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Отчет DSB 13.10.15: MH17 Crash Appendices A-U

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https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … -july-2014
https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/media/ … ndices.pdf

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Appendices
MH17 Crash

https://a.radikal.ru/a39/1907/41/ab85e79e0c12.png

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Appendices
to report Crash of
Malaysia Airlines
flight MH17



The Hague, October 2015
The reports issued by the Dutch Safety Board are open to the public.
All reports are available on the Safety Board’s website safetyboard.nl.
Source photo cover: DCA Malaysia

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Dutch Safety Board
The aim in the Netherlands is to limit the risk of accidents and incidents as much as
possible. If accidents or near accidents nevertheless occur, a thorough investigation into
the causes, irrespective of who are to blame, may help to prevent similar problems from
occurring in the future. It is important to ensure that the investigation is carried out
independently from the parties involved. This is why the Dutch Safety Board itself selects
the issues it wishes to investigate, mindful of citizens’ position of dependence with
respect to authorities and businesses. In some cases the Dutch Safety Board is required
by law to conduct an investigation.
Dutch Safety Board
Chairman: T.H.J. Joustra
E.R. Muller
M.B.A. van Asselt
Associate members
of the Board: B.J.A.M. Welten
A.P.J.M. Rutten
General Secretary: M. Visser
Visiting address: Anna van Saksenlaan 50
2593 HT The Hague
The Netherlands
Postal address: PO Box 95404
2509 CK The Hague
The Netherlands
Telephone: +31 (0)70 333 7000 Fax: +31 (0)70 333 7077
Website: safetyboard.nl

NB: This report is published in the English and Dutch languages. If there is a difference in
interpretation between the English and Dutch versions, the English text will prevail.

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CONTENTS

APPENDICES PART A: CAUSES OF THE CRASH                                                7
Appendices A. Investigation activities and participants (Part A)                        8
Appendices B. Reference information (Part A)                                               18
Appendices C. Air Traffc Control flight plan                                                    22
Appendices D. NOTAM information                                                                25
Appendices E. Load information                                                                    34
Appendices F. Weather chart and weather satellite image                                37
Appendices G. ATC Transcript                                                                       38
Appendices H. Recorded data                                                                       48
Appendices I. Radar screen images                                                               56
Appendices J. Aeroplane systems and engines information                              60
Appendices K. Ballistic trajectory analysis methods                                         70
Appendices L. Typical fracture modes                                                            76
Appendices M. Agreement regarding Ukrainian ATC data                                 81
Appendices N. Background to occupants exposure                                          83
APPENDICES PART B: FLYING OVER CONFLICT ZONES                                    87
Appendices O. Participants in the investigation (Part B)                                   88
Appendices P. Developments relevant to the investigation                               90
Appendices Q. Laws and regulations                                                              92
Appendices R. Operators that flew over the eastern part of Ukraine              104

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Appendices S. Precedents: Accidents involving civil aviation over
conflict zones                                                                                                   113
Appendices T. Report of the Dutch review committee for the intelligence
and security services                                                                                         115
Appendices U. Flying over conflict zones - risk assessment                                   150
APPENDICES AVAILABLE VIA THE WEBSITE                                                    170
Appendices V. Consultation Part A: Causes of the crash                                         171
Appendices W. Consultation Part B: Flying over conflict zones                                172
Appendices X. NLR Report: Investigation of the impact damage due to
high-energy objects on the wreckage of flight MH17                                              173
Appendices Y. TNO Report: Damage reconstruction caused by impact of
high-energetic particles on Malaysia Airlines flight MH17                                        174
Appendices Z. TNO Report: Numerical simulation of blast loading on
Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 due to a warhead detonation                                     175

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Appendices
part A:
Causes of the crash

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APPENDICES PART A:
CAUSES OF THE CRASH

Appendices A. Investigation activities and participants (Part A)      8
Appendices B. Reference information (Part A)                             18
Appendices C.. Air Traffc Control flight plan                                 22
Appendices D. NOTAM information                                              25
Appendices E. Load information                                                 34
Appendices F. Weather chart and weather satellite image             37
Appendices G. ATC Transcript                                                     38
Appendices H. Recorded data                                                    48
Appendices I. Radar screen images                                            56
Appendices J. Aeroplane systems and engines information           60
Appendices K. Ballistic trajectory analysis methods                      70
Appendices L. Typical fracture modes                                          76
Appendices M. Agreement regarding Ukrainian ATC data               81
Appendices N. Background to occupants exposure                       83

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APPENDIX A

INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES AND PARTICIPANTS (PART A)
This Appendix provides an overview of the activities performed in relation to the
investigation and the parties, persons, and organisations involved. It also gives an
explanation about a number of information sources that were used.
List of activities
The following activities were performed in 2014 and 2015 with regard to the investigation
into the crash of flight MH17:


2014


18 July:                  Deployment of team of investigators to Kyiv, Ukraine.


22 July:                  Recorders were received.


23 July - 24 July:     Delegation of the Annex 13 MH17 investigation: signing of Memorandum of
                              Understanding between Ukraine and the Netherlands, signing of Agreement
                              between NBAAI and Dutch Safety Board. Due to the security situation,
                              investigators could not travel to the crash sites.


23 - 27 July:           Read out of Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder at AAIB,
                              Farnborough, UK.


28 July:                  Informal meeting ICAO observer with Dutch Safety Board chairman, vice-chairman
                              and project manager.


27 July - 7 August: Team of Dutch Safety Board investigators standby in Kharkiv, Ukraine for
                             deployment to crash site.


4 - 6 August:          Dutch Safety Board investigators on standby in Soledar, Ukraine for deployment
                             to crash site.


2 - 15 August:         Dutch Safety Board Investigation Manager liaisons present in Kyiv.


4 August:               Handover of small wreckage material from Malaysian investigators at Dutch Safety
                             Board offce.


4 - 6 August:          Meeting with investigator ATSB at Dutch Safety Board offce.


5 - 8 August:          Meeting with investigators AAIB UK at Dutch Safety Board offce.


11 August:             Dutch Safety Board investigators back at Dutch Safety Board offce.


25 - 28 August:      Meeting with investigators NBAAI at Dutch Safety Board offce regarding radar
                             data.


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26 August:                Vice-chairman Dutch Safety Board informs relatives of the MH17 passengers
                                about the investigation process, Nieuwegein, the Netherlands.


27 - 28 August:         Meeting with investigators from the Russian Federation regarding radar data.


29 August:               Draft Preliminary Report MH17 Crash sent to Accredited Representatives for their
                               comments.


9 September:           Publication of the Preliminary Report MH17 Crash.


11 September:         Chairman Dutch Safety Board, Vice-chairman, Project Manager and Investigator in
                               Charge present the Preliminary Report to the relatives of the MH17 passengers in
                               Nieuwegein.


24 September:          Dutch Safety Board investigators attend forensic investigation meeting of the
                                Joint Investigation Team.


9 - 11 October         Deployment and preparations of Coordinator Recovery Operations Dutch Safety
                              Board in Kyiv.


22 - 25 October:      Preparations of Coordinator Recovery Operations Dutch Safety Board in Kharkiv.


28 Oct. - 13 Nov.:    Preparations for recovery in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Donetsk, Ukraine and
                              reconnaissance of wreckage site near Hrabove, Ukraine by Coordinator Recovery
                              Operations Dutch Safety Board.


14 November:         Agreement between Dutch Safety Board and SES for recovery of wreckage.


14 - 16 November:  Dutch Safety Board Investigation Manager liaison present in Kyiv.


16 - 22 November:  Recovery of wreckage parts with assistance of OSCE, SES and local habitants and
                              transport to railway station Torez, Ukraine.


17 Nov. - 9 Dec.:     Dutch Safety Board Investigation Manager liaison present in Kharkiv.


23 November:         Wreckage transported by 12 train wagons and 2 trucks from Torez to Kharkiv.


1 - 8 December:      Transfer of wreckage parts and preparation for transport to the Netherlands in
                              Kharkiv from the 12 trains and 2 trucks into 16 trucks.


3 December:           Dutch Safety Board present at meeting in Nieuwegein with the relatives of the
                              MH17 passengers.


8 - 12 December:    Transfer of the wreckage by road from Kharkiv to Gilze-Rijen Air Force Base, the
                              Netherlands.


10 December:         Unloading, sorting, forensic investigation and photographing of the wreckage
                              started at Gilze-Rijen Air Force Base.


2015


10 - 16 January:      Investigations performed in Malaysia at Malaysia Airlines.


30 January:             Dutch Safety Board present at meeting in Nieuwegein with the relatives of the
                               MH17 passengers.


4 - 7 February:        Observation of wreckage parts recovered by local inhabitants in Kharkiv by
                              Coordinator Recovery Operations Dutch Safety Board.


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9 - 13 February:          Meeting Investigator in Charge and Coordinator Reconstruction Operations with
                                  NTSB in Washington and Boeing in Seattle, USA.


17 - 20 February:        1st progress meeting of the Annex 13 investigation participants at Gilze-Rijen Air
                                  Force Base.


27 February:               Meeting for preparations with family liaison offcers of the Dutch National Police
                                 and victim support personnel about relatives’ wreckage visits.


3 - 7 March:                Visits to wreckage by relatives at Gilze-Rijen Air Force Base.


9 March:                     Transfer of Flight Data Recorder data to Public Prosecutor.
                                  Planning and start of detailed forensic investigation and preparation of retrieved
                                  high-energy objects and associated wreckage parts.


9 -10 March:                Meeting Investigator in Charge and Coordinator Reconstruction Operations with
                                   AAIB UK at Farnborough.


20 - 28 March:             Observation of wreckage parts recovered by local habitants near Petropavlivka,
                                   Ukraine by Coordinator Recovery Operations Dutch Safety Board. Preparations for
                                   transport to the Netherlands.


30 March - 2 April:       Special Envoy Dutch Safety Board and Investigator in Charge have several
                                  meetings in Kyiv to retrieve investigation data.


19 April - 2 May:          Recovery of wreckage parts and preparations for transport of eight 40-feet
                                   containers to the Netherlands.


6 - 7 May:                   2nd progress meeting of the Annex 13 investigation participants at Gilze-Rijen Air
                                  Force Base.


12 May:                      Forensic investigation and preparation of retrieved parts in containers from last
                                  recovery mission commenced.


26 May:                      Start 3D reconstruction forward part of aeroplane wreckage at Gilze-Rijen Air
                                  Force Base.


2 June:                       Draft Final Report sent to parties involved for review.


11-12 August:             Closing meeting of the Annex 13 investigation participants at Gilze-Rijen Air Force
                                  Base.


Other material made available to the investigation
The Dutch Safety Board received information from various sources, such as police, news
organisations, social media and individuals regarding the crash. This material included
eye-witness statements, articles, messages, flms of the wreckage and flms and photos
from the sites in east Ukraine where the wreckage hit the ground. The Safety Board has
used this material for as far as it was considered applicable to the investigation.
The Dutch Safety Board noted an amount of relevant, classifed, information regarding
the crash to flight MH17 that was in the possession of the Dutch intelligence services
AIVD and MIVD. This is information from the AIVD and MIVD themselves and from the
intelligence services of other countries. This classifed information includes the results of

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the use of intelligence resources. The Dutch Safety Board has assessed its fndings
against this classifed information. The classifed information confrms the fndings about
the causes of the crash as contained in this report.
The classifed information cannot be disclosed for reasons of national security.
Participating states and observer
Accredited Representatives and advisers from the following participating states were
involved in the investigation:
• Ukraine (State of Occurrence);
• Malaysia (State of the Operator and State of Registry);
• United States of America (State of Design and Manufacture of the aeroplane);
• United Kingdom (State of Design and Manufacture of the engines);
• Australia (State that provided information on request - photographs of aeroplane
wreckage parts on the crash site), and
• Russian Federation (State that provided information on request - radar- and communication data).
An observer from the International Civil Aviation Organization was available for support
during the investigation.
Attendence to progress meetings
First Progress Meeting, 17 - 20 February 2015

State                       Number of persons attending
Australia                                       1
Belgium                                        3*
Germany                                       2*
Malaysia                                       8
Russian Federation                         7
United Kingdom                             3
Ukraine                                         2
United States of America                4
-----------------------------------------------
Observer                   Number of persons attending
ICAO                                             1
------------------------------------------------
* Attended only on February 17

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Second Progress Meeting, 6 and 7 May 2015
State                                 Number of persons attending
Malaysia                                  2
Russian Federation                   6
United Kingdom                        2
Ukraine                                   1
United States of America          2
Third Progress Meeting, 11 and 12 August 2015
State                               Number of persons attending
Malaysia                                  4
Russian Federation                   6
United Kingdom                        2
Ukraine                                  10
United States of America           2
Observer                         Number of persons attending
ICAO                                        1

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Guidance committees

For the purpose of this investigation the Dutch Safety Board formed two guidance
committees for Part A of the investigation. These committees consisted of external
members with expert knowledge relevant to the investigation and was chaired by a
Dutch Safety Board member. The external members served on the committees in a
personal capacity. The committees had an advisory role in the investigation.
The composition of the guidance committee for the investigation to the cause of the
crash was as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
E.R. Muller (chairman) Vice-chairman of the Dutch Safety Board
H. Bijl Delft University of Technology
C. Frostell* Former Chief AIG Section, ICAO
Y. de Haan Former Chief Pilot, KLM
G.H. Kroese Former CEO, ATC the Netherlands
M.A.G. Peters CEO, NLR
A. Rutten Associate Memberof the Dutch Safety Board 1
A. Verberk Former CEO, Martinair Holland
B.J.A.M. Welten Associate Member of the Dutch Safety Board
----------------------------------------------------------------------
* Consulted outside meetings.

This guidance committee had four meetings.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
1 As of 1 February 2015

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The guidance committee for the ‘survival aspects’ part of part A of the investigation was
as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
E.R. Muller (chairman) Vice-chairman of the Dutch Safety Board
-------------
P.L. Meurs Associate Member of the Dutch Safety Board; chair of the Council for Public
Health and Health Care
------------
J.J. van Lieshout Head of acute admissions department of internal medicine and Laboratory for
Clinical Cardiovascular Physiology, Academic Medical Centre Amsterdam;
professor of Cardiovascular Physiology, University of Nottingham, United
Kingdom
-------------
B.P.R. Gersons Professor emeritus of psychiatry at the Academic Medical Centre (AMC) and
the University of Amsterdam; senior scientifc adviser to the Arq Psychotrauma
Expert Group
-------------
P.A. Boelen Professor of Clinical and Health Psychology at the University of Utrecht
-------------
I.B. Schipper Trauma surgeon, head of trauma surgery sub-department at the Leiden
University Medical Centre
-------------
H.J. ten Duis Professor emeritus of trauma surgery at the University Medical Centre
Groningen and the University of Groningen
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the investigation, this guidance committee met three times.

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Project team

The project team for the investigation into the crash of flight MH17 comprised the
following persons:
M. Visser MH17 Programme Manager
H. van Duijn Investigation Manager 2
K.E. Beumkes Project Manager
C.J. van der Schors Project Manager ‘survival aspects’
G.J. Vogelaar Investigator in Charge
R. Smits Coordinator Recovery and Reconstruction Operations
E.M. Berends Investigator
A.J. van der Kolk Investigator
G.W. Medendorp Investigator
M.L.M.M. Peters Investigator
G.J. de Rover Investigator
H. van Ruler Investigator
A. Samplonius Investigator
M.J. Schuurman Investigator
Th.M.H. van der Velden Investigator
W.F. Furster Investigator
F. Gisolf Investigator
L.G.L. Hoogduin Investigator
--------------------------------------------------------------------
2 Until March 2015.

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The following individuals were added to the project team under the supervision and
responsibility of the Dutch Safety Board:
-----------------------------------------------------         
H.G. van Galen Ground Engineer Boeing 777
--------------------
D. den Hartog Trauma surgeon Erasmus Medical Centre and head of South-West
Netherlands trauma centre
--------------------
G. van Ingen Pathologist
--------------------
T. Meeuwsen Flight physiologist, Senior aviation accident investigator, Deputy
commander Centre for Man and Aviation (CML), Royal Netherlands
Air Force
--------------------
J.A. Melkert Senior lecturer aeronautical engineering, Aerospace Engineering
Faculty, Delft University of Technology
--------------------
J.C. de Mol Air traffc control expert
--------------------
B. Mulder Aircraft Ground Engineer B1 Boeing 777
-------------------
J.G.W. van Ruitenbeek Aircraft structures Expert
-------------------
F. Schaefers Cabin safety expert SGI Aviation
-------------------
E.F. Thomassen Aircraft Mechanic/sheet metal worker Boeing 777
-------------------
A.J. van Utrecht Technical Investigator
-------------------
H.G.J.M. Vermetten Psychiatrist, Head of Military Mental Health Research Centre and Arq
Psychotrauma Expert group, professor of psychiatry at Leiden
University Medical Centre (LUMC) and Leiden University
------------------
J. van der Vlist Machinist/contributor reconstruction
------------------
A.P. Young Investigator
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsidiary investigations were performed by the following institutions at the instruction
of the Dutch Safety Board:
• Academisch ziekenhuis Maastricht (azM);
• Element Materials Technology;
• National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR);
• Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI);
• Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientifc Research (TNO);
• Delft University of Technology, Faculty of Aerospace Engineering - Structural Integrity
& Composites, Fatigue, Damage Tolerance & Durability.
During the investigation of the Dutch Safety Board assistance was provided by the Dutch
Ministry of Defence, in particular:
• Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence, the Hague;
• Inter Present Combined Joint Interagency Task Force;
• Commander and personnel of Gilze-Rijen Air Force Base;

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• Gilze-Rijen Air Force Base Infrastructure Organisation;
• Gilze-Rijen Air Force Base Motor Transport Squadron;
• Dutch Defence Salvage team;
• Dutch Defence Catering Service;
• Dutch Defence Guards and Security Organisation;
• Dutch Defence Transportation Organisation.
The following companies and organisations provided specialist services at the request of
the Dutch Safety Board:
• Dutch Association for Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (Experts);
• Voortman Steel Group (Body aircraft reconstruction);
• Van der Vlist speciaal- en zwaar transport B.V. (Transport);
• Loonbedrijf Hans Vogelaar (Internal transport)

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APPENDIX B
REFERENCE INFORMATION (PART A)

Reference material
The following reference material was used in the investigation:
• Memorandum of understanding between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine concerning
the investigations regarding the accident of the downing of civilian aircraft, Malaysia
Airlines Flight MH17 on July 17, 2014;
• Agreement between the National Bureau of Air Accident and Incidents Investigation
with Civil Aircraft (NBAAI) of Ukraine and the Dutch Safety Board of the Netherlands
on delegation of investigation in respect of aircraft accident involving Boeing 777-
200, registration: 9M-MRD Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17;
• International regulations;
• Malaysia Airlines documentation.
International regulations
The international regulations relevant to this investigation include:
• The ‘Standards and Recommended Practices’ in the Appendices to the Chicago
convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO);
• Certifcation requirements of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA);
• Certifcation requirements of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA);
• Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia regulations.
International Civil Aviation Organization
Six Appendices are of particular importance for the investigation. These are Appendices
2, 6, 8, 10, 11 and 13.
ICAO Annex 2 - Rules of the Air
The Standards in this document, together with the Standards and Recommended
Practices of Annex 11, govern the application of the Procedures for Air Navigation
Services - Air Traffc Management (PANS-ATM) and the Regional Supplementary
Procedures - Rules of the Air and Air Traffc Services, contained in Doc 7030. In the latter
document subsidiary procedures of regional application are found

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ICAO Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft, Part I - International Commercial Air Transport - Aeroplanes
The purpose of Annex 6 is to contribute to the safety of international air navigation by
providing criteria of safe operating practice and to contribute to the effciency and
regularity of international air navigation by encouraging states to facilitate the passage
over their territories of aeroplanes in international commercial air transport belonging to
other states that operate in conform with such standards.
Annex 6 Part I contains the regulations for commercial air traffc using aircraft. Section 2
(Applicability) of this Annex states the following: ‘The Standards and Recommended
Practices contained in Annex 6, Part I, shall be applicable to the operation of aeroplanes
by operators authorised to conduct international commercial air transport operations.’
ICAO Annex 8 - Airworthiness of Aircraft
Annex 8 contains the Standards and Recommended Practices for the airworthiness of
aircraft. This concerns type certifcation, design approval, certifcation of airworthiness and
the so-called continuing airworthiness. Part III A of Annex 8 specifes the Standards and
Recommended Practices with regard to airworthiness of large aircraft (more than 5700 kg)
regarding which certifcation took place after 13 June 1960 and before 2 March 2004.
ICAO Annex 10 - Aeronautical Telecommunications
Annex 10 contains Standards and Recommended Practices with regard to aeronautical
telecommunications. The Annex sets out the standards and practices that enable
telecommunications and the radio aids to air navigation to contribute to the safety,
regularity and effciency of international air navigation.
ICAO Annex 11 - Air Traffc Services
Annex 11 contains Standards and Recommended Practices with regard to air traffc
control. This Annex refers to the classifcation of airspaces and air traffc control services
that have as their objective ensuring a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffc.
ICAO Annex 13 - Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
Annex 13 contains Standards and Recommended Practices with regard to accident and
incident investigation. This Annex sets out the basic requirements for the establishment of
an accident investigation and how it should be reported. It was reviewed by the Dutch
Safety Board with regard to its applicability to an accident where unlawful interference
was suspected. The Annex makes no differentiation between sorts of accidents. The main
principle of the investigation, regardless of cause is ‘the prevention of accidents and
incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability’. (See Annex
13, paragraph 3.1).
With regard to unlawful interference, Annex 13, paragraph 5.11 requires that ‘If, in the
course of an investigation it becomes known, or it is suspected, that an act of unlawful
interference was involved, the investigator-in-charge shall immediately initiate action to
ensure that the aviation security authorities of the State(s) concerned are so informed’.
This requirement was introduced into the Annex by Amendment 5 in 1976. Annex 17 to
the Convention, entitled Security only refers to accident investigation is so far as the
requirements of Annex 13 paragraph 5.11 are reproduced.

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Other documents
In addition to Annex 11, ICAO Doc 4444 - Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Air
Traffc Management (PANS-ATM), provides additional provisions with regard to air traffc
control procedures. PANS-ATM is a supplement to Annex 11.
Furthermore Doc 8168 - Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Aircraft Operations,
Volume 1 Flight Procedures prescribes among other things operational procedures,
which are recommended for the guidance of flight operational personnel and flight crew
members.
Lastly, ICAO Doc 9554 - Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities
Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations, provides guidance material which is
meant to assist States in providing for the safe and orderly flow of international air traffc
in the event that military activities, which constitute potential hazards to civil aircraft, are
planned and conducted.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
The aeroplane type Boeing 777 was certifed on the basis of the certifcation requirements
of FAA airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes: FAR Part 25.
The specifcation Technical Standard Order, TSO-C64, for oxygen masks.
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
The aeroplane’s engines were certifed on the basis of EASA airworthiness standards for
engines; EASA CS-E.
Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia
Malaysian Civil Aviation Regulations 1996

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Malaysia Airlines
The investigation made use of a number of documents that Malaysia Airlines used in the
preparation and execution of the flight. Some of the documents were produced by
Boeing. These documents included:
• Operations Manual Part A, and
• Boeing 777 Flight Crew Operations Manual.
Research reports
As part of the investigation, studies were performed with the cooperation of external
institutions at the instruction of the Dutch Safety Board. The reports produced as a result
of their studies are published on the Dutch Safety Board’s website. These are:

National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR)

Impact damage due to high-energy objects on the wreckage
of MH17

Netherlands Organisation for Applied
Scientifc Research (TNO)

Reconstruction of the damage pattern caused by
the impact of high-energy objects on Malaysia Airlines flight
MH17

Netherlands Organisation for Applied
Scientifc Research (TNO)

Numerical simulation of blast loading on Malaysia
Airlines flight MH17 due to a warhead detonation

In addition, the NLR and Delft University of Technology (failure analyses), Element
Materials Technology (forensic investigation of the high-energy objects found) and the
Netherlands Forensic Institute (forensic investigation of the high-energy object found)
contributed to the investigation.

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APPENDIX C
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FLIGHT PLAN

Flight plan
A flight plan is a document that the pilot-in-command of an aircraft, or the operator,
submits to the authorities prior to a flight. A flight plan provides the planned route of the
proposed flight. The flight plan’s format is established in ICAO Doc 4444.
In general, the compilers of a flight plan will opt for the most economic route, using the
air routes that are available. The shortest route is represented by a straight line between
the departure and arrival aerodromes, the so-called great circle. The preferred route is
determined using the available air routes (airways) that are located closest to the great
circle. The fnal route is established taking into account the operational limitations related
to the aircraft and the weather. Examples of this would be avoiding areas with a lot of
headwind, or looking for areas with a lot of tailwind.
The aeroplane’s equipment may also present limitations. The systems on board with
emergency oxygen for passengers and crew members may restrict the ability to fly over
high terrain. With a twin-engine aeroplane, there must be a suitable diversion aerodrome
at each point of the route within one, two or three hours flying time on one engine,
depending on the equipment and certifcation. Another limitation when selecting a route
is related to whether the operator in question has permission to fly over a certain area or
country. The applicable NOTAMs are also examined to establish whether they impose
any restrictions on the route.
Airways can be viewed as three-dimensional highways for aircraft. The flight plan includes
the airways to be followed and reporting points or waypoints. The waypoints are
important airway intersections or points where an airway passes the boundary of a flight
information region (FIR).
During the flight, the crew can request permission from air traffc control to deviate from
the flight plan. In addition, air traffc control can issue the crew with instructions to change
course. In doing so, the pilot-in-command remains responsible for the safety of the flight
operations.
Flight levels are used above the transition altitude, which varies from one country to
another. These are used to facilitate the separation between aircraft. Above the transition
altitude, a globally agreed standard altimeter setting applies, which means that all traffc
uses the same altitude indication. Airways employ standard flight levels. Typically,
magnetic tracks between 0 and 179 degrees have odd-numbered flight levels (FL290,

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FL310, etc.) and magnetic tracks between 180 and 359 degrees have even-numbered
flight levels. A flight plan must also specify the flight levels for the proposed route.
FPL-MAS17-IS
-B772/H-SDFGHIJ3J5M1RWXY/LB1D1
-EHAM1000
-N0490F310 ARNEM UL620 SUVOX UZ713 OSN UL980 MOBSA DCT POVEL DCT SUI
L980 UTOLU/N0490F330 L980 LDZ M70 BEMBI L980 PEKIT/N0480F350 L980 TAMAK/
N0480F350 A87 TIROM/N0490F350 A87 MAMED B449 RANAH L750 ZB G201 BI DCT
MURLI DCT TIGER/N0490F370 L333 KKJ L759 PUT R325 VIH A464 DAKUS DCT
-WMKK1137 WMSA WMKP
-PBN/A1B1C1D1L1O1S2 DOF/140717 REG/9MMRD EET/EDGG0017 EDWW0023
EDUU0036 EPWW0052 UKLV0135 UKBV0153 UKDV0225 URRV0255 UATT0347
UTAK0411 UTAA0432 UTAV0507 OAKX0518 OPLR0601 OPKR0616 VIDF0631 VABF0725
VECF0747 VYYF0926 VOMF0930 VTBB1013 WMFC1051 SEL/QREJ
ORGN/KUL02MH RMK/ACASII EQUIPPED

Flight plan text

Explanation

FPL-MAS17-IS

Flight plan for flight MH17, a scheduled commercial
flight operating under instrument flight rules

B772/H-SDFGHIJ3J5M1RWXY/LB1D1

Aeroplane type (777-200) followed by code letters for
relevant equipment on board and, where applicable,
authorisation from the appropriate authority.

EHAM1000

Airport of departure and scheduled departure time in
UTC.

N0490F310

Initial cruising speed in knots and frst cruising level.

ARNEM UL620 SUVOX UZ713 OSN UL980
MOBSA DCT POVEL DCT SUI L980 UTOLU/
N0490F330 L980 LDZ M70 BEMBI L980 PEKIT/
N0480F350 L980 TAMAK/N0480F350 A87
TIROM/N0490F350 A87 MAMED B449
RANAH L750 ZB G201 BI DCT MURLI DCT
TIGER/N0490F370 L333 KKJ L759 PUT R325
VIH A464 DAKUS DCT

Route details consisting of the names of air navigation
waypoints and airway codes.
Notes:
DCT = direct to
/N0490F350 after a waypoint name shows that the
aeroplane will change speed and/or level. In the case
of the change at waypoint TIROM: increase speed
from 480 knots to 490 knots and remain at FL350.

WMKK1137 WMSA WMKP

Destination airport code, total time for flight (in this
case, 11 hours and 37 minutes) and the airport codes
for alternate airports.

PBN/A1B1C1D1L1O1S2

Codes relating to en-route navigation capability

DOF/140717

Date of flight

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Flight plan text

Explanation

REG/9MMRD

Aircraft registration.

EET/EDGG0017 EDWW0023 EDUU0036
EPWW0052 UKLV0135 UKBV0153 UKDV0225
URRV0255 UATT0347 UTAK0411 UTAA0432
UTAV0507 OAKX0518 OPLR0601 OPKR0616
VIDF0631 VABF0725 VECF0747 VYYF0926
VOMF0930 VTBB1013 WMFC1051

EET = Estimated elapsed time to the boundaries
between Flight Information Regions.

SEL/QREJ

Callsign for the selective-calling radio system.

ORGN/KUL02MH

Flight plan submitted by Malaysia Airlines.

RMK/ACASII EQUIPPED

Other information. In this case, the type of Airborne
Collision Avoidance System installed.

Table 1: Explanation of air traffc control flight plan.

The flight plan starts with the aerodrome of departure (EHAM=Amsterdam Airport
Schiphol) and the flight’s departure time (10.00). It then indicates the planned cruise
speed in knots and the altitude as a flight level (N0490 F310). This is followed by the frst
air navigation waypoint (ARNEM) and the airway (UL620) that the flight will take to the
next waypoint (SUVOX). In this way, the flight plan describes the entire route, in which the
airways are always referred to by using one or two letters followed by numbers and the
air navigation waypoints by name. If a flight directly approaches an air navigation
waypoint, the waypoint’s designation is preceded by ‘DCT’ (direct). If the flight must fly
at a different speed and/or altitude, this is also specifed in the flight plan. Lastly, the
aerodrome of arrival is mentioned in the flight plan (WMKK = Kuala Lumpur), the duration
of the flight (11 hours and 37 minutes), and the diversion aerodromes (WMSA = Sultan
Abdul Aziz Shah/ Subang and WMKP= Penang).

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APPENDIX D
NOTAM INFORMATION

https://d.radikal.ru/d25/1907/48/e7d6f3b38071.png
Figure 1: Ukrainian NOTAMs. (Source: Google, Landsat)

https://c.radikal.ru/c36/1907/51/724066c29611.png
Figure 2: Side view of restricted airspace. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

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De-coding NOTAM data
The following material is provided so as to allow the reader to better understand the
material in this report.

NOTAM text

Explanation

A1353/14 NOTAM

Reference number; the letter A followed by a
numeric code and the year

Q) UKXX/QRTCA/IV/BO /W
/000/050/4731N03254E196

Q-code: used by flight planning software to
determine its applicability to a planned flight

A) UKDV UKOV UKFV

Flight Information Region or regions affected

B) 1406290000
C) 1407282359

Period of validity of NOTAM
B) is date and time FROM, and
C) is date and time TO in the format
YYMMDDHHMM

E) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA BOUNDED BY
COORDINATES: 464700N 0373000E 455800N
0345000E THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY
UNTIL POINT 481400N 0281700E CLOSED

Area of airspace that is restricted
TEMPO = temporarily

THE PROHIBITION IS NOT APPLIED FOR FLIGHTS
OF STATE ACFT OF UKRAINE. FLIGHTS OF CIVIL
ACFT IN AREA IS AUTHORIZED UNDER
CONDITIONS:
- FPL SENDING IN THE DAY BEFORE UNTIL
1200(UTC)

Operational considerations associated with the
restriction

F) SFC
G) 1500M AMSL

F) Altitude from which the restriction applies, and
G) Altitude or level to which the restriction applies

The NOTAMs address airspace that is closed or restricted to air traffc. Two sorts of
restriction were applied:
1. Temporary Reserved Area3
Defned volume of airspace normally under the jurisdiction of one aviation authority
and temporarily reserved, by common agreement, for the specifc use by another
aviation authority and through which other traffc may be allowed to transit, under air
traffc control clearance.
2. Temporary Restricted Area
Airspace of defned dimensions above the land areas or territorial waters of a state,
within which the flight of aircraft is restricted in accordance with specifc conditions.
All times in this Appendix are in UTC only.


3 EUROCONTROL, Airspace Management Handbook for Application of the Concept of the Flexible Use of Airspace,
Ed. 3.0, 2010.

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NOTAMs - Ukraine

https://d.radikal.ru/d27/1907/59/ab64a0c3f477.png
Table 3: UkSATSE NOTAMs valid during the crash.

Свернутый текст

NOTAM number Lower limit Upper limit Valid from Valid to

It is noted that NOTAMs 1383/14 and 1384/14 effectively covered the same area. NOTAM
1383/14 closed all airspace, whilst NOTAM 1384/14 closed the airways that passed
through that airspace. NOTAMs 1492/14 and 1493/14 also closed both airspace and
airways in the same way. This practice is common as it facilitates computerised flight
planning by specifying exactly which portions of an airway are restricted.
The areas restricted by NOTAMs 1383/14, 1384/14, 1492/14 and 1493/14 were considered
relevant to the investigation as they restricted parts of Ukrainian upper airspace closest
to the planned route of flight MH17


4 NOTAM end date no earlier than 14 August 2014.
5 NOTAM end date no earlier than 14 August 2014.

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A1352/14 NOTAM
Q) UKXX/QRTCA/IV/BO /W /000/050/5015N03349E140
A) UKBV UKDV
B) 1406290000 C) 1407282359
E) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA BOUNDED BY COORDINATES: 511600N 0303500E
THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT 501900N 0364942E 490600N
0365000E 492300N 0352700E 512400N 0322000E 511600N 0303500E CLOSED.
THE PROHIBITION IS NOT APPLIED FOR FLIGHTS OF STATE ACFT OF UKRAINE.
FLIGHTS OF CIVIL ACFT IN AREA IS AUTHORIZED UNDER CONDITIONS:
- FPL SENDING IN UKRAEROCENTRE THE DAY BEFORE UNTIL 1200(UTC)
- NOT LATER THAN ONE HOUR BEFORE DEPARTURE RECEIVING PERMISSION OF AIR
FORCES OF UKRAINE THROUGH UKRAEROCENTRE ON FLIGHT
- INFORMING AIR DEFENS UNIT OF AIR FORCES OF UKRAINE AND AIR TRAFFIC
SERVICE ABOUT FLIGHT.
F) SFC G) 1500M AMSL
A1353/14 NOTAM
Q) UKXX/QRTCA/IV/BO /W /000/050/4731N03254E196
A) UKDV UKOV UKFV
B) 1406290000 C) 1407282359
E) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA BOUNDED BY COORDINATES: 464700N 0373000E
455800N 0345000E 455242N 0323043E 460755N 0312733E 462300N 0312400E
462300N 0310700E 451200N 0294500E
THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT 481400N 0281700E 484900N
0292300E 481600N 0302700E 472500N 0304500E 472500N 0324400E 465800N
0325100E 470200N 0342700E 472442N 0351749E 473846N 0353706E 475542N
0355136E 472200N 0363900E 465400N 0370500E 464700N 0373000E CLOSED.
THE PROHIBITION IS NOT APPLIED FOR FLIGHTS OF STATE ACFT OF UKRAINE.
FLIGHTS OF CIVIL ACFT IN AREA IS AUTHORIZED UNDER CONDITIONS:
- FPL SENDING IN UKRAEROCENTRE THE DAY BEFORE UNTIL 1200(UTC)
- NOT LATER THAN ONE HOUR BEFORE DEPARTURE RECEIVING PERMISSION OF AIR
FORCES OF UKRAINE THROUGH UKRAEROCENTRE ON FLIGHT
- INFORMING AIR DEFENS UNIT OF AIR FORCES OF UKRAINE AND AIR TRAFFIC
SERVICE ABOUT FLIGHT.
F) SFC G) 1500M AMSL
A1383/14 NOTAM
Q) UKDV/QRAXX/IV/NBO/W /000/260/4833N03731E111
A) UKDV
B) 1407010000 C) 1407282359
E) TEMPORARY RESERVED AREA BOUNDED BY COORDINATES: 501900N 0364942E
490600N 0365000E 481520N 0360510E 475542N 0355136E 472200N 0363900E
465400N 0370500E 0464700N 0373000E 465900N 0382000E 470642N 0381324E

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THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT 501900N 0364942E.
AUTHORIZED FLIGHTS OF STATE ACFT OF UKRAINE. FOR FLIGHTS OF CIVIL ACFT
NEED HAVE PERMISSION HEADQUARTERS OF ARMED FORCES UKRAINE NOT LESS
ONE DAY BEFORE FLIGHT.
F) SFC G) FL260
A1384/14 NOTAM
Q) UKXX/QARLC/IV/NBO/E /000/260/4829N03721E114
A) UKDV UKFV B) 1407010000 C) 1407282359
E) SEGMENTS ATS ROUTES CLOSED:
KHR-GOBUN A137 LS-TP A83
RUBES-FASAD B493 OLGIN-MASOL G476
KERTA-FASAD L140 LS-NALEM L32
DNP-GONED L69 PW-FASAD L984
DNP-TAMAK M70 KHR-KUBOK M987
LI-OLGIN M995 KHR-GUKOL M996
LS-LI P851 MASOL-LUGAT T242
PW-ELBAM W531 TOROS-KERTA W533
LI-FASAD W538 RUBES-KUBIR W546
ELBAM-OLGIN W617 GOBUN-LI W624
RUBES-LUGAT W633 DON-TAGAN W644.
FROM SFC TO FL260.)
A1387/14 NOTAM
Q) UKXX/QRTCA/IV/BO /W /140/180/4805N03533E197
A) UKBV UKDV UKFV UKOV
B) 1407010000 C) 1407282359
E) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA BOUNDED BY COORDINATES: 511400N 0342700E
504942N 0341300E 502043N 0335720E 501000N 0335500E 491900N 0334000E
485800N 0332500E 484118N 0324431E 483620N 0324010E 483128N 0323605E
482300N 0323900E 480730N 0325324E 474600N 0325000E 474400N 0330300E
464600N 0325300E 460730N 0325430E 455700N 0331937E 454600N 0333000E
453840N 0344305E 452840N 0350317E 445612N 0363636E 450418N 0363418E
451218N 0363200E 451442N 0363542E 451824N 0363524E 452242N 0364100E
452700N 0364100E 463424N 0372206E 463930N 0372518E 464700N 0373000E
465400N 0370500E 472200N 0363900E 475542N 0355136E 473846N 0353706E
472442N 0351749E 473100N 0350455E 474943N 0345125E 474907N 0344411E 481312N
0340735E 482257N 0340608E 484200N 0341000E 485800N 0344500E 484000N
0353900E 481520N 0360510E 490600N 0365000E 494030N 0364948E 492000N
0361400E 492000N 0352200E 495600N 0353000E 502218N 0353848E
THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT 511400N 0342700E CLOSED.
F) FL140 G) FL180)


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