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Отчет DSB 13.10.15: Crash MH17, 17 July 2014

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2.6 Aircraft information

This Section and Appendix J provide information on the following:
• A general description of the aeroplane involved in the crash;
• A description of the operation, airworthiness and maintenance of the aeroplane and
specifc systems and equipment that are deemed relevant to the investigation, and
• The load of the aeroplane.
2.6.1 General description
The aeroplane, a Boeing 777-200, is a low-wing, wide body, commercial aeroplane ftted
with two wing-mounted turbofan engines and a tricycle landing gear confguration. The
aeroplane’s maximum take-off mass was 286,897 kg. The passenger seating confguration
for 9M-MRD was 33 business class seats located in the front of the cabin and 247 economy
class seats. The aeroplane had accumulated 76,322 flight hours and 11,434 cycles (see
Section 12 - Abbreviations and Defnitions). The aeroplane was equipped with two RollsRoyce Trent-892B series engines.
The most recent version of the certifcate of registration of 9M-MRD, issued by the
Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia, in accordance with Malaysia Civil Aviation
Regulations 1996, was dated 23 August 2006. The Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia
issued a certifcate of airworthiness numbered M.0817 for 9M-MRD (serial number 28411)
on 7 July 2014 that replaced the certifcate previously issued on 8 July 2013. The new
certifcate was valid until 29 July 2015.
The scheduled maintenance, implementation of mandatory modifcations and the
treatment of defect reports were analysed. Details on this and other airworthiness related
issues at Malaysia Airlines are provided in Appendix J.
2.6.2 Aeroplane load and technical defects
According to the load sheet, the aeroplane was loaded as follows:
Load sheet data
Checked baggage and cargo:                                              17,751 kg
Passengers and hand-baggage (based on standard masses): 20,225 kg
Aeroplane - empty mass:                                                  145,015 kg
The aeroplane’s balance fgures were:
Percentage mean aerodynamic chord (MAC):                          25.51
Loaded index:                                                                      35.47
Table 4: Load data.



The actual take-off mass of the aeroplane was 278,691 kg *6 and the forward and aft limits
of the centre of gravity at the take-off mass were 21 and 38.5 percent MAC, respectively.
The take-off mass and the load were within authorised limits.
The 17,751 kg baggage and cargo load was distributed in the under-floor cargo
compartments as shown in Appendix E.
The NOTOC (see Section 12 - Abbreviations and Defnitions and Appendix E) produced
for the flight crew by the ground handling agent showed that the loaded cargo did not
contain any dangerous goods. The NOTOC recorded medical supplies, cut flowers and
animals as being on board and classifed as Special Load.
A review of the cargo manifest showed no evidence of any goods that should have been
classifed as dangerous goods; e.g. chemicals, vehicle engines, etc. It was noted that a
single lithium-ion battery was included on the cargo manifest. This item was declared as
properly packaged and was therefore exempted from being classifed as dangerous
goods. As such, this small item was not considered relevant to the investigation.
The technical log entry made prior to departure from Schiphol shows that the fuel
quantity in the aeroplane was 96,500 kg of which 9,800 kg remained from the previous
flight. This is 800 kg more than was required for the planned take-off fuel of 95,700 kg.
Prior to flight MH17, engine oil was added to the left engine. The technical log was signed
by the line engineer and the captain of flight MH17, confrming that the required
maintenance checks had been conducted.
Three defciencies were open as deferred items on flight MH17. These were:
• Cockpit Voice Recorder area microphone cap in the cockpit was missing;
• A comment about the condition of two cabin overhead bins;
• The left engine acoustic lining was damaged. The area of the damage was
approximately 2 x 6 centimetres.

Summary of aircraft information
• According to the documents and information received, the aeroplane was in an
airworthy condition on departure from Schiphol, with three technical defects
• The flight documents also showed that the aeroplane was prepared for departure
from Schiphol with a load of 283 passengers, 17,751 kg of checked baggage and
cargo and 96,500 kg of fuel. An air traffc control flight plan had been fled. The
flight crew had been provided with an operational flight plan, NOTAMs, loading
and weather information.
• The mass and the centre of gravity of the aeroplane were within authorised limits.

*6 The take-off mass excludes 800 kg of fuel that was used during taxiing.



2.7 Meteorological information

2.7.1 General
The weather conditions described in this paragraph were obtained from three
meteorological institutes:
• Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute (KNMI);
• British Met Offce;
• Ukrainian Hydrometeorological Institute.
2.7.2 Forecast weather
The meteorological reports (METARs) for the airports in the vicinity, and at about the
time of the crash (times in UTC only), show the following information:
Explanation of relevant information                                                             Airport name (ICAO code)
Information issued: 17 July, 13.30;                                                              Kryvyi Righ (UKDR)
Wind: mainly from direction 050º and variable between 020° and 090º,          171330Z 05006MPS
speed 6 m/s;                                                                                              020V090 CAVOK 25/16
Cloud and visibility: CAVOK;*7                                                                       Q1011 3609//70 NOSIG
Temperature: 25 ºC, dew point 16 ºC;
Barometric pressure at sea level: 1,011 hPa, and
No signifcant change expected.
Information issued: 17 July, 13.30;                                                               Dnipropetrovsk (UKDD)
Wind: mainly from direction 060º, speed 5 m/s;                                             171330Z 06005MPS 9999
Cloud and visibility: visibility more than 10 km, thunderstorms in the               VCTS SCT033CB BKN100
vicinity, scattered cumulonimbus cloud coverage at 3,300 feet, broken at         25/18 Q1011 08210270
10,000 ft;                                                                                                   TEMPO 05008G14MPS
Temperature: 25 ºC, dew point 18 ºC;                                                           TSRA BKN015CB
Barometric pressure at sea level: 1,011 hPa, and;
Expected change: temporarily in the coming 60 minutes, wind direction
050º and wind speed 8 m/s with gusts of 14 m/s, thunderstorms and rain
and cloud coverage: cumulonimbus clouds broken at 1,500 feet.
Information issued: 17 July, 13.30;                                                               Kharkiv (UKHH)
Wind: mainly from direction 070º, speed 4 m/s;                                             171330 07004MPS 9999
Cloud and visibility: visibility more than 10 km, scattered cumulonimbus           SCT033CB BKN200 31/11
cloud coverage at 3,300 ft, broken cloud coverage at 20,000 ft;                        Q1013 070/// 65 TEMPO
Temperature: 31 ºC, dew point 11 ºC;                                                            08009G16MPS
Barometric pressure at sea level: 1,013 hPa, and
Expected change: temporarily in the coming 60 minutes, wind direction
080º, wind speed 9 m/s with gusts of 16 m/s.
*7 CAVOK stands for “Ceiling and Visibility OK”; specifcally, (1) there are no clouds below 5,000 feet above
aerodrome level or minimum sector altitude (whichever is higher) and no cumulonimbus or towering cumulus; (2)
visibility is at least 10 kilometres or more, and (3) no current or forecast signifcant weather such as precipitation,
thunderstorms, shallow fog or low drifting snow.



Explanation of relevant information                                            Airport name (ICAO code)
Information issued: 17 July, 13.30;                                             Kyiv Boryspil (UKBB)
Wind: direction 030º, speed 7 m/s;                                            171330 03007MPS CAVOK
Cloud and visibility: CAVOK;                                                       30/16 Q1015 88CLRD95
Temperature: 30 ºC, dew point 16 ºC;                                         NOSIG
Barometric pressure at sea level: 1,015 hPa;
Runway clear of contamination and braking action is good, and
Expected change: no signifcant change.
Table 5: METARs in force on 17 July 2014.

On 17 July two SIGMET *8 messages for the Dnipropetrovsk Flight Information Region
were published. The second SIGMET, number 5, superseded the frst. The SIGMETs (with
times in UTC only) contain the following information:
Plain language explanation                                                                          SIGMET
SIGMET 4 for the UKDV FIR                                                                      UKDV SIGMET 4
Validity: 17 July between 09.00 and 12.00;                                                VALID 170900/171200 UKDVм
Forecast: Embedded thunderstorms with large hail stones                           UKDV DNJEPROPETROVSK FIR
forecast over the whole Dnipropetrovsk region, with cloud                           EMBD TSGR FCST OVER WHOLE
tops between 34,000 and 39,000 feet moving North with                            DNJEPROPETROVSK FIR
a speed of 20 km/h, and                                                                          TOP FL340/390 MOV N 20 KM/H NC
Expected change: No change.
SIGMET 5 for the UKDV FIR                                                                       UKDV SIGMET 5
Validity: 17 July between 12.00 and 15.00;                                                 VALID 171200/171500 UKDV
Forecast: Embedded thunderstorms with large hail stones                            UKDV DNJEPROPETROVSK FIR EMBD
forecast over the whole Dnipropetrovsk region, with cloud                            TSGR FCST OVER WHOLE
tops between 37,000 and 41,000 ft, moving North with a                             DNJEPROPETROVSK FIR
speed of 15 km/h, and                                                                              TOP FL370/410 MOV N 15 KM/H INTSF
Expected change: intensifying.
Table 6: SIGMETs in force on 17 July 2014.

2.7.3 Weather information provided to flight crew
Prior to departing from Schiphol, the flight crew received the most recent weather
information from the ground handling agent during the flight preparation. The information
provided was:
• Prognostic weather charts for signifcant weather, valid on 17 July at 06.00, 12.00 and
18.00 (08.00, 14.00 and 20.00 CET) on the route Amsterdam - Kuala Lumpur between
FL250 and FL630;
• The forecast wind direction, speed and air temperature between Amsterdam and
Kuala Lumpur from ground level to FL430 at different points along the planned route;
• Forecast of turbulence and, if present, its severity at each air navigation waypoint on
the route Amsterdam - Kuala Lumpur;
*8 A SIGMET contains information concerning en-route weather phenomena which may affect the safety of aircraft



• The weather reports of large airports and Flight Information Regions on the route
Amsterdam - Kuala Lumpur, including the METAR for Kyiv Boryspil Airport described

The prognostic weather charts for signifcant weather showed an area with occasional
embedded cumulonimbus clouds up to FL350 north-west of the Black Sea forecast to
move north-east during the period of the forecast.
The forecast wind and temperature in Ukraine at FL330 and FL350, as reported to the
flight crew in the information provided by the ground handling agent prior to the flight,
varied between 160 and 165 degrees/17 to 19 knots in Ukrainian airspace up to air
navigation waypoint PEKIT, and between 180 and 220 degrees/20 to 40 knots between
air navigation waypoint PEKIT and the border with the Russian Federation at air navigation
waypoint TAMAK. The outside air temperature varied between -40 and -50 ºC.
2.7.4 Actual weather
An aftercast was made of the general weather conditions in the area of Donetsk at about
14.00 (16.00 CET) on 17 July 2014 by KNMI.
A near stationary occlusion associated with an area of low pressure above the Black Sea
extended from the Russian Federation and Ukraine to Romania. In between this
depression and an anticyclone over north-western Europe, a weak north-easterly flow
led warm and unstable continental air over the vicinity of the crash site. Several clouds,
producing rain and thunderstorms, originated at different places in this system. The
cloud base was between 3,000 and 5,000 feet with peaks, generally, at around FL350.
Weather satellite images of Europe showed large cloud formations west and north of the
Black Sea; an area largely matching with the Dnipropetrovsk Flight Information Region.
The area to the south of flight MH17’s last known position contained mostly cumulonimbus
clouds and possibly thunderstorms. The sky above areas associated with the
cumulonimbus clouds was obscured with a cloud base of between 1,000 and 5,000 ft. In
other places, the sky was less obscured. The weather system was moving to the northeast. See also Appendix F.
Analysis of ground observations, showed that thunderstorms were reported in the area
to the south, west and south-west of the crash area. The winds at ground level were
north or north-easterly and tended to gradually veer with altitude, eventually becoming
south-westerly by about FL230. From this point, the winds increased in speed with
altitude towards the tropopause, indicated at being around FL400. The cloud cover is
shown on a visible-light satellite image issued at 13.00 (15.00 CET).


Figure 4: Satellite image of weather and route overlaid on map of the eastern part of Ukraine. Note: the yellow
              cross was added by the meteorological institute to mark the geographic position 48ºN 038º E.
              (Source: Google, TerraMetrics)

Summary of the weather information
The weather forecast indicated that the weather over the eastern part of Ukraine
included thunderstorms. The actual weather was consistent with the forecast.

2.8 Aids to navigation

In addition to the NOTAMs described in paragraph 2.9.4 of this report, the flight crew’s
briefng package contained one company instruction that pertained to Ukrainian
airspace. On 28 April 2014, Malaysia Airlines introduced briefng note MAS 00083/14
regarding the possible loss of Global Positioning System (GPS) signals in Ukrainian
airspace (See Appendix D). Flight Data Recorder data showed that the GPS reception
was normal on flight MH17.

2.9 Air Navigation Service Provider information and other data

2.9.1 General
This Section contains information regarding air traffc management in Ukraine and the
Russian Federation. Information regarding the Russian Federation is included since flight
MH17 was about to enter Russian Federation airspace. Following a short introduction
about the Air Navigation Service Providers, radar data from both Air Navigation Service
Providers and the communications between the air traffc controllers from Ukraine and the



Russian Federation are described. Lastly, information from Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS) aeroplanes is described. Air traffc management, the airspace affected
and associated restrictions are described in detail in Section 6 (part B) of this report.
Licenses and qualifcations of the air traffc controllers were not relevant to the
investigation into the crash. The handling of the flight and the actions after radio contact
with flight MH17 was lost, were considered adequate.
2.9.2 Air traffc management
Ukrainian State Air Traffc Service Enterprise (UkSATSE) is the air navigation service
provider for civil aviation in Ukraine. Air traffc management in Ukraine is the responsibility
of a two-party system, comprising the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Ministry of
Defence. Civil and military air traffc management activities are coordinated by Integrated
Civil Military Air Traffc Management System that functions as a part of UkSATSE.
For the Russian Federation, civil and military air traffc management is the responsibility
of the State Air Traffc Management Corporation (GKOVD). This is a government owned
corporation (a so-called Federal State Unitary Enterprise) which is supervised by the
Federal Agency for Air Transport (ROSAVIATSIA), which in turn comes under the Ministry
of Transport.
2.9.3 Airspace
Ukrainian airspace is made up of fve flight information regions and a network of airways
for the purpose of provision of air traffc control service for en-route flights. Ukraine
applies the ICAO system of flight levels. It was noted that due to the situation in Crimea,
the Ukrainian authorities restricted the use of segments of the routes within Simferopol
FIR from 3 April 2014. At the time of the crash, these restrictions, published in NOTAM
number 0569/14, were in force.
The adjacent sector in the Russian Federation to Dnipropetrovsk Control Sector 4 in
Ukraine has the callsign Rostov Radar.
For flights such as flight MH17, performed under instrument flight rules, the general
principle of standard flight levels (FL) applies: odd thousands of feet (flight levels 310,
330, 350) when on a magnetic track of 0º through 179º and even thousands of feet (flight
levels 300, 320, 340) when on a magnetic track of 180º through 359º. Other flight levels
may be available from air traffc control.
For flight MH17, following airway L980, through the Dnipropetrovsk (UKDV) FIR, on an
eastbound track, odd number standard flight levels were in use, as depicted in its flight
plan for this part of its routing: FL330 and FL350. The airway’s width is 10 NM (5 NM on
either side of the centreline) and extends from FL280 to FL660 vertically.
2.9.4 Airspace restrictions
Both Ukraine and the Russian Federation had issued NOTAMs that restricted access to parts
of their respective airspace up to FL320. On 17 July parts of the airspace in both countries
were restricted up to FL320. At the time of the crash, flight MH17 was flying at FL330 in
unrestricted airspace of the Dnipropetrovsk (UKDV) FIR in the eastern part of Ukraine.



Appendix D contains complete details of all NOTAMs in force at the time of the crash
and provides a short explanation of the structure and content of the NOTAMs. In Part B
of this report the airspace restrictions are described and discussed in more detail.

Summary of the airspace information
At the time of the occurrence, flight MH17 was flying at FL330 in unrestricted
airspace of the Dnipropetrovsk (UKDV) FIR in the eastern part of Ukraine.

2.9.5 Air traffc services surveillance data Introduction
Ground-based data sources were available and obtained for the investigation. Recorded
data from Ukrainian and Russian Federation radar stations was provided to the Dutch
Safety Board.
Air traffc services surveillance data is, in general, obtained from three different sources:
• Primary radar: a system that emits a series of radio waves in pulses that are reflected
off moving targets. Target position and speed are determined by comparison of the
transmitted and the reflected radio waves.
• Secondary surveillance radar: a radar system that interrogates a transponder carried
in an aircraft to provide the air traffc controllers with information such as aircraft type,
position, altitude, flight number and destination. This is known as Mode S.
• Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast data: an aircraft-based technology
whereby the aircraft broadcasts its position, altitude and speed to air traffc control.
The data received by the sensors in the three systems is known as raw data. The raw data
is processed for display on a radar screen for use by air traffc control staff. The raw data
received by the radar sensors, the data processed for display and the actual displayed
data can all be recorded and stored for analysis at a later date. The Standards and
Recommended Practices in ICAO Annex 11 - Air Traffc Services, contain the requirements
for recording and retaining such data. Table 7 summarises the standards for recording and
retaining data in Annex 11. The recordings are to be retained for a minimum of 30 days.
Data type                                                                                                ICAO Annex 11 Reference
Data link data between ATC and aircraft                                                          6.2.2
Data link data between ATC stations
ATC computer data exchanged between ATC stations
Surveillance data (including primary and secondary data) shall be                     6.4.1
saved for incident and accident investigation, Search and Rescue
and ATC system evaluation and training.
Table 7: Summary of Annex 11 air traffc management data recording requirements.



A state that, for certain reasons, does not comply with an ICAO Standard is required to
notify ICAO that a difference between their national regulations and the ICAO Standard
exists. A review of the differences notifed to ICAO by states showed that neither Ukraine
nor the Russian Federation had notifed to ICAO that their national regulations differed
from the Standards promulgated in Annex 11.
Surveillance data from the radar systems of both Ukraine and the Russian Federation was
requested for the investigation. The data requested for the investigation was as follows:
Type                                                                 Ukraine                           Russian Federation
Primary radar data - raw data                            Not available                     Not available

Primary radar data - processed data                   Not available                     Not available

Secondary surveillance radar data - raw data       Available                          Not available

Secondary surveillance radar data -
processed data                                                 Available                           Not available

ADS-B data                                                      Available                           Not available
Other data made available                           Video flm of radar screen         Video flm of radar screen
                                                                 showing processed                  showing processed primary
                                                                 secondary data                       and secondary data
Table 8: Radar data, requested and received.

Appendix I contains various relevant stills from the videos provided by both UkSATSE
and GKOVD.
The reasons why data was not available are discussed in paragraph
On 23 July 2014 (before the MH17 investigation was delegated to the Netherlands),
experts of the international group of investigators and a representative of NBAAI had an
interview with UkSATSE experts. During the interview information from different sources
was provided by UkSATSE. The transferring of Air Traffc Control (ATC) records, including
video and audio records to the experts of the international group of investigators was
laid down in a protocol. See Appendix M. The next day, the investigators transferred the
information received from UkSATSE to the Dutch Safety Board. Surveillance radar data
The radar data for flight MH17 received from both Air Navigation Service Providers,
UkSATSE and GKOVD, is described in this paragraph.
The Ukrainian civil primary radar stations in the area were not functioning at the time of
the crash due to scheduled maintenance. The military primary radar stations were also
not operational. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence stated that this system was not
operational, because there were no Ukrainian military aircraft in the sector through which
flight MH17 flew. UkSATSE provided secondary surveillance radar data in raw data format
and a video containing a replay of the radar screen. Figure 5 shows a sample image of
the replay of the radar screen and an explanation of the data displayed.


Figure 5: Sample Ukrainian radar screen display. (Source: UkSATSE)

The secondary surveillance radar symbol for flight MH17, showed the flight number
‘MAS17’, the flight level ‘330’ and aeroplane type ‘B772H’. The letter ‘H’ stands for
‘heavy’; a term referring to the aeroplane’s wake-turbulence category. The word ‘TAMAK’
indicated the air navigation waypoint to which the aeroplane was cleared. The number
‘491’ indicated the aeroplane’s groundspeed in knots. The line displayed in brown was
airway W633 with air navigation waypoint BELOL displayed.
The data did not contain any failures, emergency codes or other alerts from flight MH17.
The raw data for the last received message and the last target data information from
flight MH17 both have a time stamp of 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET). The processed data
showed that no Mode S data was displayed from 13.20:18 (15.20:18 CET) and the coasting
mode (see Abbreviations and Defnitions) was activated at 13.20:36 (15.20:36 CET). This
is shown by the target symbol changing from a diamond shape (◊) to a hash (#) and by an
arrow next to the target symbol. This can be seen in the images in Appendix I. Due to
processing delays in the system, the change in display was not expected to coincide with
the actual time of the last Mode S transmission; the former may occur later.
The combined primary radar and secondary surveillance radar data from the Russian
Federation’s Air Navigation Service Provider, GKOVD, was provided in the form of a
video containing a radar screen replay. No other data was received. Due to the absence
of raw data, it was not possible to verify the video radar replay. The video of the radar
screen did not show any failures, emergency codes or other alerts of flight MH17. Figure
6 presents a sample image of the replay of the radar screen and an explanation of the
data displayed. This primary radar data was available for an area between about 30 to
60 km to the south of the aeroplane’s fnal position and about 90 km to the north and
east and about 200 km to the west


Figure 6: Sample Russian Federation radar screen display. (Source: GKOVD)

GKOVD data showed flight MH17 as a combined primary and secondary target radar
symbol and label. The data label for the flight ‘MAS17’ showed the callsign in Cyrillic
script ‘MAC17’, the flight level ‘330’ and the aeroplane type ‘Б772H’ with the ‘B’ in Cyrillic
script (meaning Boeing 777-200). The number ‘893’ indicated the aeroplane’s groundspeed in km/h. N.B. This image is not of the same moment as the image in Figure 5.
From the Ukrainian raw radar data it was established that the last secondary radar return
was at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET) with flight MH17 flying straight and level at FL330. The
video radar replay did not show any primary or secondary radar targets in the vicinity of
flight MH17 at that time.
In general, the video replay of the Russian Federation’s combined primary and secondary
radar data was consistent with the Ukrainian radar data. The following observations were
• Flight MH17’s target was detected by primary and secondary radar;
• The video replay data was consistent with the radar data from Ukraine until 13.20:03
(15.20:03 CET);
• At 13.20:47 (15.20:47 CET), there was a ‘jump’ from the previous track; this is due to
the radar re-acquiring the target. In essence, the radar target was coasting and it was
re-acquired north of the coasting track;
• The target data for flight MH17 was lost on the Russian Federation radar screen at
13.20:58 (15.20:58 CET). At that moment the secondary radar label changed to ‘xxxx’;
• The MH17 label on the radar screen continued to be visible as a coasting secondary
radar target until 13.22:10 (15.22:10 CET) and until 13.25:57 (15.25:57 CET) as a primary
radar target;
• A second, primary, target was visible near the MH17 labelled target on two occasions.
Once between 13.20:47 - 13.21:08 and again between 13.21:18 - 13.25:57 (15.20:47 -
15.21:08 and 15.21:18 - 15.25:57 CET).



Regarding other aeroplanes in the vicinity, the surveillance data showed that three other
aeroplanes flew through the same sector as flight MH17 at around the time of the crash,
see Figure 7. These three aeroplanes were operating flights for Air India*9 (flight AIC113),
EVA Air (flight EVA88) and Singapore Airlines (flight SIN351). Two of these flights were
cruising eastbound and one flight was cruising westbound. All flights were under the
control of Dnipro Radar. At 13.20 (15.20 CET), the distance between flight MH17 and the
closest of the three aeroplanes was 33 km.
Figure 7: Image of the Dnipropetrovsk FIR, Sectors 2 and 4, and the flown (black line) and intended (thin black
              line) route of flight MH17. The yellow line represents the centre of airway L980. Also the aeroplane
              type and flight level of the three aeroplanes flying in the same area are shown. The image depicts
              the situation at 13.20 (15.20 CET). (Source: Google, Landsat)

Summary of the radar data
• The raw UkSATSE surveillance radar data and the GKOVD radar screen video
replay both showed flight MH17 on a straight and level flight on FL330 until
13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET).
• The GKOVD radar screen showed flight MH17 after 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET) and
also showed primary returns in the vicinity of the MH17 target up to 13.25:57
(15.25:57 CET).
• According to radar data three commercial aeroplanes were in the same area as
flight MH17 at the time of the occurrence. Two aeroplanes were flying eastbound
through the airspace and one was flying westbound. All aeroplanes were under
the control of Dnipro Radar. At 13.20 (15.20 CET), the distance between flight
MH17 and the closest of the three other aeroplanes was 33 km.

*9 In the Preliminary Report, Figure 2 showed the relative positions of other traffc. Air India flight AIC113 was
erroneously shown as an Airbus A330 and not as a Boeing 787.


стр.42 Recording of surveillance radar data
Both Ukraine and the Russian Federation were requested to provide their surveillance
radar data of flight MH17. Not all the requested information was provided (see paragraph
The Russian Federation did not provide the radar data stating that no radar data was
saved, but instead provided the radar screen video replay, which showed combined
surveillance primary and secondary radar. In the absence of the underlying radar data
(so-called raw data), the video information could not be verifed. For analysis, raw data is
preferred to processed data. The screenshots and video flms made of the data, as
displayed to the controller, whilst of use, were the least preferred media for analysis.
In accordance with ICAO Annex 11 - Air Traffc Services, paragraph 6.4.1 (Automatic
recording of surveillance data) states are required to automatically record data from
primary and secondary surveillance radar equipment systems for use in accident and
incident investigations, search and rescue, and air traffc control and surveillance systems
evaluation and training. These recordings shall be retained for a period of at least thirty
days, and for accident and incident investigation for a longer period until it is evident
that the recordings will no longer be required.
The Federal Air Transport Agency of the Russian Federation stated that because the
crash had occurred outside Russian Federation territory, no radar data was saved, nor
was it required to be saved by national requirements. The Federal Air Transport Agency
confrmed that if the event had occurred in Russian Federation territory, the recorded
radar data would have been saved in accordance with Russian Federation requirements.
The national requirements for radar data recording management in the Russian
Federation are included in the following documents:
• Federal Aviation Regulations ‘CNS and aeronautical telecommunications’, as endorsed
by Federal Aviation Service Decree Number 115, dated 26 November 2007;
• Federal Aviation Regulations ‘ATM in the Russian Federation’, as endorsed by Ministry
of Transport Decree Number 293, dated 25 November 2011.
The regulation, ‘CNS and aeronautical telecommunications’, states that information that
is supplied through aeronautical telecommunication networks and radar data sources to
the displays installed at the working positions of air traffc controllers should be recorded
by special equipment.
This is further clarifed in the regulation, ‘ATM in the Russian Federation’, in terms of the
set of recorded information and their storage time. The regulation states that radio
communications between air traffc control units and flight crew members, air traffc
controller conversations, pre-flight inspections, weather information transferred by radio,
radar and flight plan information should be recorded by special equipment. In addition,
the recorded data should be stored for 14 days using analogue media and for 30 days
when using digital media.



The information provided by the Russian Federation does not mention an exception to
the requirement to store radar data when that data relates to an area outside the Russian
Federation territory. When a state cannot, or will not, follow the provisions of an ICAO
standard, ICAO requires that the difference between the national version of a specifc
standard and ICAO’s text be reported to ICAO. The obligation to make such a notifcation
was imposed by Article 38 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. The Russian
Federation has not fled a difference to ICAO Annex 11 paragraph 6.4.1.
2.9.6 Communications
A transcript of the communications between flight MH17, other traffc in the area and air
traffc controllers, and of communication between air traffc controllers at Dnipro and
Rostov air traffc control centres is contained in Appendix G to this report. Below is a
summary of the communication.
The flight crew of flight MH17 made initial radio contact with Dnipro Radar (Sector 2) at
12.53:29 (14.53:29 CET) and reported being at FL330. Dnipro Radar (Sector 2) requested
the flight to climb to FL350 but the flight crew replied that they were unable to do so. Six
minutes later, MH17’s flight crew asked for a clearance to deviate 20 NM to the left ‘due
to weather’; this request was approved. The flight crew next asked to climb to FL340.
Dnipro Radar responded that FL340 was not available at the time.
At 13.07:46 (15.07:46 CET) Dnipro Radar (Sector 2) transferred the flight to Dnipro Radar
(Sector 4). Contact with this station was established at 13.08:00 (15.08:00 CET).
After coordinating by telephone with air traffc control in the next sector (Rostov Control,
in the Russian Federation), which the aeroplane was about to enter, flight MH17 was
cleared at 13.19:49 (15.19:49 CET) to proceed direct to air navigation waypoint RND. This
message was confrmed by the flight crew between 13.19:56 and 13.19:59 (15.19:56 and
15.19:59 CET).
At 13.20:00 (15.20:00 CET) Dnipro Radar (Sector 4) further advised flight MH17 to expect
a further clearance to fly direct to air navigation waypoint TIKNA after passing waypoint
RND. This message was not acknowledged by flight MH17. From this time until 13.35:50
(15.35:50 CET) Dnipro Radar (Sector 4) called flight MH17 repeatedly, and also contacted
Rostov Control, but no response from MH17 was received. The flight crew of the nearby
aeroplane, Singapore Airlines flight 351, en-route from Copenhagen to Singapore, was
asked if they could see flight MH17 either visually or on the Airborne Collision and
Avoidance System display. The flight crew of Singapore Airlines flight 351 answered that
they could not see flight MH17. Singapore Airlines flight 351 also tried, without success,
to contact flight MH17 by radio on the emergency frequency 121.5 MHz. Following the
transmission at 13.20:00 (15.20:00 CET), the last radio transmissions from Dnipro Radar
(Sector 4) to flight MH17 were ten unanswered calls between 13.26 (15.26 CET) and 13.35
(15.35 CET).
No distress messages from flight MH17 were received by air traffc control.



Summary of the radio communications
• The last radio transmission made by flight MH17 began at 13.19:56 (15.19:56 CET)
and ended at 13.19:59 (15.19:59 CET).
• The last radio transmissions made by Dnipropetrovsk air traffc control centre
(Dnipro Radar) to flight MH17 began at 13.20:00 (15.20:00 CET) and ended at
13.35:50 (15.35:50 CET). The flight crew did not respond to these transmissions.
• No distress messages from flight MH17 were received by air traffc control.

2.9.7 Airborne Warning and Control System aeroplanes
Two NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aeroplanes conducted
missions in NATO airspace over Poland and Romania on 17 July 2014.
In correspondence with the Dutch Safety Board, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander
Europe stated that the AWACS aeroplanes detected flight MH17 during its flight but the
aeroplane ‘had flown beyond NATO AWACS coverage well before it crashed’. He noted
that, following a request from the Dutch Safety Board, NATO specialists had re-analysed
the data that had been collected by the AWACS aeroplanes on 17 July but that ‘there is
no data from the AWACS which would be relevant to the investigation of the crash.
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe does not hold any other radar or other
AWACS data relevant to MH17’.

Summary of the information regarding AWACS aeroplanes
NATO AWACS aeroplanes did not have information pertinent to the investigation.

2.10 Aerodrome information

Not applicable to this investigation.

2.11 Flight recorders, satellite and other data

2.11.1 Recovery of Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder
The Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder were not recovered by the Annex 13
investigation team. Individuals unknown to the investigation team removed the two flight
recorders from the wreckage area. On 21 July 2014, the recorders were handed over to a
Malaysian offcial in Donetsk, Ukraine by representatives of the armed group present in
the area. On 22 July 2014, the recorders were handed over to the Dutch Safety Board in
Kyiv, Ukraine. Appendix H contains further information on the Cockpit Voice Recorder and
the Flight Data Recorder readouts and data analysis.



Both flight recorders had two sets of text labels, one in Cyrillic text and one in French. The
manufacturer’s text labels were in French and, on the other side of the recorder, in English.
The other text label was in Cyrillic text on the recorder unit and read ‘The Prosecutor
General’s Offce of the Donetsk People’s Republic’. These text labels were not added by
the Dutch Safety Board, but were on both data recorders when they were handed over to
the Safety Board.
No evidence or indications of manipulation of the flight recorders were found.
2.11.2 Cockpit Voice Recorder
The housing of the Cockpit Voice Recorder (Figure 8) was damaged. The model and
serial numbers were unreadable on the data plate, but the serial number 1366, was
stamped on the underside of the chassis. The serial number 1366 was also provided by
Malaysia Airlines. The external damage to the Cockpit Voice Recorder was consistent
with impact damage; however, the internal memory module was intact. The Cockpit
Voice Recorder was successfully downloaded and contained valid data from the flight.
Figure 8: Cockpit Voice Recorder. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)
The replay of the communications recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder matched air
traffc control communications with flight MH17 (see Appendix G). The audio recording
indicated that besides the flight crew, a cabin crew member was in the cockpit. The
audio recording included the internal cockpit flight crew communication which contained
no indication that there was anything unusual with the flight. The Cockpit Voice Recorder
audio recording ended abruptly at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET). A replay of the Cockpit Voice
Recorder audio recording did not identify any aeroplane aural warnings or alerts of
system malfunctions. One of the four recorded audio channels, the cockpit area
microphone, was of poor sound quality. The relevant parts of the Cockpit Voice Recorder
audio recording were integrated with the air traffc control transcript in Appendix G of
this report.
At the end of the recording, two sound peaks were identifed on the last 20 milliseconds
of the recording. A graphic representation of the two sound peaks for the four Cockpit
Voice Recorder microphones is shown in Figure 9.


Figure 9: Sound peaks recorded at the end of the CVR recording. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

Текст рис.9

Microphone P2 (First Offcer)
Cockpit Area Microphone (CAM)
Observer Microphone (OBS)
Microphone P1 (Captain)

The time period shown on each image is 4 milliseconds. The sound identifed as ‘peak 1’
was only recorded on the cockpit area microphone (CAM).
2.11.3 Flight Data Recorder
The Flight Data Recorder (Figure 10) was manufactured by Allied Signal, model number
980-4700-003 and serial number 2196. The serial number matched the details provided
by Malaysia Airlines. The recorder that was given to the Dutch Safety Board had no
Underwater Locator Beacon attached.
The exterior of the flight data recorder was slightly damaged, but the internal memory
module was intact. The external damage on the Flight Data Recorder and the loss of the
underwater locator beacon was consistent with impact damage. The Flight Data Recorder,
designed so that a minimum of the last 25 hours of operational data is retained on the
recording medium, was successfully downloaded and contained valid data from flight MH17.


Figure 10: Flight data recorder without Underwater Locator Beacon. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

The data *10 on the Flight Data Recorder showed that the aeroplane was flying at 33,000 feet,
on a constant displayed heading of 115° and at a constant computed airspeed of
293 knots.*11 The recording had stopped abruptly at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET). The Flight
Data Recorder showed that the aeroplane’s position at 13.20:02 (15.20:02 CET) was
48.12715 N 38.52630538 E.
No aeroplane or engine system warnings or cautions were found on the recorded data.
For engine parameters and pressure cabin parameters used in the investigation, see
Appendix H.

Summary of the data recorder information
• Both the Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder were recovered and
both contained recordings that could be used. Both recordings ended abruptly
at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET).
• No aural alerts or warnings of aeroplane system malfunctions were heard on the
Cockpit Voice Recorder. The communication between the flight crew members
gave no indication of any malfunction or emergency prior to the end of the flight
recorder recordings.
• Two peaks of sound were identifed on the last 20 milliseconds of the Cockpit
Voice Recorder recording.
• No technical malfunctions or warnings in relation to flight MH17 were found on
Flight Data Recorder data.
• The engine parameters were consistent with normal operation during the flight.
No engine or aeroplane system warnings or cautions were detected.

*10 Additional data extracted from the Flight Data Recorder is produced in Appendix H.
*11 The recorded groundspeed was 494 knots or 914 kilometres per hour



2.11.4 Quick Access Recorder
The aeroplane was equipped with a Quick Access Recorder (QAR). This unit, installed in
the rear part of the aeroplane, records similar data to the Flight Data Recorder and is, as
its name suggests, easily accessible for, among other things, maintenance purposes. The
QAR was not recovered.
2.11.5 Emergency Locator Transmitters
The aeroplane was equipped with two Emergency Locator Transmitters. One Emergency
Locator Transmitter was a fxed unit mounted in the aeroplane (Model ADT 406 AF) and
the other unit was a portable unit to be used during emergency evacuations (Model ADT
406 AP). The Emergency Locator Transmitters operate on three frequencies: 406 MHz,
243 MHz and 121.5 MHz. The Emergency Locator Transmitters were powered by highenergy lithium batteries and are capable of transmitting signals for at least 60 hours.
Each Emergency Locator Transmitter was uniquely identifable by a hexadecimal code
embedded into the Emergency Locator Transmitter software. More information on the
Emergency Locator Transmitter is described in Appendix H.
The fxed Emergency Locator Transmitter, located in the aft section of the aeroplane,
was connected to the cockpit remote control panel for manual activation. The Emergency
Locator Transmitter was connected to an antenna on top of the fuselage and it also had a
back-up antenna.
The portable Emergency Locator Transmitter was located in a stowage area to the right
of the forward passenger door 1R. The portable Emergency Locator Transmitter had only
a manual activation system. It was not recovered. It had not been activated, because no
data was found to have been received by the ground stations.
The fxed Emergency Locator Transmitter can be activated in one of three ways,
automatically, manually using a switch in the cockpit or manually using a switch on the
Emergency Locator Transmitter unit. The Emergency Locator Transmitter system logic is
designed to transmit the frst encoded signal after 30 seconds when automatically
activated and after 50 seconds when manually activated. The automatic activation is
based on a G-Switch in accordance with the EUROCAE ED-62 standard. The threshold
for activation is 2.0 to 2.6 g acceleration directed in the direction of flight of the aeroplane.
Normal turbulence during flight will not activate the Emergency Locator Transmitter.



Emergency Locator Transmitter detection
After the Emergency Locator Transmitter has been activated, the detection and
localisation process has two stages. Firstly, the Emergency Locator Transmitter
emergency signal is picked up by at least one of the six satellites in a geosynchronous
orbit that contain Emergency Locator Transmitter reception equipment. These signals
are then relayed to one or more of 31 ground stations. Secondly, when a low-earth
orbit satellite (fve such satellites have Emergency Locator Transmitter signal detection
equipment) passes overhead the Emergency Locator Transmitter, its signal is used to
calculate the position of the Emergency Locator Transmitter. Again, this information
is relayed to ground stations. This second detection may have a delay, as more than
one low-earth orbit satellite pass may be required to determine the Emergency
Locator Transmitter’s position. As the location determination process is done on the
basis of the Doppler shift principle, two possible locations are generated and by
correlation of subsequent satellite passes one of the two locations is eliminated.

On 10 July 2014, a test signal during maintenance from the fxed Emergency Locator
Transmitter was detected by a satellite and relayed to three ground stations. On 17 July,
fve ground stations received an Emergency Locator Transmitter signal which had been
relayed by two satellites between 13.20:35 and 13.20:36 (15.20:35 and 15.20:36 CET).
This signal was active until 11.48:06 (13.48:06 CET) on 18 July.*12 The locations of the fxed
Emergency Locator Transmitter as transmitted by the satellites showed that the
Emergency Locator Transmitter was located, up to the moment that transmissions ended,
in wreckage site 4. This was the site that contained, among other parts, the fuselage
between the wing and the tail section (see Section 2.12).
The fxed Emergency Locator Transmitter was not recovered by the investigation team,
although the fuselage structure at the rear of the aeroplane onto which the fxed
Emergency Locator Transmitter was mounted was recovered. Figure 11 shows the typical
installation of a fxed Emergency Locator Transmitter in a Boeing 777 (left) and the panel
recovered from the wreckage of flight MH17 where the fxed Emergency Locator
Transmitter was mounted (right).
*12 Appendix H provides more information on the times of the receipt of the Emergency Locator Transmitter signal


Figure 11: Fixed ELT location installed in a Boeing 777 (left), panel recovered from 9M-MRD with no insulation
                material or ELT attached (right). (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

Summary of the data from the Emergency Locator Transmitters
• The aeroplane was equipped with two Emergency Locator Transmitters, one
fxed and one portable. Neither Emergency Locator Transmitter was recovered.
• The fxed Emergency Locator Transmitter was automatically activated and its
signal was detected at 13.20:35 - 13.20:36 (15.20:35 - 15.20:36 CET). No signal
was detected from the portable Emergency Locator Transmitter.
• The fxed Emergency Locator Transmitter transmitted from a location in wreckage
site 4 until 11.48:06 (13.48:06 CET) on 18 July 2014.

2.11.6 Other aeroplane data
Two other recorded data sources that were obtained for the investigation were:
• Data transmitted by Very High Frequency (VHF) radio, and
• Data transmitted by Satellite Communication (SATCOM).
The SATCOM data was of interest to the investigation because, unlike VHF radio,
SATCOM interrogates the aeroplane’s system if no data is exchanged for more than
about 15 minutes. Satellite Communication
SATCOM is a radio system that uses a constellation of satellites used to transmit voice
and data (see explanation below). Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting
System (ACARS) (see Abbreviations and Defnitions) can make use of SATCOM to transmit
data to ground stations. The SATCOM system used by the aeroplane was linked to the
Inmarsat network.



SATCOM and Inmarsat
The Satellite Communication system uses aircraft earth stations to provide the aircraft
interface to the Inmarsat satellites. Inmarsat is a provider of global mobile satellite
communications services, delivering voice and high-speed data communications on
land, at sea and in the air. Inmarsat operates several satellites in geosynchronous orbit.
Four satellites cover the oceans and the three major landmasses. Their combined footprints provide worldwide communications coverage except in the extreme Polar
Regions. Inmarsat also has a terrestrial network to receive satellite messages, so-called
land earth station operators. One of these stations is located in Burum, the
Netherlands. It was this station that received data from flight MH17, prior to relaying
the data further on the Inmarsat ground network.

SATCOM transmissions were recorded as having taken place throughout the flight at
irregular intervals between 10.11 (12.11 CET) and 13.08 (15.08 CET). The transmissions
were relayed via two satellites. The last transmission from flight MH17 by SATCOM was
between 13.07:26 and 13.08:51 (15.07:26 and 15.08:51 CET). The ground station had an
inactivity timer. After approximately 15 minutes the ground station checked to see if the
aeroplane terminal was still operating by sending a message to the system: a so-called
Log-on Interrogation. As the ground station did not receive a reply from flight MH17, the
Log-on Interrogation message was sent two more times; again without reply. The ground
station’s logic then considered that the aeroplane’s reception terminal was not operating.
This occurred at 13.21:26 (15.21:26 CET), 14 minutes after the previous transmission
commenced. Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System
The following Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS)
messages were sent/received on 17 July 2014 to and from the aeroplane:
• load sheet and mass and balance information;
• Auxiliary Power Unit report;
• engine data (take-off and climb);
• position reports;
• flight route information;
• communication status messages (uplink messages).
The ACARS data showed a total fuel quantity of 96,400 kg. This is 100 kg less than is
recorded on the technical log and is considered to be a small inconsistency between the
different measuring means. The maximum fuel capacity of the aeroplane type, according
to Boeing, was 135,224 kg. The margin between the actual take-off mass of 278,691 kg
and the aeroplane’s maximum take-off mass of 286,897 kg was 8,206 kg.
According to the aeroplane’s load sheet 86,900 kg of fuel was required as trip fuel for the
flight. Trip fuel is defned as being the fuel quantity required for the period of the flight
from take-off to landing. It excludes fuel required for taxi-out and taxi-in, but includes the
fuel required for known or expected weather conditions or air traffc control restrictions.



The fuel planned to be remaining on landing at Kuala Lumpur was 8,800 kg. ACARS data
showed that the engines were consuming an average of 8,758 kg of fuel per hour in the
two hours of cruise flight for which ACARS reports were available. Flight Data Recorder
data showed that the fuel on board immediately prior to the end of the recording was
70,100 kg.
The timing and content of several messages could be verifed by cross reference of other
sources; e.g. Rolls-Royce and Inmarsat. The frst ACARS message from the aeroplane on
17 July was transmitted at 09.24 (11.24 CET) from Schiphol.
At 09.56:35 (11.56:35 CET), an ACARS transmission of the load sheet was recorded. The
Rolls-Royce engine take-off and climb reports for the Engine Health Monitoring
programme were sent to Malaysia Airlines at 10.31:20 (12.31:20 CET) and 10.48:32,
(12.48:32 CET), respectively.

Engine Health Monitoring
Engine Health Monitoring is a system that intermittently records a number of engine
parameters for the purpose of maintenance trend monitoring of the engine’s
performance. More details on Engine Health Monitoring are included in Appendix J.

Various position reports, generated between take-off at Schiphol and 13.12 (15.12 CET),
were transmitted by ACARS. ACARS Message number 50868018 showed that at 12.57:32
(14.57:32 CET), the last position report was sent.
ACARS Message number 50868202 was the last SATCOM transmission and it was
recorded at 13.07 (15.07 CET). The fnal ACARS VHF radio transmission was, according to
the ACARS log, made at 13.12 (15.12 CET). Later messages sent from the ground to the
aeroplane were not received by the aeroplane. These messages were stored by Malaysia
Airlines and were available to the investigation.

Summary of the other recorded data
None of the recorded data sources indicated that electrical power was available on
flight MH17 after 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET).

2.12 Wreckage and impact information

The following paragraphs describe the geographic area of the crash and wreckage as it
was found. Details are provided on the location, identifcation and observed damage of
the wreckage pieces



2.12.1 Crash area access
Under escort of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), air
accident investigators from Ukraine and Malaysia, the Australian Federal Police and
journalists had access to the crash area in the days following the crash. During these
visits, the wreckage was photographed extensively and showed the locations mostly
undisturbed. The information gathered was shared with the Dutch Safety Board.
Due to the security situation within the geographic area of the crash, the Dutch Safety
Board was unable to start the collection and preservation of the wreckage directly after
Ukraine had delegated the investigation to the Netherlands.
It was not until 4 November 2014 that the Dutch Safety Board was able to visit the various
locations where the wreckage was located, under the protection of the Dutch Ministry of
Defense’s Recovery Mission. Starting on 16 November, after receiving permission from
local authorities, wreckage parts were collected during six days and transported to the
Netherlands for the investigation and partial reconstruction of the aeroplane. It was
necessary to cut some parts into smaller pieces for transport.
It was not until 20 March 2015 that it was possible to gain access to the site north-west of
the village of Petropavlivka for the frst time. Between 19 April and 2 May, pieces of
wreckage that had been collected by local residents were recovered.
It should be noted that many pieces of the wreckage were not physically examined by
the Dutch Safety Board until four months after the crash. During this period some parts
were removed, therefore it was not possible to retrieve all wreckage pieces. Wherever
possible, the photographs taken immediately after the crash were used in conjunction
with the wreckage found.
2.12.2 General distribution and description of the wreckage
The wreckage parts of the aeroplane were identifed within an area of approximately
50 km2. Most of the wreckage was located on six sites within this area. The majority of
the wreckage was located in three of these sites to the south-west of the village of
Hrabove. Figure 12 shows the geographic location of the six wreckage sites. Each
wreckage site has an associated colour. The distribution of wreckage pieces over a large
area indicates an in-flight break-up.


Figure 12: Overview of wreckage area showing the six smaller sites. (Source of satellite images: Google Earth/
                Digital Globe)
Table 9 gives an overview of the wreckage sites that are described in this paragraph.
Outside of the six specifed sites, no items of note were identifed. Between sites 3 and
4, personal belongings, as well as small pieces of wreckage originating from the aft side
of the aeroplane were found.
Table 9: Description of wreckage sites in this report.

текст таб.9

1 Yellow Farm land                                                                                       
2 Orange Residential area of Petropavlivka                                                     
3 Red Farm land south of the village of Rozsypne                                            
4 Green A built-up area partially surrounded by a forest in a gully                    
5 Blue Farm land separated by an elevated road                                             
6 Purple Farm land separated by an elevated road southwest of the village of Hrabove
0 Black Parts of wreckage of which the initial location could not be verifed        



Figure 13 shows the origin of the wreckage pieces that were recovered from the various
wreckage sites by the Dutch Safety Board.
Figure 13: Side view left (top) and right (bottom). Identifcation of wreckage retrieved from the wreckage sites.
                The retrieved parts of the wings, engines and horizontal stabilizers, found in sites 5 and 6, are not
                shown in this image, but are described in the following paragraphs. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

As a result of shelling within the geographic area of the crash, the Dutch Safety Board
was not able to retrieve all identifed wreckage pieces during the recovery mission in
November 2014. The site in which these wreckage pieces were located was either not
accessible to the Dutch Safety Board or the pieces were no longer present at their impact
location. Table 10 indicates the wreckage pieces not able to be recovered.
Wreckage part                                                                   Section                  Location
Cockpit fuselage top section                                                41                         Site 1
Fuselage top above business class (two pieces)                     41                         Site 1
Fuselage left hand side with positive pressure relief valves     43                         Site 1
Forward section passenger floor (business class)                   41                         Site 2
Fuselage with windows and door frame of door 1L                 41                         Site 2
Fuselage with door frame of door 1R and surrounding fuselage 41                       Site 2
Table 10: Wreckage parts not able to be recovered



The following paragraphs provide, per wreckage site, a detailed description of the
wreckage parts, relevant for the analysis. In the description of the pieces of wreckage of
the aeroplane, Boeing references such as sections and stations (STA) are used. Information
on these two means of reference is provided in the list of Abbreviations and Defnitions. Wreckage site 1 (yellow)
This site of approximately 3 km2, is located 8.8 km west of the village of Hrabove. Parts of
wreckage were distributed over three agricultural felds which were separated by roads
and vegetation. No fre nor infrastructure damage was observed on this site. An overview
of the wreckage sites 1, 2 and 3 and the locations of the wreckage pieces is depicted in
Figure 14.
Figure 14: Overview of wreckage sites 1, 2 and 3 and the locations of the wreckage pieces. (Source: Dutch
                Safety Board)

текст рис.14

Sites 1, 2 and 3
Residential area
Wreckage location
Site 1
1. Upper left hand cockpit fuselage*
2. Upper part fuselage above business
class (forward)*
3. Upper part fuselage above business
class (aft)*
4. Right hand fuselage with partial text
5. Left hand fuselage with positive
pressure relief valves*
Site 2
6. Left hand fuselage with door frame of
door 1L*
7. Right hand fuselage with door frame of
door 1R*
8. Left hand fuselage with door frame of
door 2L
9. Lower fuselage with forward cargo
10. Right hand fuselage with door 2R
11. Left engine intake ring
12. Cockpit fuselage
13. Forward section passenger floor,
business class
Site 3
14. Cockpit, including forward bulkhead,
forward cargo hold, nose gear wheel
bay, avionics
* Parts not retrieved by the Dutch Safety

The numbers in brackets following the titles below correspond with the locations in
Figure 14.
Upper left hand cockpit fuselage (1)
A portion of the cockpit fuselage’s top section (STA236.5 to STA332.5) was located in the
south-western region of site 1 (Figure 15). This part was not recovered. The fuselage skin



showed evidence of perforation from the outside. The aft side of the fuselage skin was
bent upwards and a number of formers and stringers were missing from the fuselage.
The upper side of the fuselage showed traces of soot.
Figure 15: Upper left hand cockpit fuselage. (Source: DCA Malaysia)

Upper parts of fuselage above the business class (2 and 3)
The upper side of the forward fuselage (section 41), above the business class, was found
in two pieces. The distance between the two pieces of fuselage was approximately
150 metres.
The foremost part of the upper fuselage (STA357.25 to STA529) was found in the southern
region of site 1. The inner portion of the fuselage was facing upwards and the Traffc
Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) antenna module was visible. A number of
formers and stringers were partly detached from the fuselage and others were broken.
The aft portion of the upper fuselage (STA529 to STA655) was located in the south of
site 1. The exterior side of the fuselage was facing upwards and showed evidence of
perforation from the outside. The upper transponder antenna, attached to the outside of
the fuselage, showed no signs of damage.
The upper parts of the fuselage above the business class were no longer present at the
time of the recovery mission.



Right hand fuselage with partial text ‘Malaysia’ (4)
A wreckage piece with a partial print of the text ‘Malaysia’ belonging to section 43 and
section 45 (STA846 to STA1032) on the right hand side of the aeroplane was located on
the south-eastern side of site 1. The upper portion of the fuselage had sheared just
above the text and the letter ‘M’ on the left hand side of the wreckage piece appeared
to be missing. All edges showed clear shears. Halfway, the fuselage was partially sheared
from top to bottom. Formers and stringers were no longer attached to the fuselage.
Left hand fuselage with positive pressure relief valves (5)
The part of the fuselage containing the two positive pressure relief valves was found in
the south of site 1. The fuselage part of the left hand side of the aeroplane (STA529 to
STA655), also contained a static port and six passenger windows. Photographic evidence
showed that both positive pressure relief valves were found in a closed position. The
upper side of the fuselage was sheared just above the window frames. This wreckage
piece was no longer present at the time of the recovery mission.
Cockpit and cabin furnishing
In site 1, pieces of cockpit and cabin furnishing, including the Captain’s charts folder and
pieces of a galley trolley, were found. A single overhead luggage bin, belonging to row
11 JK was found on the eastern region of the site. The surrounding overhead luggage
compartments were missing.
Fragments of two cargo containers with registration AKE3951MH and AKE3540MH were
identifed on site 1. In total six textile rolls each with a length of approximately 100 metres
were located in the northern region of site 1. These rolls were identifed as being part of
the cargo. The cargo manifest indicated that in the forward- and aft cargo compartment
of the aeroplane, two unit load devices, each carrying 10 textile rolls, had been loaded.
These pieces of cargo were used as part of the trajectory analysis in paragraph 3.11.7. Wreckage site 2 (orange)
This site of approximately 2.5 km2, covers a large part of the village of Petropavlivka and
is located 8 km west of Hrabove. Several structures in the village of Petropavlivka were
damaged by debris. An overview of the wreckage site and the location of the wreckage
pieces is depicted in Figure 14.
Left hand fuselage with door frame of door 1L (6)
The door frame of door 1L (STA309.5 to STA529) with surrounding fuselage was located
in the northern region of site 2. The inner structure of the fuselage was facing upwards
and the frames of six passenger windows were visible. Photographic evidence showed
traces of soot on the bottom portion of the fuselage and the absences of the upper door
sill. This wreckage piece was not recovered from the wreckage site.
Cockpit and cabin furnishing were found nearby the fuselage. However, the initial impact
location of this furnishing on the ground could not be verifed due to the absence of
photographic and video evidence. It is of note that as time went by, pieces of wreckage
were collected by the residents of Petropavlivka.



Right hand fuselage with door frame of door 1R (7)
The fuselage near door 1R (STA276.5 to STA345) was located parallel to a dirt road in the
western region of site 2. The exterior side of the fuselage was facing upwards and a
portion of the door frame of door 1R was visible. This wreckage piece was no longer
present at the time of the recovery mission.
Left hand fuselage with doorframe of door 2L (8)
The fuselage near door 2L (STA655 to STA930) was found in a yard in the north-eastern
region of area 2. The exterior side of the fuselage was facing upwards and the upper side
of the fuselage was folded in longitudinal direction. The fuselage contained three
windows. The upper portion of the fuselage contained the casing of the anti-collision
light. A partial letter (‘M’) of the text ‘Malaysia’ was visible.
Lower fuselage with forward cargo floor (9)
Pieces of the cargo floor (STA634 to STA888) were found in Petropavlivka, in the centre
of site 2. The skin on the right hand side of the fuselage had sheared just above the
cargo floor and the cargo rails itself were visible. The fuselage was relatively intact, aside
from shear damage. Two static ports were visible on the right hand side of the fuselage.
Cracks were observed in the transverse direction on the cargo floor.
The left nose wheel landing gear door and the casing of the right negative pressure relief
vent were found near the cargo floor.
Right hand fuselage with door 2R (10)
The fuselage containing door 2R was identifed in the eastern region of site 2. The
fuselage surrounding door 2R had sheared above the text ‘sia’ near STA655 on the left
side and STA888 on the right side.
The door was positioned in the door frame and the fuselage had sheared below the
frame of the left negative pressure relief valve. The left negative pressure relief valve was
attached to the upper portion of the frame and the valve was pinned in its open position
between the casing and the ground. Neither the frame nor the door of the right negative
pressure relieve valve were found at site 2.
The negative pressure relief valve itself was cracked over the half of its vertical length.
The valve showed damage consistent with the valve being fully opened and striking the
adjacent rib (Figure 16).

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