380202E CLOSED.
F) SFC G) UNL

NOTAMs - Russian Federation

https://b.radikal.ru/b22/1907/ba/3a8dd3017b8d.png
Table 5: Russian Federation NOTAMs restricting airspace in force at the time of the crash.

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A6158/14 NOTAM
Q) Not reported
A) URRV
B) 1407170000 C) 3801010000
DUE TO COMBAT ACTIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE UKRAINE NEAR THE STATE
BORDER WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE FACTS OF FIRING FROM THE
TERRITORY OF THE UKRAINE TOWARDS THE TERRITORY OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
TO ENSURE INTL FLT SAFETY,
ATS RTE SEGMENTS CLSD AS FLW:
- A100 MIMRA - ROSTOV-NA-DONU VOR/DME (RND),
- B145 KANON - ASMIL,
- G247 MIMRA - BAGAYEVSKIY NDB (BA),
- A87 TAMAK - SARNA,
- A102 PENEG - NALEM,
- A225 GUKOL - ODETA,
- A712 TAMAK - SAMBEK NDB (SB),
- B493 FASAD - ROSTOV-NA-DONU VOR/DME (RND),
- B947 TAMAK - ROSTOV-NA-DONU VOR/DME (RND),
- G118 LATRI - BAGAYEVSKIY NDB (BA),
- G534 MIMRA - TOROS,
- G904 FASAD - SUTAG,
- R114 BAGAYEVSKIY NDB (BA)-NALEM.
SFC - FL320
DEP FM/ARR TO ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD TO/FM MOSCOW FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG
ATS RTE G128 KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) - MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR) AND
R11 MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR) - BUTRI ON ASSIGNED FL.
DEP FM ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD TO DNIPROPETROVSK FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG
ATS RTE A102 KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) - NALEM ON FL340 AND ABOVE.
ARR TO ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD FM DNIPROPETROVSK FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG
ATS RTE A712 TAMAK - SAMBEK NDB (SB) THEN DCT KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA)
ON FL330 AND ABOVE.
SFC TO FL530
A2681/14 NOTAM
Q) Not reported
A) URRR
B) 1407170000 C) 3801010000
DUE TO COMBAT ACTIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE UKRAINE NEAR THE STATE
BORDER WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE FACTS OF FIRING FROM THE
TERRITORY OF THE UKRAINE TOWARDS THE TERRITORY OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
TO ENSURE INTL FLT SAFETY DEP FM/ARR TO ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD TO/FM
MOSCOW FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG ATS RTE:
G128 KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) - MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR) AND R11
MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR) - BUTRI ON ASSIGNED FL.

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DEP FM ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD TO DNIPROPETROVSK FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG
ATS RTE A102 KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) - NALEM ON FL340 AND ABOVE.
ARR TO ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD FM DNIPROPETROVSK FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG
ATS RTE A712 TAMAK - SAMBEK NDB (SB) THEN DCT KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA)
ON FL330 AND ABOVE.

Malaysia Airlines briefng note - loss of GPS signals
The following company briefng note was issued by Malaysia Airlines to its crews on
flights crossing Ukrainian airspace:

https://b.radikal.ru/b11/1907/f8/66b40be90857.png
Figure 3: Company briefng note regarding loss of GPS signal. (Source: Malaysia Airlines)

текст

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APPENDIX E
LOAD INFORMATION

The flight’s load sheet, showing the information about the loading of the aeroplane is
reproduced here.
https://d.radikal.ru/d04/1907/b4/e87ceb57cab9.png
Figure 4: Load sheet for flight MH17. (Source: Malaysia Airlines)

текст

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The flight’s NOTOC, issued at Schiphol, is reproduced here.

https://b.radikal.ru/b11/1907/61/d1f33562ce80.png
Figure 5: NOTOC for flight MH17. (Source: Malaysia Airlines)

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The cargo and baggage was loaded as shown in Figure 6 and Table 6.

https://c.radikal.ru/c35/1907/ee/9c91b099064b.png
Figure 6: Distribution of cargo and baggage in the aircraft. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

текст

https://a.radikal.ru/a16/1907/4e/714c45f16e37.png
Table 6: Load information for flight MH17

текст

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APPENDIX F
WEATHER CHART AND WEATHER SATELLITE IMAGE

https://d.radikal.ru/d32/1907/ee/70ea7e8e3eda.png
Figure 7: Synoptic weather for Europe, 17 July 2014. (Source: Meteostar via Aviapartner)

https://c.radikal.ru/c13/1907/03/6266f0408c75.png
Figure 8: Weather satellite image, eastern part of Ukraine, 17 July 2014, 13.15 (15.15 CET). (Source: KNMI)

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APPENDIX G
ATC TRANSCRIPT
This appendix contains relevant portions of communication between air traffc controllers
and the aeroplane’s crew and between different air traffc controllers as recorded by
UkSATSE.
The codes used in this transcript are:
CALLSIGN
MH17 = Malaysia Airlines flight MH17
DNP = Dnipro Radar, Ukraine
SIN351 = Singapore Airlines flight SIN351
S2 = Sector 2
S4 = Sector 4
AIRCRAFT = Aircraft, callsign unknown
RST = Rostov Radar, Russian Federation
MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
RAD = VHF Radio
TEL = Telephone
Where a language other than English was used, a translation is given in the right hand
column.
12.53:29

CALLSIGN

MEANS

ORIGINAL DISCOURSE

MH17

RAD

Hello, Dnipro, Malaysian one
seven, flight level three three
zero

DNP (S2)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar, hello, identifed, advise
... able to climb flight level
three fve zero?

MH17

RAD

Malaysian one seven, negative,
we are maintain three three
zero

DNP (S2)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, roger

13.00:02

MH17

RAD

Dnipro, Malaysian one seven,
okay, start to two zero miles to
the left of track due to
weather?

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CALLSIGN

MEANS

ORIGINAL DISCOURSE

DNP (S2)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, roger,
cleared avoid

MH17

RAD

Roger, cleared two zero miles
left, Malaysian one seven

13.00:52

MH17

RAD

Malaysian one seven, is level
three four zero non-standard
available?

DNP (S2)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, stand by

13.01:20

DNP (S2)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, maintain
flight level three three zero for
a while, three four zero is not
available for now

MH17

RAD

Roger, maintain three three
zero, Malaysian one seven

13.07:46

DNP (S2)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, contact
Dnipro Radar, one three fve
decimal eight, bye

MH17

RAD

One three fve eight, Malaysian
one seven, good day

13.08:00

MH17

RAD

Dnipro Radar, Malaysian one
seven, flight level 330

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar, good day, radar contact

MH17

RAD

Malaysian one seven

13.19:21

DNP (S4)

TEL

Да.

RST

TEL

Так. Днепр, Ростов один.
Вы Малазийскому можете
дать курс на Ростов, в
точку RND, там у нас
сходятся три штуки

DNP (S4)

TEL

Малазийскому
семнадцатому?

RST

TEL

Да, потом мы его вернем
на TIKNA

DNP (S4)

TEL

Хорошо

RST

TEL

Да,точка RND

DNP (S4)

TEL

Хорошо

RST

TEL

Ага, спасибо

41

40
13.19:49

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, due
traffc proceed direct to point
ROMEO NOVEMBER DELTA

13.19:56

MH17

RAD

ROMEO NOVEMBER DELTA,
Malaysian one seven

13.20:00

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, and after
point ROMEO NOVEMBER
DELTA expect direct to TIKNA

13.21:10

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, how do
you read me?

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar

13.21:36

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar

13.22:02

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar

13.22:05

RST

TEL

Слушаю, Ростов

DNP (S4)

TEL

Ростов, а вы малазийца
семнадцатого наблюдаете
по...по ответу?

RST

TEL

Да нет. Что то начала
разваливаться метка его.

DNP (S4)

TEL

Ну у нас тоже. И на вызовы
не отвечает

RST

TEL

И не отвечает на вьізовьі,
да?

DNP (S4)

TEL

Да. И не видим пока его.
То-есть ему дали отворот,
он подтвердил и ...

RST

TEL

И все, да?

DNP (S4)

TEL

Да и исчез.

RST

TEL

Сейчас, подожди, я
попрошу

DNP (S4)

TEL

В пассиве там ничего у вас
не наблюдается?

RST

TEL

Не не не ничего. Ничего не
видим.

DNP (S4)

TEL

Ну хорошо, сейчас мы
зовем их сюда.

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CALLSIGN

[b]MEANS[/b]

ORIGINAL DISCOURSE

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar

13.23:04

DNP (S4)

RAD

Singapore three fve one,
Dnipro Radar

SIN351

RAD

Singapore three fve one, go
ahead

DNP (S4)

RAD

Singapore three fve one,
please, report, are you
observed traffc ahead of you
at distance one six miles at
flight level three three zero?

SIN351

RAD

Singapore three fve one,
copied, stand by

DNP (S4

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar

DNP (S4

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar

AIRCRAFT

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar is calling you

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar, how do you read me?

DNP (S4)

RAD

Singapore three fve one,
Dnipro Radar

SIN351

RAD

Singapore three fve one, go
ahead

DNP (S4)

RAD

Singapore three fve one, do
you have any traffc insight of
you?

SIN351

RAD

Singapore three fve one,
negative, say again position of
traffc

DNP (S4)

RAD

Singapore three fve one,
roger

13.24:03

RST

TEL

Днепр, слушаю, Ростов
один

DNP (S4)

TEL

Ну что не видно, не
СЛЬІШНО?

RST

TEL

Не видно... Слушай,
«СИНГАПУРА» вижу три
пять ноль, его вижу, а
этого...

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CALLSIGN

MEANS

ORIGINAL DISCOURSE

DNP (S4)

TEL

А это ладно, ну мы тоже не
видим. У нас пассив идет
просто, синтетическая
метка и все

RST

TEL

Где он хоть...
синтетическая...где он хоть
находится?

DNP (S4)

TEL

Ну по синтетике над точкой
ТАМАК. Но мы же дали
отворот, а синтетика ведет
его по плану, да. То есть мы
не знаєм...

RST

TEL

Ну мы тогда сейчас скинем
этого, три два ноль дадим
ему

DNP (S4)

TEL

Ну давайте. Потому что
крайняя была три три ноль,
курс Ростов, все что он...
дали на ROMEO
NOVEMBER DELTA, да, и
сказали после ROMEO
NOVEMBER DELTA
рассчитывать TIKNA

13.25:22

DNP (S4)

RAD

Singapore three fve one,
check your TCAS please,
report are you ... do you have
any traffc ahead of you, at
flight level three three zero?

SIN351

RAD

Singapore three fve one,
roger, looking a traffc and say
again distance of traffc from
us

DNP (S4)

RAD

Singapore three fve one,
below position, but
approximately one fve miles

SIN351

RAD

Singapore three fve one,
negative, no indication of
traffc on TCAS though

DNP (S4)

RAD

Singapore three fve one,
roger, thanks, contact Rostov
Control one three three
decimal six

SIN351

RAD

One three three six, Singapore
three fve one, good day

13.25:56

RST

TEL

Да, Днепр, слушаю Ростов

44

43

TIME (UTC)

CALLSIGN

MEANS

ORIGINAL DISCOURSE

DNP (S4)

TEL

Ростов, что то есть у вас?

RST

TEL

Ничего нету, слушай

DNP (S4)

TEL

И у нас он не откликается.
Он шел, крайнее было
указание следовать на
Ростов, после Ростова на
TIKNA, на триста
тридцатом эшелоне

RST

TEL

Да, да, да, я ж по просьбе
моей, да не видим ребята,
не видим. Вот три пять
ноль «СИНГАПУР» зашел,
сейчас «VIMAVIA» тогда
подымем..

DNP (S4)

TEL

СИНГАПУР» сзади. И его
не вижу...не наблюдает...мы
просим, он все спрашивает
‘Где позиция, не вижу не
вижу!’. Ничего то есть нам
не докладывает.

RST

TEL

Ой, ой, ой, конечно. Ладно,
хорошо.

13.26:05

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar

13.26:35

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar

13.27:03

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar

13.27:26

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar

13.27:46

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar

13.28:00

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar

13.28:37

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar

13.28:51

RST

TEL

Слушаю Днепр, Ростов
один

DNP (S4)

TEL

Ну как? Никак у вас ни
заявился?

45

44

TIME
(UTC)

CALLSIGN

MEANS

ORIGINAL DISCOURSE

RST

TEL

Никак. Да и не видим. Уже
тут доложили всем это, и
не видим и ничего это и на
аварийке да не отвечает
он?
In no way. No, and we don’t
see. Already reported here to
everyone about this, and can’t
see anything. He is not
responding on the emergenc

DNP (S4)

TEL

Да ни на чем не отвечает.
Он пропал после как это
отдали на Ростов...

RST

TEL

Ну да да. Как я попросил
дать на Ростов да. Мы уже
этого подняли три четыре
ноль, отвернули его там на
Багаевский…

DNP (S4)

TEL

Угу. Ну все. Сзади
СИНГАПУР тоже ничего не
видит, никто там, ну хотя
он в районе Ростова
должен быть, если он так…

RST

TEL

Да, он сейчас САМБЕК у
нас проходит, a EVA
прошла FASAD, навряд ли
что, ага

DNP (S4)

TEL

Ну что б кто то...

13.29:44

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar

13.30:03

RST

TEL

Днепр слушаю, Ростов
один
Dniepr, listening to you, It’s
Rostov on

DNP (S4)

TEL

Ростовчик, а у вас никого
там нет в радиусе..?
Малазийского тоже, что бы
он может на частоте
компании или где-то там
позвал

RST

TEL

В радиусе Малазийского?

DNP (S4)

TEL

Ну да, что бы те...Там может
Малазийца нигде нет на
связи. Может, попросить
чтоб им там где-то
окликнули через
компанию. Попробуйте,
потому что у нас никого
нету Малазийца чтобы....

46

45

TIME
(UTC)

CALLSIGN

MEANS

ORIGINAL DISCOURSE

RST

TEL

Да вот я и смотрю, сейчас я
скажу там РП. Там мало
сейчас...пока мы тут ничего
не видим

DNP (S4)

TEL

Ну хорошо. Все тогда

13.31:20

RST

TEL

Да. Слушаю РП.

DNP (S4)

TEL

Алло, (name).

RST

TEL

Да.

DNP (S4

TEL

Это (name). Ну. что
нашелся, нет Малазиец?
И нету. У меня тоже
пропал.

RST

TEL

Нет, у меня не синтетика,
бо я метку видел, потом
пропала высота, потом он у
меня с потерей пошел.

DNP (S4)

TEL

Ну, а я синтетику только
видел, и все.

RST

EL

Нет, у меня нету его

13.31:20

DNP (S4)

TEL

И нету у меня тоже, пропал

RST

TEL

Я его видел, он с потерей
пошел

DNP (S4)

TEL

Да, ну синтетику-то я тоже
вижу, до сих пор вижу

RST

TEL

А ты в том районе хорошо
видишь?

DNP (S4)

TEL

Сейчас... Я вижу конечно, я
вижу почти до AKERI, вот
до этой точки.

RST

TEL

Я понял. Ну пока никого
нету у меня из Малазийцев
чтобы через авиакомпанию
позвать.

DNP (S4)

TEL

Ну вот Сингапур триста
пятьдесят первый за ним
шел следом.

RST

TEL

Ну он видел... че, нет его ?

DNP (S4)

TEL

Нет и по TCASy не видел.

47

46

TIME
(UTC)

CALLSIGN

MEANS

ORIGINAL DISCOURSE

RST

TEL

А куда он деться-то мог ?

DNP (S4)

TEL

Не знаю.

RST

TEL

Ладно, сейчас я его...
Хорошо.

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar

13.35:50

DNP (S4)

RAD

Malaysian one seven, Dnipro
Radar

13.36:07

RST

TEL

Да.

DNP (S4)

TEL

Ну, что нету ?

RST

TEL

Сейчас я воспроизведение
смотрю. Уменя пока не
отвечает, молчит

DNP (S4)

TEL

Понятно. Я сейчас тоже
пойду смотреть и слушать.

13.36:25

RST

TEL

Да, Днепр, Ростов один.
Слушаю

DNP (S4)

TEL

Ростовчик, что там у вас,
нету его ?

RST

TEL

Да ничего. Сейчас тоже
вот, как говорится, по всем
сейчас каналам этим и
частотам. Да, сейчас вот
тоже подняли тут, как
говорится. Дальше будем
спрашивать. Не знаю. Ну не
видим. Нету метки, ни
синтетики, никак.

DNP (S4)

TEL

Понятно. Ну мы тоже в ту
степь никого доворачивать
не будем, чтоб посмотреть
то есть...

RST

TEL

Ну, да, да, да. Ну че
известно, подскажим.

DNP (S4)

TEL

Все, давай.

13.48:59

RST

TEL

Да, Днипро.

48

47

TIME
(UTC)

CALLSIGN

MEANS

ORIGINAL DISCOURSE

13.48:59

DNP (S4)

TEL

Да, здравствуйте. Что-то
дозваться вас не могли. К
вам Малазиец так и не
вышел? Вы его не видите?

RST

TEL

Нет, не видим, не слышим!
Я был занят у меня тут
движение идет

DNP (S4)

TEL

Хорошо, спасибо

49

48

APPENDIX H


RECORDED DATA

General description work performed
The Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder were not recovered from the
wreckage site by investigators of the investigation team, but by individuals unknown to
the team.
On 21 July 2014, the recorders were handed over to a Malaysian offcial in Donetsk by
representatives of the armed group controlling the area. The recorders were transported
by train from Donetsk to Kharkiv accompanied by Dutch and Malaysian offcials and then
transported to Kyiv accompanied by Dutch, Malaysian and ICAO offcials.
On 22 July 2014 at 19.00 (21.00 CET) in Kyiv, Ukraine, the Flight Data and Cockpit Voice
Recorders from the Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 were taken into custody by the Dutch
ambassador and a team of international investigators led by an investigator of the Dutch
Safety Board.
The Dutch Safety Board requested that the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB)
perform the data download from both the recorders. The recorders were transported to the
AAIB’s laboratory at Farnborough, arriving 23 July in the early morning. There, an
international team of air safety investigators carried out work to download data contained
within them. Investigators from the following states / organisations were present:
• Germany;
• Interstate Aviation Committee;
• Malaysia;
• The Netherlands;
• Ukraine;
• United Kingdom, and
• United States of America.
ICAO was present as observer.
On 23 July the international team of investigators started at approximately at 09.00
(11.00 CET) a thorough examination of the Cockpit Voice Recorder. The Cockpit Voice
Recorder was damaged but the memory module was intact. Furthermore, no evidence
or indications of manipulation of the Cockpit Voice Recorder were found. Following the
examination, the Cockpit Voice Recorder data was successfully downloaded and
contained valid data from the flight.

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On 24 July at 08.00 (10.00 CET) the international investigation team conducted a
thorough examination of the Flight Data Recorder. The Flight Data Recorder was slightly
damaged but the memory module was intact. Furthermore, no evidence or indications of
manipulation of the recorder were found.
Following the examination, the data was successfully downloaded and the Flight Data
Recorder contained valid data of the flight. Downloaded data from the flight was
decoded using multiple software tools from different manufacturers. The data is
consistent with other recorded information regarding the flight of Malaysia Airlines flight
MH17. Furthermore the unique ICAO 24-bit aircraft address issued by the State of
Registry (Malaysia) matched the recorded ICAO 24-bit aircraft address code on the Flight
Data Recorder. The State of Registry registered the aeroplane as 9M-MRD.
Initial work started to verify shortlist parameters from about 1,300 parameters recorded
on the Flight Data Recorder and identify possible areas and/or systems of interest to the
investigation team. The creation of a shortlist is a means to ensure an effective
investigation and to obtain an insight into possible causes.
On 25 July at 08.30 (10.30 CET) the international investigation team wrapped up the
work. A small team continued to work to verify a shortlist of parameters. On 26 July the
‘short list’ of parameter verifcation was completed.
Cockpit Voice Recorder

Recorder Manufacturer:

Honeywell

Recorder Model:

980-6020-001

Recorder Serial
Number:

not available as data plate was damaged and unreadable, but the
underside of the recorder contained a printed serial number 1366
(97396ASSY 710-G310-005 REV G).

This model Cockpit Voice Recorder is a solid-state Cockpit Voice Recorder that records
30 minutes of 4-channel digital cockpit audio. The recording consists of three individual
crew positions microphones, and a 4th channel, the cockpit area microphone (CAM), that
records additional audio information.
Upon arrival at the AAIB UK, it was evident that the Cockpit Voice Recorder had sustained
damage. The Underwater Locator Beacon, or ‘pinger’, was attached to the unit. The
Cockpit Voice Recorder casing was bent over the protective memory module. The
Cockpit Voice Recorder was disassembled to gain access to the protective memory
module. Once this was achieved the memory module was opened to retrieve the memory
board. The protective moulded plastic covering (Room Temperature Vulcanizing or RTV
plastic) was removed to verify the memory board was not damaged. The data stored on
the memory board was downloaded normally

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On 23 July, after downloading the Cockpit Voice Recorder audio, a frst listening session
was held in the presence of the Accredited Representatives6 and two Dutch Safety Board
investigators. A second listening session was held with a representative from the
Interstate Aviation Committee on 24 July together with a Dutch Safety Board investigator.
On 24 July a Cockpit Voice Recorder transcript group was formed. The task of the
Cockpit Voice Recorder group was to transcribe flight pertinent information of the
30 minutes of available audio. This work was completed at the end of the day. After the
successful download a second download of the Cockpit Voice Recorder was performed.
The reason for this was that one channel was found to contain poor/unusable audio. The
recorder group decided to perform a second download of the audio data using different
equipment than on the day before. A comparison of the second download to the frst
download did not yield any difference. The poor sound quality on the CAM channel
noted during the investigation was most likely due to the missing microphone cap from
the CAM.
Thereafter, in August 2014, the Accredited Representatives from Ukraine and the Russian
Federation listened to the Cockpit Voice Recorder data during meetings in The Hague
with the Dutch Safety Board. In August 2015 another check was performed by a captain
of Malaysia Airlines.
Crew communication gave no indication that there was anything abnormal with the flight.
At the very end of the recording, two peaks of sound were identifed on the last
20 milliseconds of the recording. A graphic representation of the two peaks of sound for
the four Cockpit Voice Recorder microphones are shown here.

https://a.radikal.ru/a41/1907/d0/a7e5a038090f.png
Figure 9: Sound peaks at end of recording. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)
The time period shown on each image is four hundredths of a second. It is noted that
peak of sound ‘peak 1’ is only recorded on the CAM.
The Cockpit Voice Recorder investigation resulted in the following fndings:
• The Cockpit Voice Recorder contained the event flight;
• No warnings were heard on the 30 minutes of audio on the Cockpit Voice Recorder;
• The Cockpit Voice Recorder audio ended abruptly;


6 The frst listening session was attended by representatives from ICAO and from the following states: Germany,
Malaysia, Ukraine, United Kingdom and the United States of America

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• One of the four channels of audio was found to contain poor/unusable audio. The
cockpit area microphone was not working as expected, and
• The Cockpit Voice Recorder did not contain additional flight operation information
which was not already included in the air traffc control transcript.
Flight Data Recorder

Recorder Manufacturer:

Allied Signal (Honeywell)

Recorder Model:

980-4700-003

Recorder Serial Number:

2196

This solid-state Flight Data Recorder model accepts serial bit stream data in an ARINC
573/717 format at a rate of 128 12-bit words per second. The Flight Data Recorder uses
solid-state flash memory technology as the recording medium. The recording is stored in
a crash survivable memory unit. A minimum of the last 25 hours of operational data is
retained on the recording medium. This output is a continuous sequence of four-second
data frames. Each frame consists of four sub-frames of 128 separate 12-bit words, with
the frst word containing a unique 12-bit synchronisation word identifying it as sub-frame
1, 2, 3 or 4. The data stream is ‘in sync’ when successive synchronisation words appear at
the proper 128-word intervals. If the data stream is interrupted, synchronisation words
will not appear at the proper interval or sequence, and the time reference will be lost
until the sub-frame pattern can be re-established.
Upon arrival at the AAIB, it was evident that the Flight Data Recorder had sustained little
damage. The Underwater Locator Beacon was not attached to the unit and was missing,
the bracket that holds the locator beacon to the Flight Data Recorder was however
attached to the unit.
The protective memory module was accessible and opened by specialists. The memory
board protective moulded plastic covering (RTV plastic) was removed and electrical
continuity tests were performed to verify the memory board was not damaged. Next the
memory board was downloaded from the unit normally using a ‘surrogate download unit’.
From 24 July to 26 July, the Flight Data Recorder data was analyzed using decoding
documentation provided to the Dutch Safety Board by the manufacturer under the
provisions of ICAO Annex 13. Using a ‘short list’ of parameters the goal was to verify the
Flight Data Recorder data and to determine if possible warnings of aeroplane systems
were present at the end of the flight.
The Flight Data Recorder investigation concluded:
• The Flight Data Recorder data contains the event flight;
• No warnings have been detected in the data of flight MH17, and
• The Flight Data Recorder data ends abruptly and at the same time as the Cockpit
Voice Recorder.

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Three extracts of the Flight Data Recorder are shown for the fnal three minutes of the
recorded data in the Figures 10 to 12.

https://b.radikal.ru/b23/1907/43/e09976ebbda2.png
Figure 10: Flight Data Recorder data (image 1 of 3). (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

https://d.radikal.ru/d25/1907/76/a5664c8e3aff.png
Figure 11: Flight Data Recorder data (image 2 of 3). (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

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https://c.radikal.ru/c14/1907/24/97f2981e475e.png
Figure 12: Flight Data Recorder data (image 3 of 3). (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

As can be seen in Figure 12, the reproduction of some engine parameters stops earlier
than others. This is the result of the sampling rate (once per 64 seconds) for these
parameters and is not related to a problem with the engines.
Emergency Locator Transmitters
Each Emergency Locator Transmitter was uniquely identifable by a hexadecimal code
embedded into the Emergency Locator Transmitter software. The fxed Emergency
Locator Transmitter’s code ended with the fgures /0/1, whereas the portable Emergency
Locator Transmitter ended /1/1. The code was for identifcation purposes and it was
embedded in the data that was transmitted to a satellite when the Emergency Locator
Transmitter was activated.

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The unique codes for the two Emergency Locator Transmitters installed in the aeroplane
were as follows:

Item

Fixed ELT

Portable ELT

Description

ELT ADT 406 AF

ELT ADT 406 AP

Customer

MALAYSIA AIRL

MALAYSIA AIRL

Aeroplane Type

Boeing 777

Boeing 777

Registration

9M-MRD

9M-MRD

Serial number

4340238

4340282

Unit code

533/1/9MMRD/0/1

533/1/9MMRD/1/1

Hex code

C2A439E7AB25CD1

C2A439E7AB25DD1

Table 7: Emergency Locator Transmitter coding.
The fxed Emergency Locator Transmitter, located in the aft section of the aeroplane,
was connected to the cockpit remote control panel for manual activation. It has both a
connector for the antenna on top of the fuselage and a back-up antenna.
The fxed Emergency Locator Transmitter was installed upside down, inside the fuselage
in close proximity to the antenna. The fxed Emergency Locator Transmitter is located
near the rear of the aeroplane at a point near Station 1880 (STA1880, See Section 12 -
Abbreviations and Defnitions); a part of the structure that normally remains together
during an accident. The external antenna is located at STA1882.
The portable Emergency Locator Transmitter is located in a stowage area near the
forward passenger door on the right hand side, door 1R. A placard is installed near the
portable Emergency Locator Transmitter to inform the aeroplane’s crew of its location. A
portable Emergency Locator Transmitter has a 50 second time period between activation
and the transmission of its signal. The portable Emergency Locator Transmitter, with only
a manual system of activation, was not recovered. It was not activated; there was no data
found to have been transmitted by the portable Emergency Locator Transmitter.
The ACARS traffc log fle was received on 22 July 2014 by the AAIB. A preliminary
analysis was performed on the data. Follow-up work was conducted on the data and a
subsequent analysis was performed. Several questions were posed to the ACARS service
provider and Malaysia Airlines to discuss the fndings and verify received data and
conclusions.
The log fles of the Inmarsat system were received on 20 July 2014 for the investigation.
A preliminary analysis was performed on the data. Follow-up work was conducted on the
data and a subsequent analysis was performed. Several questions were posed to Inmarsat
to discuss the fndings and verify received data and conclusions.

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Information was acquired on the specifcations and the performance of the two
Emergency Locator Transmitters installed in the aeroplane and to determine the
Emergency Locator Transmitter’s emergency signal time and position according to
available information. In addition, the geographic location of the Emergency Locator
Transmitter was analysed using COSPAS-SARSAT satellite and network data. Follow-up
work was conducted on the COSPAS SARSAT data and a subsequent analysis was
performed. Several questions were posed to COSPAS-SARSAT to discuss the fndings
and verify received data and conclusions.
It is noted that the fxed Emergency Locator Transmitter frst transmitted a signal at
around 13.20:36 (15.20:36 CET). This was relayed to ground station as follows:

Time (UTC)

Ground Station location

13.20:04.51

Algeria

13.20:35.70

Spain

13.20:36.01

Greece

13.20:36.02

France

13.20:36.09

Norway

Table 8: First time of Emergency Locator Transmitter signal receipt by ground stations.
The time of receipt of the message at the Algerian ground station was recorded as being
at 13.20:04.51 (15.20:04.51 CET), 31 seconds earlier than the other messages. Verifcation
against other messages received by the Algerian system on 17 July 2014 confrmed that
there was an offset of just over 31 seconds in their recording system meaning that the
message was actually recorded at 13.20:36 (15.20:36 CET); consistent with the other
messag

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APPENDIX I


RADAR SCREEN IMAGES

Ukrainian air traffc control - radar data
The images in Table 9 show secondary surveillance data and are accompanied by text
explaining the images and their symbols.
https://b.radikal.ru/b04/1907/0f/5c803b4444c3.png

The secondary surveillance radar symbol for flight
MH17 is shown in this image. The line displayed in
brown is airway W633 with air navigation waypoint
BELOL displayed.

An arrow appears on the display showing that the
system has detected a loss of the secondary
surveillance radar (Mode S) data link. According to
information provided by UkSATSE, the arrow
symbol is not expected to have been displayed at
the actual time of the last data transmission.

https://d.radikal.ru/d03/1907/7e/96cd776c6717.png

The secondary radar data symbol for MH17 is
replaced by a hashtag (#) symbol. This shows that
the system has entered a ‘synthetic’ or
extrapolated track mode known as ‘coasting’ (see
below). This occurs from 13.20:36 until 13.24:56.

This image is taken from the data 4 seconds
before it ends at 13.25:00. With the exception of
other known and identifed commercial traffc, no
other aircraft are displayed near to the MH17
symbol between 13.20 and 13.25. The aeroplane
is over the Russian Federation border on a
predictive ‘coasting’ track.

Table 9: Ukraine air traffc control - radar screenshots. (Source: UkSATSE)

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Notes
Times in Table 9 are in UTC only.
The symbols for flight MH17 are decoded as follows:
• The flight number MH17 is shown as ‘MAS17’;
• Its flight level, FL330, is shown as ‘330’;
• The aeroplane type, Boeing 777-200, is shown as ‘B772H’ with the letter ‘H’ standing
for ‘heavy’; a term referring to the aeroplane’s wake-turbulence category. The number
‘491’ indicates the flight’s groundspeed in knots;
• The word ‘TAMAK’ indicates the air navigation waypoint to which the aeroplane is
currently cleared to.
The replay showed no other contacts in the direct vicinity of MH17.
A ‘coasting’ mode is one for which the radar returns have been (temporarily) interrupted
and position and altitude are being predicted and displayed based on the previously
received radar data and flight plan information. The phenomenon is comparable to the
manner in which a car’s navigation system continues to display vehicle movement when
in a tunnel, without being able to receive a signal.
Russian Federation air traffc control - radar data
The flm provided to the investigation by GKOVD depicted the Rostov air traffc
controller’s radar screen from 13.00 to 13.40 (15.00 to 15.40 CET) showing flight MH17
and other aircraft in the area. The scale of the screen was such that the distance shown
from the symbol for flight MH17 is between about 30 and 60 km to the south, about 90
km plus to the north and east and about 200 km to the west. An image of the flm,
showing a small portion of the radar screen, is reproduced below.

https://b.radikal.ru/b10/1907/20/9cd95625c65f.png
Figure 13: Russian Federation radar Basic image from flm. (Source: GKOVD)

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https://a.radikal.ru/a06/1907/b2/d8fbb6a0875e.png

The combined primary and secondary surveillance
radar symbols for flight MH17 are shown in this
image. Data labels are in a Cyrillic script.

Data shows MH17 as a combined primary and
secondary symbol and label. The symbol for MH17
shifts to the north-east with the speed vector
turning to a north-easterly direction. A second
primary return is displayed for the frst time.

https://d.radikal.ru/d15/1907/3e/7d5e37eec5af.png

Data shows MH17 as a combined primary and
secondary symbol, now labelled XXXX. This shows
that the system has entered a ‘synthetic’ or
extrapolated track mode known as ‘coasting’ (see
below). The second primary return is no longer
displayed

Data shows MH17 as a combined primary and
secondary symbol, labelled XXXX.
A new primary return in the vicinity of the MH17
symbol appears.

https://b.radikal.ru/b27/1907/56/f99ebdd79305.png

MH17’s primary symbol is shown as ////.
The second symbol remains as a primary return
only.

The label for MH17 is no longer displayed. Primary
returns are noted. These primary returns, frst
noted at 13.20:47, and others are analysed
elsewhere in this report.

https://a.radikal.ru/a30/1907/82/8bdbb8c01fdc.png

The label for MH17 is no longer displayed.
Primary returns are noted. The second symbol,
orginally near to MH17’s position is no longer
displayed.

Table 10: Russian Federation radar screenshots from flm. (Source: GKOVD)

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The images in Table 10 show stills from the video flm of the Russian Federation radar
display and they are intended to provide the reader with a summary of the fnal minutes
of the display seen by the air traffc controller. The images below, comprising of primary
and secondary surveillance data, are accompanied by an explanatory text regarding the
image and its symbols.
Notes
Times in Table 10 are in UTC only.
The symbols for flight MH17 are decoded as follows:
• The flight number MH17 is shown as ‘MAC17’;
• Its flight level, FL330, is shown as ‘330’;
• The aeroplane type, Boeing 777-200, is shown as ‘Б772H’ with the ‘B’ in Cyrillic script.
The number ‘893’ indicates the flight’s groundspeed in km/h, and
• Data labels are in a Cyrillic script; MAC = MAS (Malaysia Airlines) and CHA = SIN
(Singapore Airlines).
The aircraft identifed as 3416 (Air India flight AIC 113) and CHA351 (Singapore Airlines
SIN351) are not discussed in Table 10.
The replay showed no other contacts in the direct vicinity of MH17.
During the investigation it was confrmed by the Federal Air Transport Agency of the
Russian Federation that the last known positions of MH17 was:
• secondary surveillance data: 48° 07´ 57’ N 038° 39´ 47’ E at time 13.22:10 (15.22:10
CET). This is 10 km north-east from the aeroplane’s recorded position at 13.20:03
(15.20:03 CET).
• primary radar data: 48°06´ 39’N 038° 36´ 35’ E at time 13.25:58 (15.25:58 CET). This is
4.5 km south-west from above mentioned secondary position mark, recorded at
13.22:10 (15.22:10 CET).


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