MH17: ?

, ! .


» MH17: ? »  DSB JIT » : DSB


: DSB

1 13 13

1

18.07.14
Dutch Safety Board sends team to Ukraine to investigate crash
The Dutch Safety Board is shocked by the air disaster in Ukraine and thoughts are with the next of kin of those on board. The Board will be doing all it can to provide next of kin with as much information as possible about the disaster. Therefore the Board will be travelling to Ukraine at the earliest opportunity to take part in the international investigation into the disaster, which occurred in the Donetsk region.

The Dutch Safety Board was formally informed on the air disaster by its Ukrainian counterpart (NBAAI) at around 8am this morning. The NBAAI also requested the Dutch Safety Board to participate in the international investigation. According to international (ICAO) regulations, the State in which the crash took place is responsible for taking the lead in investigating the circumstances of the incident. In response to Ukraine's request, the Dutch Safety Board will be sending a team of investigators to take part in the international investigation. Contact will also be sought with the relevant authorities for retrieving the data stored on the black boxes. The Dutch Safety Board would like to stress the importance of carrying out a full and thorough investigation into the disaster. Given the large number of Dutch fatalities, the Board will contribute in any way it can to the investigation into the cause of the crash.

Internal investigation
The international investigation is likely to direct its full focus on the cause of the crash and how it unfolded. The Dutch Safety Board will, however, also be looking at underlying procedures. As well as taking part in the international investigation, the Board will therefore be launching an investigation into the decision-making processes around flight routes and the availability of passenger lists.

Investigation process
The Boards investigators are currently en route to the site of the crash. The investigation into the decision-making processes around flight routes and the availability of passenger lists will be carried out independently by the Dutch Safety Board.



2

23.07.14

Data Cockpit Voice Recorder MH17 downloaded
On Tuesday 22 July 2014 at 22:00 in Kiev, Ukraine, the flight data and cockpit voice recorders (the 'black boxes') from the Malaysian Airlines flight 17 were taken into custody by the Dutch ambassador and a team of investigators led by the Dutch Safety Board. The Dutch Safety Board requested that the Air Accident Investigation Branch of the United Kingdom (AAIB) perform the data download from both the recorders. The recorders were transported to the AAIB's laboratory at Farnborough, arriving 23rd July in the early morning.

An international team of investigators has conducted a thorough examination of the Cockpit Voice Recorder. The Cockpit Voice Recorder was damaged but the memory module was intact. Furthermore no evidence or indications of manipulation of the Cockpit Voice Recorder was found. Following the examination,  the Cockpit Voice Recorder data was successfully downloaded and contained valid data from the  flight. The downloaded data have to be further analysed and investigated.

A thorough analysis  of the information obtained will take time, the results of this will be included in the investigation. Tomorrow the team will start the examination of the Flight Data Recorder. This will show whether this recorder also contains relevant information, in which case the data from both recorders will be combined.



23.07.14

Dutch Safety Board heads investigation: investigation effort in full swing, black boxes currently being read out
The Dutch Safety Board took over formal responsibility for the air crash investigation from Ukraine yesterday evening. The two black boxes have since arrived in the United Kingdom, where they are currently being read out and analysed by a team of international specialists. The on-site investigation in Ukraine is currently in full swing. Although investigators still do not have safe access to the crash site, work to gather and analyse data from various sources is underway in both Kiev and the Netherlands.

The first priorities will be to gather information from the crash site, analyse the black boxes and coordinate the international team. Ultimately, the air crash investigation should offer victims families and the international community a clear and comprehensive overview of the causes and course of the crash.

With the Dutch Safety Board now heading the investigation, the international investigation team will have more freedom to go about its tasks unhindered. The Dutch Safety Board is also responsible for coordinating all participating investigators and investigation teams from the countries involved (Ukraine, Malaysia, Australia, Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia) and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The international team currently consists of 24 investigators. A total of four Dutch Safety Board investigators are currently operating in Ukraine.

Black boxes
On Tuesday evening the two recorders arrived in Kiev from Kharkiv and were handed over to the Dutch Safety Board. They were then shipped by air to the United Kingdom, where an international team of specialists is working on the read-out and analysis of the data stored in the recorders. As a part of this effort, the team will also assess whether the black boxes may have been manipulated. The black boxes are expected to provide information relevant to this investigation. The analysis of black box data may take several weeks.

On-site investigation
At the time of writing, the investigators have not yet been able to visit the site of the crash and conduct their investigation under safe conditions. In order to conduct an effective investigation, the investigators must have the opportunity to move around the entire investigation site freely, investigate materials and traces from up close and secure them for further study where necessary. At present, the investigators' safety has not been guaranteed. The Dutch Safety Board and other parties involved are continually working to gain access to the accident site, and are working with other parties to organise effective security so that the investigators can do their work under controlled and safe conditions. Despite the fact that evidence and traces have been damaged or lost, the Dutch Safety Board expects it will be able to gather sufficient relevant information from the crash site.

Over the past few days, investigators have been working on the investigation in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev and in the Netherlands on the basis of available film and photo materials and other sources of information.

Investigation results
All information gathered as a part of this international investigation will be submitted to the Dutch Safety Board. The Dutch Safety Board will subsequently analyse this information, which will serve as the basis for a report and where necessary relevant recommendations. Other investigators or investigation boards will support this process and comment on the draft investigation report and its conclusions. The Dutch Safety Board will have the final say as regards the contents and timing of all publications. If the investigation shows evidence of any criminal or terrorist activities, the information will subsequently be submitted to the relevant authorities in accordance with applicable regulations. The Dutch Safety Board's investigation will focus on ascertaining facts, rather than apportioning blame.

In addition to the international accident investigation, the Dutch Safety Board is also conducting two other independent investigations: an investigation into the decision-making process with regard to flight routes and an investigation into the availability of passenger lists. These investigation reports are expected to be published ahead of the main accident report.



24.07.14

Permission Dutch Safety Board to move wreckage
The Dutch Safety Board gave permission to move wreckage on the crashsite, after a request about this received by the Safety Board through the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This in order to be able to salvage the remaining victims. The moving of the wreckage will be carried out by local parties.

The Dutch Safety Board considers it of the utmost importance that as many victims as possible can be returned to the Netherlands so that they can be identified and returned to their next of kin.     



  24.07.14

Data Flight Data Recorder MH17 downloaded
Following yesterdays press release, the international investigation team led by the Dutch Safety Board, continued the work on the Cockpit Voice Recorder and the Flight Data Recorder today. The work took place at the Farnborough headquarters of the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) in the United Kingdom.

The international investigation team has conducted a thorough examination of the Flight Data Recorder. The Flight Data Recorder was slightly damaged but the memory module was intact. Furthermore, no evidence or indications of manipulation of the recorder was found. Following the examination, the data was successfully downloaded and the Flight Data Recorder contained valid data of the flight. The data from both recorders will be further analysed and combined.

A thorough analysis of the information obtained will take time and the results will be included in the investigation.



25.07.14

Dutch Safety Board heading to disaster area
In the next few days, investigators from the international team investigating the cause of the crash will set out on several missions to the scene of the disaster. The investigation on the basis of other sources, such as photographs, satellite images and the data recorders (black boxes) will also continue. The missions to the disaster area will focus on verifying the information already obtained from other sources, searching for possible new information and seizing materials that could be relevant to the investigation, such as particular pieces of the wreckage. The fact that a great deal of information has already been gathered will allow the investigation team to examine the disaster area in a very specific and focussed manner.

A number of missions have been organised for investigating the disaster area. The security situation will be assessed for each mission. During the missions, the international investigation team will be supported by the security organisations in the area and will only access the disaster area under their supervision. The international investigation team, under the leadership of the Dutch Safety Board, will not examine the entire disaster area. It is also not their intention to collect all of the various pieces of the wreckage and transport them to the Netherlands. The team is searching for specific evidence and material. The investigation in Ukraine will certainly take another few days. The first factual information is expected in short term. This information will be made public, when exactly is yet unknown.

Various investigations
The investigation into the crash will be conducted by an international investigation team under the leadership of the Dutch Safety Board. This team will investigate the cause and circumstances of the crash on the basis of factual information. The Dutch Safety Board will thus provide an overview that is as comprehensive and undisputed as possible to the next of kin and the international community.

Alongside the international investigation under the leadership of the Dutch Safety Board, the Dutch government has initiated two further, ongoing investigations. One concerns an investigation into the identification and repatriation of victims by the National Team of Forensic Examination (LFTO). This large-scale team is expected to examine the entire disaster area in order to salvage and recover the victims and the personal belongings that are still there. The other investigation from the Dutch government is a criminal investigation under the leadership of the Public Prosecution Service (OM).



3

11.08.14

-Investigation into cause of MH17 plane crash continues in The Hague - The Netherlands
The investigation into the crash of flight MH17 led by the Dutch Safety Board will continue in The Hague. In recent weeks, an international team of some 25 aircraft accident investigators has collected as much investigation information as possible in Ukraine. Since it is not necessary to stay in Ukraine any longer to analyse the information and write a report on the preliminary findings, the team has relocated to The Hague to continue its work.

The team's efforts will initially focus on the report of preliminary findings, which the Dutch Safety Board aims to publish in a few weeks' time. The report will contain the first factual findings arising from the investigation based on various sources, such as the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder (the black boxes), air traffic control data, radar and satellite images. This data is currently being compared and will subsequently be analysed.

Due to the changed safety situation in East Ukraine it is unclear whether the data can be supplemented with information from further investigations at the crash site. To date under Ukranian supervision only a few investigators were able to briefly visit the crash site immediately after the plane crash. Since the Dutch Safety Board took the charge of the investigation no new opportunity has arisen for the team to visit the crash site. The investigators who were on stand-by in Kharkov and Soledar to travel to the disaster area returned to the Netherlands last week in the light of the deteriorated safety situation in East Ukraine and the Dutch government's decision to leave the crash site for the time being.

The Dutch Safety Board is represented by a liaison in the Dutch Embassy in Kiev for the purpose of the working arrangements that need to be made with all parties involved.

Investigations
In addition to the investigation into the relevant facts of the MH17 disaster, the Dutch Safety Board is conducting an investigation into the decision-making process concerning the flight routes and the risk assessment made in choosing to fly over East Ukraine. The Dutch Safety Board is also investigating why the complete passenger list for MH17 was not available immediately.

The Dutch Safety Board will not make any statements with regard to apportioning blame or liability, and these issues will not form part of its investigation. The investigation will be conducted on the basis of the ICAO Convention setting out the procedures for international aviation investigations.



20.08.14
Questions and answers concerning the investigation into flight MH17
1. Why is an investigation necessary?
In the event of an aircraft accident, it is very important to conduct an investigation in order to clearly ascertain the cause. This will allow the surviving relatives, other parties involved and also the world to understand what happened based on a factual account. An investigation can also contribute to the safety of civilian (and other) aviation:  recommendations are made whenever necessary to avoid similar incidents in the future.

The Dutch Safety Board believes that the MH17 crash should be the subject of an extensive and in-depth investigation. In addition to the (international) investigation into the cause of the crash, the decision-making process surrounding flightroutes and the availability of passenger lists will also be examined.

2. Why is the Dutch Safety Board leading the investigation?
Ukraine has transferred responsibility for investigating the cause of the crash to the Dutch Safety Board. The request came from Ukraine.

This request was made because the flight departed from the Netherlands, and due to the large number of Dutch nationals who died in the crash. The transfer was formally recorded in an agreement on 23 July.

3. Which countries are involved in the investigation and why?
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) states that it is the responsibility of the country where an aircraft accident took place to investigate the cause. Immediately following the crash of flight MH17, aviation investigators  from Ukraine began investigating the cause of the accident. The Netherlands (as one of the countries affected) received official word of the crash of MH17 from the investigators shortly after it took place, including an invitation to take part in the investigation.

The ICAO agreement dictates that certain countries are obliged to be involved in the investigation.  In principle, the country where the accident took place (state of occurance) should lead the investigation. However, the option is available to transfer the obligation of the investigation to another country. The countries where the operator is based, where the aircraft was designed and where it was built are also entitled to take part. Countries that can supply specific information or expertise may participate at the invitation of the party leading the investigation. Countries that suffered fatalities are also entitled to play a part in the investigation, but have limited rights.

In the case of the MH17 crash, many countries volunteered their assistance of their own accord. In some cases this assistance was accepted because the investigators had specific knowledge, information or expertise to offer.

The following countries have contributed (to a greater or lesser extent) to the international investigation team into the crash of flight MH17: Ukraine, Malaysia, Australia, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, France, Italy and Indonesia. The ICAO and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) also contributed to the investigation as organisations. The leadership of the investigation rests with the Dutch Safety Board, which will publish both the preliminary and final report. The countries that have a formal role as participants in the investigation under the ICAO agreement will be given access to the draft reports, and may provide feedback.  The country leading the investigation may offer other countries access to the draft reports at its discretion.

4. Is it possible to conduct an effective investigation if nobody has visited the crash site itself?
Although additional investigation at the crash site itself is preferable, it is not impossible to conduct an effective investigation based on other sources and to produce a definitive final report. Incidentally, on the days following the incident (when Ukraine was still leading the investigation), several Ukrainian aviation investigators visited the crash site briefly several times for investigative purposes.

Once a secure and stable situation has been established, the Dutch Safety Board will visit the location. This in order to verify the results of the investigation from other sources and to conduct a specific search for wreckage and other vital pieces.

5. Why has the Dutch Safety Board not yet visited the crash site?
The Dutch Safety Board was not abled to visit the crash site because the safety of the investigators could not be guaranteed. The Dutch government believes that people investigating the causes of the crash will be at greater risk than forensic investigators, next of kin or journalists. In this respect, the safety of others at the crash site is also being taken into account: the presence of Dutch Safety Board investigators must not put others in danger.

Moreover, recovering the victims' bodies and searching for personal belongings had top priority. The opportunities for visiting the crash site were limited, and priority was given to forensic investigators (and the supporting marechaussees).

6. What is a preliminary report?
The preliminary report is an interim report used to publish the initial results of an investigation following an major aircraft accident. The ICAO agreement that sets out the investigative procedures for civil and other aviation states that a preliminary report must be released during an investigation. This report may also include safety warnings. The preliminary report is not subject to any criteria in terms of structure or scope. The content is partly dependent on the progress of the investigation and the need to report certain findings.

The preliminary report on the crash of MH17 being prepared by the Dutch Safety Board contains a number of facts based on various sources; allowing an initial, provisional sequence of events to be made. The investigation team collected information from various sources, such as the Cockpit Voice Recorder, the Flight Data Recorder, satellite and other images, and radar information. All the data is then compared to determine whether the various sources corroborate each other, or show a different view. This is a delicate and time-consuming process that has not yet been completed.

The draft versions of the preliminary report will be discussed by the international investigation team and with the Board prior to being published. The ICAO states that the normal period required for drawing up a preliminary report is 2-4 weeks, however justified exceptions are permitted. Given the particular and complex circumstances surrounding this occurence, it is not yet exactly clear when the preliminary report will be published.

7. Will the Dutch Safety Board be publicly releasing the content from the Cockpit Voice Recorder and the Flight Data Recorder?
Investigative materials and sources of information used by the Dutch Safety Board in its investigations are protected by law. Only information relevant to determining the cause of the MH17 crash will be included in the final report. The available investigative information  will not be released publicly in their entirety, except for what is published in the final report. This is in accordance with the Dutch Safety Board Act (Rijkswet Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid) and the ICAO agreement.

8. When will the final report be released?
An aviation accident investigation requires a lot of time. Not only is the investigation a complex, delicate and therefore time-consuming process involving various different parties, the Dutch Safety Board is also bound to international regulations that are set out in the ICAO agreement. One of these regulations prescribes that a draft of the final report must be presented for feedback to all parties which are formally involved. These parties then have sixty days to respond to the draft, after which the Dutch  Safety Board must incorporate their feedback. The definitive report is expected to be published within one year.

9. What is the difference between the preliminary report and the final report?
The preliminary report provides an overview of the initial, provisional facts a relatively short time after the occurence. When the report is released, not all investigation data will have been analysed and no definitive conclusions drawn. Additional investigation data, an analysis and the conclusions based thereon will be included in the final report, making it far more extensive and in-depth.

10. Why does the Dutch Safety Board not issue any statements concerning guilt or liability?
In addition to providing a clear understanding of the cause, the aim of the  Dutch Safety Board's work is to increase safety. This is achieved by investigating the causes of an incident and if possible making recommendations to improve safety. This is set out as such in the ICAO agreement, which deals specifically with aviation investigations.

11. What is the ICAO and what is Annex 13?
Founded in 1947, the International Civil Aviation Organisation is a specialist UN organisation whose goal is to establish the principles and standards for international civil aviation for the improvement of aviation. Among other things, the ICAO agreement prescribes how aviation accidents must be investigated, and that the purpose of such investigations must be to improve safety and not to apportion blame or establish liability. Annex 13 (one section of the agreement) describes how investigations into aviation incidents should be conducted, the criteria that the report must satisfy, and which countries need to be involved.

4

9.09.14

Preliminary report points towards external cause of MH17 crash
No evidence of technical faults

Flight MH17 with a Boeing 777-200 operated by Malaysia Airlines broke up in the air probably as the result of structural damage caused by a large number of high-energy objects that penetrated the aircraft from outside. This is mentioned in the preliminary report on the investigation into the crash of MH17 that has been published today by the Dutch Safety Board. There are no indications that the MH17 crash was caused by a technical fault or by actions of the crew.

The cockpit voice recorder, the flight data recorder and data from air traffic control all suggest that flight MH17 proceeded as normal until 13:20:03 (UTC), after which it ended abruptly. A full listening of the communications among the crew members in the cockpit recorded on the cockpit voice recorder revealed no signs of any technical faults or an emergency situation. Neither were any warning tones heard in the cockpit that might have pointed to technical problems. The flight data recorder registered no aircraft system warnings, and aircraft engine parameters were consistent with normal operation during the flight. The radio communications with Ukrainian air traffic control confirm that no emergency call was made by the cockpit crew. The final calls by Ukrainian air traffic control made between 13.20:00 and 13.22:02 (UTC) remained unanswered.

The pattern of wreckage on the ground suggests that the aircraft split into pieces during flight (an in-flight break up). Based on the available maintenance history the airplane was airworthy when it took off from Amsterdam and there were no known technical problems. The aircraft was manned by a qualified and experienced crew.

Pattern of damage
As yet it has not been possible to conduct a detailed study of the wreckage. However, the available images show that the pieces of wreckage were pierced in numerous places. The pattern of damage to the aircraft fuselage and the cockpit is consistent with that which may be expected from a large number of high-energy objects that penetrated the aircraft from outside. Its likely that this damage resulted in a loss of structural integrity of the aircraft, leading to an in-flight break up. This also explains the abrupt end to the data registration on the recorders, the simultaneous loss of contact with air traffic control and the aircraft's disappearance from radar.

Further investigation
In its preliminary report, the Safety Board presents the initial findings of an investigation that is still fully underway. More research will be necessary to determine more precisely what caused the crash and how the airplane disintegrated. The Board believes that additional evidence will become available in the period ahead. From this point on, the research team will start working towards producing the definitive investigation report. The Board aims to publish the report within one year of the date of the crash.

Procedure
The draft preliminary report has been sent to the Accredited Representative of the states that participate in the investigation (Malaysia, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Australia) for review. All Accredited Representatives have sent a reaction. The Dutch Safety Board assessed the provided suggestions and amended the report where appropriate. 

Tjibbe Joustra, Chairman of the Dutch Safety Board:

The MH17 crash has shocked the world and raised many questions. The Dutch Safety Board wishes to determine the cause of the crash, for the sake of the loved ones of the victims and for society at large.
 
The initial results of the investigation point towards an external cause of the MH17 crash. More research will be necessary to determine the cause with greater precision. The Safety Board believes that additional evidence will become available for investigation in the period ahead.
 
The preliminary report issues the first findings in a ongoing investigation. From this point on, the investigation team will be working towards producing its final report. The Board aims to publish this report within one year of the date of the crash.

5

6.11.14

Dutch Safety Board commissions the recovery of MH17 wreckage
The Dutch Safety Board has commissioned the recovery and transportation to the Netherlands of wreckage from flight MH17. As part of the investigation into the cause and progress of the crash, the Dutch Safety Board intends to reconstruct a section of the aircraft.

Agreements have been made about a plan that should make it possible to recover the wreckage and hand it over to the Dutch Safety Board; its technical implementation is currently being prepared.

The Dutch Safety Board expects that it will be possible to start the recovery operation within a few days, although the start may have to be delayed due to the precarious safety situation in the area and other factors.



16.11.14
Recovery wreckage MH17 started
Today the recovery of wreckage from flight MH17 has started. The Dutch Safety Board commissioned the recovery and transportation to the Netherlands of the wreckage as part of the investigation into the cause of the crash of flight MH17. As part of the investigation the Dutch Safety Board intents to reconstruct a section of the aircraft.

It is expected that the recovery operation will take several days, depending on the safetyconditions and other factors. This will be assessed daily. The recovered wreckage will be collected at a location near the crashsite, from where the wreckage will be transported to Kharkov and finally to the Netherlands. At this point the Dutch Safety Board can not give detailed information about the means of transportation and the timeschedule.



17.11.14

Recovery wreckage went well
The recovery of wreckage of flight MH17 went well today and the team was able to work as planned .

For the second succesive day there has been taken wreckage of the crashsite for the investigating into the cause of the crash. Among others the tailsection of the aircraft was recovered today. The recovered wreckage was again brought back to Torez and loaded onto rail wagons. Later on the wreckage will be transported by train to Kharkov.

When the conditions allows it, the recovery will be continued tomorrow. When the conditions stay similar, the recovery could be completed in about five days.

The Dutch Safety Board has commissioned the recovery of the wreckage for the investigation into the cause of the crash of flight MH17. This includes a (partial) reconstruction of the aircraft.         



17.11.14

Recovery wreckage flight MH17 continued
The recovery of wreckage of flight MH17 has been continued this morning. For the second day wreckage will be recovered for the investigation into the cause of the crash of flight MH17. The wreckage will be brought to Torez, where it will be placed on trains. Later on it will be transported to Kharkov and finally to The Netherlands.         



18.11.14

Third day wreckage recovery
This morning the recovery of wreckage from flight MH17 has been continued for the third day in a  row. The opportunity for the recoveryteam to be able to work at the crashsite depends on safetyconditions and weatherconditions. The first two days the team was able to work as planned and wreckage has been brought to Torez and loaded into trains. Later on the wreckage will be transported to Kharkov.       



18.11.14
Third day recovery wreckage completed
The recovery of  MH17 wreckage is finished for today. For the third day in a row, the recovery team was able to work as planned  and in good cooperation with the local services. The wreckage were taken to Torez, where they are loaded onto rail wagons. Later on the wreckage will be transported from Torez to Kharkov and then to the Netherlands.



19.11.14

Wreckage recovery MH17 continued
The wreckage recovery of flight MH17 has been continued this morning. For the fourth day in a row wreckage will be recovered from the crash site and loaded onto trains. The recovery is commissioned by the Dutch Safety Board that wants to bring the wreckage to the Netherlands for investigation and for a partial reconstruction of the aircraft.



19.11.14
Recovery wreckage MH17 ended for today
The recovery of wreckage has ended for today. The team was able to work at two locations at the crashsite and brought the recovered wreckage to Torez where it was loaded into trains. Later on the wreckage will be transported to Kharkov and finally to the Netherlands. When the conditions allows it, the recovery will be continued tomorrow.



20.11.14
Recovery wreckage continued
This morning the recovery of wreckage from flight MH17 has been continued. The wreckage will be brought to Torez en loaded into trains. Later on the wreckage will be transported to Kharkov and finally to the Netherlands.       



20.11.14

Wreckage recovered for the fifth day
For the fifth day in a row there has been wreckage recovered of the MH17 aircraft. The recovery team was able to work according to plan and in good cooperation with the local services. The team expects to need a few more days for the recovery. On this moment its not possible to say how many days exactly.         



21.07.14

Recovery wreckage continued
This morning the recovery of wreckage from flight MH17 has been continued for the sixth day in a row. The wreckage will be brought to Torez en loaded into trains. Later on the wreckage will be transported to Kharkov and finally to the Netherlands.



21.07.14

Recovery wreckage ended for today
The recovery of the wreckage in the desaster area of flight MH17 is going well. The work has been completed for today. The team has to make some preparations before the wreckage can be transported to Kharkov.  It is not clear yet how many days  it will take to finish the work.



22.11.14

Transportation wreckage MH17 being prepared
The Dutch recoveryteam in Donetsk today will be preparing the transport of the recovered wreckage to Kharkov. This saturday the team will not go to the crashsite where wreckage of flight MH17 has been recovered last week.

In the passed week the recoveryteam has brought wreckage from the crashsite to Torez every day and loaded it into trains. Preparations are being made for transport by train to Kharkov. At this point it can not be said when the transport will take place. A few parts of wreckage turned out to be too large to load into trains and will be transported to Kharkov by road with two trucks today.



23.11.14

Wreckage MH17 underway towards Kharkov
The recovered wreckage from flight MH17 is underway towards Kharkov. The train with wreckage on board departed from Torez this morning and has 12 train wagons. A few parts of wreckage were too big for transport by train and arrived in Kharkov by truck yesterday.

When the wreckage has arrived in Kharkov, transportation to the Netherlands will be prepaired. At this point it can not be said when and in what way this transport will be carried out.

With the transport from Torez to Kharkov, last weeks recoveryoperation has ended. After a considerable period of planning, the actual recovery of wreckage started sunday November 16th. In the week following as many wreckage relevant for the investigation as possible was recovered, all within the realms of possibility at the crashsite. Despite the complex circumstances and local safetysituation, the team was able to work as planned  under the guidance of OSCE. The team was supported by local services and the work was done in good cooperation.

Although this recovery operation has ended, there is still wreckage left at the crashsite. Mostly smaller pieces of wreckage with no value for the investigation. Local services will remove those pieces of wreckage from the crashsite, as the recoveryteam agreed upon.



27.11.14

Foreign investigation boards meet regarding investigation Flight routes
Investigators from foreign investigation boards met in the Hague last week regarding the investigation into the decision making processes regarding flight routes. During this meeting the investigators discussed the preparation and decision making processes surrounding the selection of flight routes in different countries and how information is exchanged between countries.

Following the accident to MH17, the Dutch Safety Board is conducting three separate investigations. The investigation into the cause of the crash, an investigation into the release of the passenger lists and an investigation into the decision making process surrounding the flight routes. In this third investigation the manner in which the flight route is selected, which parties are involved and how decisions are being made will be looked into. As civil aviation is an international activity, it is of great importance that the foreign investigation boards are involved in the investigation.



6

1.12.14

-Transport of wreckage from MH17 to the Netherlands
The wreckage from flight MH17 recovered in the disaster area on instructions of the Dutch Safety Board will be loaded on trucks and transported to the Netherlands during the coming week. Once it has arrived in the Netherlands, the wreckage will be stored and investigated at the Gilze Rijen Air Base. This is also the location where part of the aircraft will be reconstructed.

The transport of the wreckage has been prepared  by the Ministry of Defence, and the first trucks will be loaded today. After loading, the trucks will depart for the Netherlands in separate convoys over the course of the week. The first of these convoys will arrive at the Gilze Rijen Air Base next week. The exact date will be announced later.

Logistics specialists from the Ministry of Defence have considered the pros and cons of the various options for transporting the wreckage, and have concluded that the most efficient method under the present circumstances is to transport the wreckage to the Netherlands by road.

Some time before the actual arrival next week, the Dutch Safety Board will announce when the first convoy of trucks is expected to arrive in Gilze Rijen.



6.12.14
Arrival of MH17 wreckage in the Netherlands
The first MH17 wreckage is set to arrive in the Netherlands over the course of the coming week. The first transport to the Netherlands comprises several sealed trucks and two covered low-loaders. Upon arrival at the air force base, the transport will be unloaded in accordance with a fixed protocol and all wreckage components will be photographed, scanned and categorized following a fixed procedure. The investigation of the wreckage and preparation for the reconstruction will then take place in a designated hangar cleared especially for this purpose. Access to the facilities will be restricted to the investigators for the duration of the activities.

The Dutch Safety Board today informed next of kin that they will later be offered an opportunity to view parts of the wreckage. This is expected to be scheduled for next year, in view of the urgent need to launch the investigation.

Next of kin attending the arrival
Next of kin who wish to do so may attend the arrival of the first wreckage transport at the air force base. The arrival of the wreckage at the air force base will not be of a ceremonial character and those attending will not be permitted to be present during the opening or unloading of the trucks.

The exact date and time of the arrival of the transport is not yet known. The Dutch Safety Board will announce this information in good time to allow the media to record the moment of arrival. The media will not be allowed on the air force base or during the opening and unloading of the trucks.



9.12.14
First wreckage of flight MH17 in the Netherlands
The first pieces of wreckage of flight MH17 have arrived in the Netherlands. Two convoys comprising eight trucks arrived at Gilze-Rijen air force base at 02.00 p.m. The transport will be unloaded in accordance with a fixed procedure and will then be photographed, scanned and categorized. The investigation of the wreckage and preparation for the reconstruction effort will then commence.

A designated hangar at the air force base has been cleared especially for the investigation of the wreckage. Here, investigation teams led by the Dutch Safety Board will investigate the cause and progress of the crash. At the same time, investigation teams of the police will conduct a criminal investigation in the same hangar under the management of the Public Prosecution Service. The investigations by the Dutch Safety Board and the Public Prosecution Service will be conducted separately and independently of each other. As it is vital to both investigations that the wreckage can be examined, agreements have been made.

About 40 next of kin took up the invitation to attend the arrival of the first pieces of wreckage. At a later date, next of kin will be offered an opportunity to view (some of) the wreckage after its (partial) reconstruction next year. The Dutch Safety Board and the Public Prosecution Service will inform the next of kin as soon as it becomes clear when the viewing can take place.

Wreckage recovery
Recovery of the wreckage of flight MH17, commissioned by the Dutch Safety Board, began at the crash site on Sunday, 16 November. The recovery was preceded by a long period of preparations. Due to the precarious safety situation in the disaster area it was uncertain, immediately before and during the recovery, how long the recovery operations would be able to continue. For this reason, the Dutch Safety Board had prioritised what wreckage was to be recovered first. In all, twelve railway wagons full of wreckage were recovered in six days. Initial expectations were for four wagons to be filled. Recovery operations were suspended after six days due to the unpredictable safety situation and because all areas that could be visited had been searched.

The Dutch Safety Board received assistance from the Dutch Ministry of Defence in both the preparation for and execution of the recovery mission. During the recovery mission assistance was provided by at least twenty workers of the SES, the (Ukraine) State Emergency Service. Sites searched during the recovery operation included large and small burn sites, fields on the roads to the town of Hrabove, a chicken farm near Hrabove and woods to the west of the chicken farm. The village of Rozsypne was also searched. Due to the safety situation the recovery mission was unable to go to Petropavkliva. SES workers did search here briefly and recovered several essential pieces of wreckage.

Agreements
To enable the recovery of wreckage, the Dutch Safety Board agreed certain arrangements with the Ministry of Emergency Services with regard to handing over the wreckage and SES assistance.  These documents have now been published on website of the Dutch Safety Board (safetyboard.nl). The first document concerns the recovery of the wreckage. The second concerns the period subsequent to the recovery. This is because some wreckage of the aircraft remained in the disaster area at the end of the recovery mission.

The investigation team will use various sources of information to determine the cause and progress of the crash of flight MH17. These include the Cockpit Voice Recorder, the Flight Data Recorder and Air Traffic Control data. While examination of the wreckage may provide new information, it will also be used to verify information derived from other sources.

With the arrival at Gilze-Rijen, two of the four convoys carrying wreckage have now reached their destination. The other two convoys are still en route and are expected to arrive in the Netherlands during the course of the week.



12.12.14

Final convoy with MH17 wreckage arrives in the Netherlands
The fourth and final convoy carrying wreckage from flight MH17 arrived at Gilze-Rijen air force base today. A total of sixteen trucks loaded with parts of the wreckage travelled from Ukraine to the Netherlands over the past week. The shipment was carried out in four convoys. Having arrived at the air force base, the wreckage will now be investigated. Efforts will also be made to reconstruct part of the aircraft.

Following lengthy preparations, the recovery of MH17 wreckage commenced on Sunday,
16 November under the authority of the Dutch Safety Board. The mission had the opportunity to work at the crash site for six consecutive days. Preparations were then made to ship the wreckage, which was transported by train from Torez to Chakov on 23 November. The Dutch Safety Board's recovery effort was conducted with the assistance of local emergency services and Dutch military personnel. The Ministry of Defence was also responsible for shipping the wreckage to the Netherlands.

Once the train with parts of the wreckage had arrived in Charkov, preparations were made for transportation to the Netherlands. The first convoy of four trucks embarked on its journey from Charkov to the Netherlands on 3 December. The first two convoys arrived at Gilze-Rijen air force base on Tuesday, 9 December. This event was attended by over 40 next of kin.

The Dutch Safety Board is leading the international investigation into the cause and course of the crash. The investigation team will be basing its efforts on multiple sources of information, including the Cockpit Voice Recorder, Flight Data Recorder and information provided by air traffic control. In addition to potentially yielding new insights, the wreckage investigation will also be used to verify information from other sources. The Dutch Safety Board will endeavour to publish the final report in the summer of 2015.



7

6.01.15

Onderzoek naar rol veiligheidsdiensten bij besluitvorming rondom veiligheid van vliegroutes
De Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (CTIVD) onderzoekt welke rol de AIVD en MIVD hebben bij de besluitvorming rondom de veiligheid van vliegroutes. Dat heeft de CTIVD vandaag bekend gemaakt. De ministers van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties en van Defensie hebben de CTIVD op verzoek van de Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid op 21 november 2014 gevraagd dit onderzoek uit te voeren.

De Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (CTIVD) onderzoekt welke rol de AIVD en MIVD hebben bij de besluitvorming rondom de veiligheid van vliegroutes. Dat heeft de CTIVD vandaag bekend gemaakt. De ministers van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties en van Defensie hebben de CTIVD op verzoek van de Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid op 21 november 2014 gevraagd dit onderzoek uit te voeren.

Het onderzoek moet antwoord bieden op drie vragen:

a) Wat is de formele structuur tussen de AIVD respectievelijk MIVD en de voor de luchtvaartveiligheid relevante partijen, zoals de luchtvaartmaatschappijen, luchtverkeersleiding en de ministeries m.b.t. het informeren over veiligheidsdreigingen?
b) Welke zijn de concrete activiteiten van deze twee diensten bij het uitwisselen van informatie met voor de luchtvaart relevante partijen?
c) Welke informatie hadden de AIVD en MIVD voorafgaand aan de crash van de MH17 over de veiligheidssituatie in Oost-Oekraïne, en in hoeverre hebben zij deze informatie gedeeld met voor de luchtvaartveiligheid relevante partijen? Wat waren de overwegingen om dit wel/niet te doen?
De CTIVD zal haar bevindingen rechtstreeks rapporteren aan de Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid. De Onderzoeksraad heeft om het onderzoek naar de rol van de veiligheidsdiensten gevraagd ten behoeve van het onderzoek van de Raad naar de besluitvorming over de vliegroutes en de risico-afweging die bij vlucht MH17 is gemaakt bij de keuze voor de vliegroute over Oost-Oekraine.

Bekijk hieronder de brieven die verstuurd zijn aan de minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties en aan de minister van Defensie.



8

20.02.15

International aviation investigators conclude meeting at Gilze-Rijen
The team of international aviation investigators who investigate the cause and contributing factors of the crash of flight MH17 concluded the investigation meeting at Gilze-Rijen.

In the past week they conducted several investigations on the wreckage, including the fractures, the failure mechanisms and the impact patterns. This meeting is part of the procedures prescribed by the ICAO provisions on international aircraft accident and incident investigation. The investigators represented the countries involved in the MH17 investigation: Ukraine, Malaysia, Australia, United States, United Kingdom and the Russian Federation. The representatives of Belgium and Germany attended the meeting on February 17. A representative of ICAO was also present.

Next week preparations will be made for the visit of next of kin to see the recovered wreckage in the first week of March. The planned three-dimensional reconstruction of a part of the aircraft will start soon. The next of kin will be allowed to view this three-dimensional reconstruction at a later time.     



25.02.15


https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/media/ … 500274.pdf

Dête February 25,2016
Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation
Mr O. Storchevoy
Deputy Director, Federal Air Transport Agency
37 Leningradsky prospect
125993 MOSCOW
RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Subject Assessment of the ¡nformation provided in your letter of January 14,2016
Dear Mr Storchevoy,
The Dutch Safety Board has received yourletterdated January 14,2016 in good orderand has
carefully considered the subjects raised by you. For a detailed response, I refer to the Appendix to this
letter.
The Dutch Safety Board concludes, w¡th reference to paragraph 5.13 of ICAO Annex 13, that none of
the information provided can be regarded as new and significant evidence

T.H.J. Joustra
Chairman, Dutch Safety Board

https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/media/ … 500274.pdf

Date February 25, 2016
To Mr O. Storchevoy,
Deputy Director Federal Air Transport Agency
Contact person
Subject Appendix to our letter with reference number 16500274

This Appendix contains detailed responses to your given arguments. The same order is maintained as
in the Attachment to your letter.
1

RF

The Ukrainian authorities deliberately concealed or distorted information on real threats to the safety of civil flights arising from the military activities of Ukraines Ministry of Defense in abuse of Article 9 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annexes 15 and 19, as well as ICAO Document 9554. As a result, other states and airlines (including Malaysia Airlines) did not have sufficient official information for making a decision to suspend flights over Ukraine. For this, five different arguments (hereunder, excl. No. 3) and one remark (No. 3) are given:
1. the closing of Ukrainian airspace;
2. the co-ordination between the civil and military air navigation service providers;
3. the statements in the report of US and NATO officials;
4. the possible presence and use of heavy anti-aircraft systems in the area;
5. the report shifts the blame and liability from Ukraine to airline operators and international organisations; 6. information regarding aircraft shot down.

DSB

For the assessment of the given five arguments and one remark of the Russian Federation, reference is made to the text in the MH17 Crash Final Report, Part B:
1. Ref.: MH17 Crash, paragraph 5.3, pages188-191: According to the Ukrainian authorities, the shooting-down of an Antonov An-26 on July 14, 2014 and a Sukhoi Su-25 on July 16, 2014 occurred while these aeroplanes were flying beyond the effective range of MANPADS. Ref.: MH17 Crash, paragraph 6.7, under 4, page 215: () The weapon systems mentioned by the Ukrainian authorities in relation tot the shooting down of these aircraft can pose a risk to civil aeroplanes. Ref.: MH17 Crash, paragraph 10.1, under 2.a, second bullet, page 261: The statements made by the Ukrainian authorities in which they reported that military aeroplanes had been shot down on 14 and 16 July, and in which they mentioned weapon systems that were able to reach cruising altitude of civil aeroplanes, provided sufficient reason for closing the airspace above the eastern part of Ukraine as a precaution. Ref.: MH17 Crash, paragraph 10.5, under 2.d, page 268: The weapon systems mentioned by the Ukrainian authorities in relation to the shooting down of these aircraft can pose a risk to civil aeroplanes, because they are capable of reaching cruising altitude. However, no measures were taken to protect civil aeroplanes against these weapon systems.
2. Ref.: MH17 Crash, paragraph 6.1, page 198 and figure 79 on page 199: The civil and military air traffic services were integrated in 1999 with the installation of the Integrated Civil-Military ATM System of Ukraine (ICMS) as part of the UkSATSE air traffic control service. The civil and military air traffic control services each have their own command structure, but work closely together at the operational level. This cooperation is coordinated by the Ukraerocenter (the main operational unit in ICMS) in which the two services are represented as illustrated in Figure 79.
3. Ref.: MH17 Crash, Appendix W, in response to the comments of the Russian Federation on page 43, paragraph 3.5 in the draft Final Report, page 12: The public statements are important for obtaining an idea of the context in which the decision-making process about the flight route and airspace management was organised.
4. Ref.: MH17 Crash, paragraph 5.3, page 190, box: () Based of information transmitted by the Ukrainian pilots, two versions are currently being considered: a shot was fired from either the Pantsir modern ground-based air defence system or the X-24 guided air-to-air missile from a Russian aircraft, which could have taken off from Milyerovo Airport []. Ref.: MH17 Crash, paragraph 5.3, page 191: On 17 July 2014, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence stated that, on 16 July 2014, a Sukhoi Su-25 fighter aeroplane was shot at in the Donetsk region, near the Ukrainian-Russian border (Amvrosiivka). According to Ukraine, it involved an air-to-air missile that had apparently been fired by a military aeroplane belonging tot the Russian Federations armed forces, which was conducting border control flights. ()
5. Ref.: MH17 Crash, paragraph 1.2, page 16: In accordance with Annex 13, it is not the purpose of this investigation to apportion blame or liability.
6. Ref.: MH17 Crash, paragraph 5.3, page 189: (...) On the same day, Ukraines National Security and Defence Council (RNBO) published a press release that stated that the aircraft was flying at an altitude of 6,500 metres when it was hit (see the box for a literal English translation of the text). Ref.: MH17 Crash, paragraph 5.3, page 190, box: Statement from the RNBO Information Analysis Centre of 14 July 2014 at 17:00. Ref.: MH17 Crash, paragraph 5.6, page 195: (...) The information that Ukrainian authorities provided during a briefing with diplomats about the shoot-down of an Antonov An-26, (). Ref.: MH17 Crash, paragraph 6.6.2, page 212: On July 14, 2014, the Ukrainian authorities announced in a press statement that an Antonov An-26 had been shot down while flying at an altitude of 6,500 metres. (...) Ref.: MH17 Crash, paragraph 8.4.2.3, page 247: (...) The downing of the Antonov An-26 on 14 July 2014 was also mentioned. As mentioned in Section 5, the Presidential Administration held a closed briefing for heads of the diplomatic missions in Ukraine on the same day. (...) The Dutch Safety Board concludes that on the basis of the arguments and the remark put forward, there is no new and significant evidence.

2

RF

The new important fact is that, even assuming the aircraft was brought down by a Buk surface-to-air missile, the description of fragments provided in the report does not match the pre-formed fragments used in the 9N314M warhead. For this the following arguments are given:
1. the tests performed by the Russian Federation;
2. the shape and weight of the fragments; 3. the chemical composition of the fragments.

DSB

1. For the assessment of the given arguments of the Russian Federation regarding the tests performed by the Russian Federation, reference is made to the text in the report MH17 About the investigation, Appendix L: Ref.: MH17 About the investigation, Appendix L, Response to the comments of the Russian Federation, page 101-102, under 2, third column: (...) The test was performed in a stationary situation on the ground, which is completely different from the detonation of a warhead at an altitude of about ten kilometres. The air density at an altitude of tenkilometres and the speeds of the missile and the aeroplane have a substantial influence on the spread of the fragments at the moment of detonation and, stemming from that, the impact, the impact pattern and the final shape and weight of the fragments. In Appendix V of MH17 Crash is written, in response to the comments of the Russian Federation to paragraph 3.4.10 of the draft Final Report: Ref.: MH17 Crash, Appendix V, Consultation Part A: Causes of the crash, page 10/21: (...) The test performed by the Russian Federation/JSC Concern AlmazAntey was not announced beforehand. So formally it could not be a part of the international investigation into the crash of flight MH17, since the Dutch Safety Board and the other States did not have the opportunity to validate the test. It is necessary to inform the State that is conducting the investigation in advance and to send an invitation to that State and possibly to the other participating States to obtain suggestions for the conduct of the work and/or to be present at these tests or simulations. In addition, the full scale experiments test by the Russian Federation have been assessed in the same way as above.
2. For the assessment of the given arguments of the Russian Federation regarding the shape and weight of the fragments reference is made to the text in Appendix L of About the investigation of the MH17 Crash report: Ref.: MH17 About the investigation, Appendix L, Response to the comments of the Russian Federation, page 102, under 2, third column: (...) As indicated before, the fragments shape and weight can change as a result of the impact, among other things by deformation and the abrasion of material. The extent to which this happens strongly depends on the location where the detonation took place and on the material that the fragments impact. Therefore, the results of the tests are irreconcilable with the weight of the fragments actually found. The same text can be found in Appendix V of the MH17 Crash report in response to the comments of the Russian Federation to Sections 2.16.1, 2.16.2, 3.4.10, 3.7.4 and 4.2 of the draft Final Report: Ref.: MH17 Crash, Appendix V, Consultation Part A: Causes of the crash, page 3-4/21, 9-10/21, 15/21 and 20/21: Considering changes due to deformation, abrasion, chipping and shattering on explosion and impact, the bow-tie fragments found in the wreckage originally had the shape, size, and mass of the fragments used in the 9N314M warhead. These fragments are very distinct and they are found in this type of warhead. For the assessment of the given arguments of the Russian Federation regarding the chemical composition of the fragments reference is made to the text in Appendix V of the MH17 Crash report in response to the comments of the Russian Federation to paragraphs 2.16.1, 2.16.2, 3.4.10, 3.7.4 and 4.2 of the draft Final Report: Ref.: MH17Crash, Appendix V, Consultation Part A: Causes of the crash, page 3-4/21, 9-10/21, 15/21 and 20/21: Studying the detailed chemical composition of the steel is not relevant to the investigation as the high-energy objects are usually made from lowgrade metal (unalloyed steel) originating from different batches, different sources, different manufacturing locations and over different periods of time. Matching the fragments found with reference material from an intact warhead would not be possible because of these differences.
The Dutch Safety Board concludes that on the basis of the arguments put forward, there is no new and significant evidence.

3

RF

The new important fact is that, even assuming the aircraft was brought down by a Buk surface-to-air missile, penetration holes on the aircraft wreckage are not consistent with those normally created by the detonation of a 9N314M warhead.
The arguments you present pertain to:
1. tests performed by the Russian Federation;
2. the penetration damage to the aircraft wreckage;
3. the presence of penetration holes in the right side of the cockpit.

DSB

1. In response to the comments of the Russian Federation on the test performed by the Russian Federation reference is made to Appendix L in MH17 About the investigation, and Appendix V in MH17 Crash, Consultation Part A: Causes of the crash. See 1 in the previous block.
2. For the response to the arguments of the Russian Federation regarding penetration damage to the wreckage reference is made to the text in section 2 of the NLR report, Appendix X of the MH17 Crash report, pages 9-28. Moreover, in response to the arguments of the Russian Federation regarding the damage to the wreckage we refer to the text in Appendix V of the MH17 Crash report in response to the comments of the Russian Federation on paragraphs 2.16.1 and 3.4.10 in the draft Final Report: Ref.: MH17 Crash, Appendix V, Consultation Part A: Causes of the crash, page 3/21 and 9/21: (...) text (...) has been improved to include more details on the fragments expected in a 9N314M warhead and the fragments recovered from the bodies of the crew members (...) and the four distinctly shaped fragments recovered. (...) However, the reported ratios between the different shapes cannot be correlated with those fragments recovered as it is not possible to recover all of the fragments from a detonation at an altitude of 10 km. In addition, JSC Concern Almaz-Antey indicated that the actual number of pre-formed fragments differs slightly from one warhead to another during manufacture, making the ratios in the comment an approximation and not an exact set of figures. For the response to the arguments of the Russian Federation regarding the damage to the aircraft wreckage reference is also made to the text in Appendix V of the MH17 Crash report in response to the comments of the Russian Federation on section 3.7.4 of the draft Final Report: Ref.: MH17 Crash, Appendix V, Consultation Part A: Causes of the crash, page 13/21: With the warhead detonating at a point within the volume of space that was calculated (see paragraph 3.8.5 of the report), it is not expected that the right hand side of the cockpit would be perforated. The complex construction of the fuselage including its furnishing, instruments, equipment and the occupants in the cockpit all form barriers that reduce the speed of the fragments and prevent perforation, from the inside out, on the aeroplanes right hand side. The fact that hundreds of fragments were found in the bodies of the three crew members in the cockpit illustrated that the path of the fragments was affected.
3. For the arguments regarding the presence of penetration holes in the right side of the cockpit reference is made to section 2.4, page 13 of the NLR report (Appendix X of the MH17 Crash report): Exit damage is observed on the wreckage of the lower right-hand side of the cockpit (Figure 10). This is an indication of a direction of impact from the upper left-hand side of the cockpit towards the lower right-hand side of the cockpit.
https://d.radikal.ru/d28/2002/5e/89fe2ae48041.jpg
Figure 10: Exit damage on lower right-hand side of the cockpit
The Dutch Safety Board concludes that on the basis of the arguments put forward, there is no new and significant evidence.

4

RF

The new important fact is that the appearance of the Section 3 encasing fragment found at the crash site does not match the appearance of fragments of the same encasing normally resulting from the detonation of a 9M38-series (9M38M1) missile.

DSB

For the response to the Russian Federations argument regarding the socalled Section 3 encasing fragment reference is made to the text in paragraph 2.12.2.8 of the MH17 Crash report: Ref.: MH17 Crash, paragraph 2.12.2.8, pages 82-83: () In order to not risk impeding the criminal Investigation, the Dutch Safety Board has decided not to publish images of all of the recovered fragments that were presented to the Annex 13 partners during the progress meeting in August 2015. Images of three of the parts are shown in Figure 36. The shape and form of the parts recovered is consistent with a 9M38-series surface-to-air missile. Images of three of the recovered parts are shown in Figure 36 together with an indication of origin on a 9M38 series surface-to-air missile; namely an engine nozzle (1), part of one of the four stabilizer fins (2) and a data cable (3). The text in the report makes it clear that the Dutch Safety Board makes no pronouncements as to whether the Section 3 encasing fragment comes from the surface-to-air missile that downed the aeroplane. That is part of the criminal investigation. The Dutch Safety Board concludes that on the basis of the argument put forward, there is no new and significant evidence.

5

RF

The new important fact is that, assuming that the aircraft was indeed brought down by a Buk surface-to-air missile, the engagement conditions as presented in the report do not agree with the algorithm of the proximity fuse used in 9M38- series missiles of the Buk surface-to-air missile system.

DSB

For the response to the arguments of the Russian Federation regarding the proximity fuse reference is made to the text in Appendix L of MH17 About the investigation: Ref.: MH17 About the investigation, Appendix L, Response to the comments of the Russian Federation, page 100, under 3, third column: The data pertaining to the sensor involved were received - through the Russian Federation - from the manufacturer of this type of missile. The data was used in new calculations and on the basis of these calculations, the Dutch Safety Board concluded that it was technically possible that a 9N314M warhead carried by a 9M38 series missile detonated in the volume of space as indicated by the Dutch Safety Board. Furthermore, for the response to the arguments of the Russian Federation regarding the proximity fuse, reference is made to the text in Appendix V of the MH17 Crash report in response to the comments of the Russian Federation to paragraph 3.7.4 of the draft Final Report: Ref.: MH17 Crash, Appendix V, Consultation Part A: Causes of the crash, page 13/21: On request of the Dutch Safety Board, Almaz-Antey delivered information about the operation of the detonation device. On the basis of this information, NLR concluded that the operation of the proximity fuse coincided with the calculated detonation point from NLR/TNO. (...) The Dutch Safety Board concludes that on the basis of the argument put forward, there is no new and significant evidence.

6

RF

The new important fact is that the location of the missile in relation to the aircraft at the moment of detonation as provided in the final report does not match the fragmentation spray area on the wreckage.
The arguments you present pertain to:
1. corrections to the fragmentation spray area on the Boeing 777 aircraft and the wreckage provided by Channel RT;
2. the missile warhead detonation area;
3. discrepancies in static and dynamic warhead simulations.

DSB

1. For the response to the first argument of the Russian Federation regarding this matter, reference is made to the text in Appendix L of MH17 About the investigation report: Ref.: MH17 About the investigation, Appendix L, Response to the comments of the Russian Federation, page 100, under 2, third column: As indicated above, the stringing method that was used is not a sound method for determining an exact detonation point on the basis of impact damage. Moreover, the damage on the inside of the fuselage cannot be included in such an analysis, as the fragments of a warhead that penetrate an object do not continue in the same direction; instead, they deviate from their course and ricochet. Therefore, the trajectory that would be described by a warhead fragment inside an aeroplanes fuselage cannot be deduced and cannot be used to determine a warheads detonation location. Only the impact pattern caused by penetrations, perforations and ricochets visible on the outside can be used to determine the general origin of the fragments. Furthermore, for the response to the first argument of the Russian Federation, reference is made to the text in Appendix V of the MH17 Crash report in response to the Russian Federations comments on paragraphs 2.19.4, 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 of the draft Final Report: Ref.: MH17 Crash, Appendix V, Consultation Part A: Causes of the crash, page 6/21 and 11/21: (...) it is a well known fact in the study of terminal ballistics of fragments that a fragment hitting a plate at an oblique angel (not perpendicular to the plate) changes its direction of travel after penetration. The initial angle is typically reduced after penetration. This change in angle is dependent on several factors and can be as small as several degrees or as large as the original oblique angel. As a result, it is usually not possible to obtain accurate data on the direction of travel of fragments outside the structure by studying parts inside the structure. With regard to the three pieces of wreckage provided by Channel RT (see photo below): These pieces of wreckage came from the upper left side of the cockpit. Two of these pieces were received in Ukraine on 30 September 2015 and the last piece was received on 3 October 2015. On 8 October these three pieces arrived at Gilze-Rijen Air Base. The Dutch Safety Board has assessed these pieces in the same manner as all the other pieces of wreckage. The damage and damage pattern of these three pieces matched the damage and damage pattern of the pieces of wreckage already recovered.
https://c.radikal.ru/c03/2002/14/d426c266013f.jpg
Figure: The three pieces of wreckage provided by Channel RT, as presented (in reconstructed form) on 13 October 2015 (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

         2. For the response to the second argument of the Russian Federation regarding in this matter, reference is made to Appendix L of MH17 About the investigation report:
Ref.: MH17 About the investigation, Appendix L, Response to the comments of the Russian Federation, pages 99-100, under 1, third column: The method used by the Russian Federation cannot be used to determine the exact detonation location of a warhead on the basis of the impact damage caused by fragments, as the trajectory described by such fragments before and after impact is not linear. The stringing method that was used only yields a general indication of the direction from which fragments approached the aeroplane. In addition, the Dutch Safety Board investigated whether the detonation of a smaller warhead could have caused the damage found. TNO simulations, however, proved that the effects of the detonation of a smaller warhead at the detonation point established by the Russian Federation are not consistent with the damage pattern observed, in particular with regard to the boundaries of the impact pattern. Furthermore, for the response to the second argument of the Russian Federation reference is made to the text in Appendix V of the MH17 Crash report in response to the comments by the Russian Federation to paragraph 3.7.3 of the draft Final Report: Ref.: MH17 Crash, Appendix V, Consultation Part A: Causes of the crash, 12/21: () The comments regarding the damage to the aeroplanes structure whereby the perforation holes are almost parallel to the direction (at the angle of 90 degrees) address an aircraft part that was photographed but was not recovered by the Dutch Safety Board. A Photo of the part is shown in paragraph 2.12.2. The image contradicts the notion that the perforation holes are at an angle of nearly 90 degrees. Furthermore, for the response to the second argument of the Russian Federation reference is made to the text in paragraph 3.8.3, page 145 of the MH17 Crash report: TNOs simulation also showed that there is no match obtained between the observed damage on the aeroplane and the simulated damage patterns when a smaller and lighter, 40 kg, warhead was applied. Figure 60 shows the simulated damage patterns for the set of simulations with a 40 kg warhead which were closest to the actual observed damage. This pattern gave a poorer match than was obtained with a heavier warhead (Model IIb). Furthermore, for the response to the second argument of the Russian Federation reference is made to the text in Appendix B, p. 1/7 of the TNO report (Appendix Y of the MH17 Crash report): During the Investigation into the cause of the crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 the possibility of a lighter warhead (lighter than 70 kg) was discussed. The hypothesis is that a match with the observed damage is found when a lighter warhead would detonate closer to the airplane. The DSB asked TNO to investigate this possibility. This appendix contains the results of the damage matching procedure for three designs of a 40 kg warhead with preformed fragments.
In section 5.4, pp. 22/25 - 23/25 of the TNO report (Appendix Y of the MH17 Crash report) it says: During the Investigation the possibility of a lighter warhead (lighter than 70 kg) was discussed. The hypothesis is that a match with the observed damage is found when a lighter warhead would detonate closer to the airplane. In consultation with the DSB a simulation was set-up whereby a 40 kg warhead detonates within 1.5 m from the airplane. Detailed results are included in Appendix B. Three different 40 kg warhead designs (A, B, and C) with two possible terminal velocities each (500 m/s and 800 m/s) have been considered. The main difference between the designs is the range of possible fragment ejection angles (design C has the largest range). A partial match is found with design C, which moves at 500 m/s. The other designs do not match because of non-compliancy with the set conditions (see Section 5.2). Figure 5.8 illustrates the differences between the best fitting 70 kg and best fitting 40 kg warhead. The 70 kg match is better.
https://c.radikal.ru/c07/2002/45/fa2247a9e66b.jpg
Figure 5.8: Red: fragment impacts for best matchwarhead design II (70 kg 9N314M). Blue: fragment impacts for best match warhead design C (hypothetical 40 kg). Design C results in a less fitting match.
Design C is extreme, in the sense that the angular range of the fragment ejection is made as large as physically possible. Only with an extreme angular range it proves possible to remotely approximate the observed damage pattern. The damage pattern of a lighter warhead closer to the airplane does not resemble the damage pattern of a heavier warhead further away from the airplane. Therefore, TNO judges the hypothesis that a lighter warhead can cause the observed damage as being improbable.

      3. For the response to the third argument of the Russian Federation in this matter, reference is made to the text in the TNO report, paragraph 4.3.2, Warhead implementations (designs), page 15/25 (Appendix Y of the MH17 Crash report): Table 4.2 provides a summary of the most important performance differences between the designs. Design II uses the specified fragment properties and detonation position according to Almaz Antey [5]. The corresponding ejection angles and velocities of design II have been determined with the Split-X software v.5.3.1.0. Design III adopts all warhead performances according to Almaz Antey without any adaptations. Table 4.2: Performances of three warhead 9N314M designs. Design I is based upon national sources, design III is based upon Almaz Antey information [5]. Design II uses the geometric design according to Almaz Antey, but the corresponding ejection angles and fragment velocities are calculated by TNO.
https://b.radikal.ru/b29/2002/92/b9df4fcda3bf.jpg
TNO rates design II as being the most realistic for the purpose of this Investigation because of the physical basis of the design. The main difference with design III is the smaller angular range for the fragment ejection. Note that the warhead model only contains preformed fragments. Other fragments that occur with the break-up of the SAM are not included in the model. Furthermore, for the response to the third argument of the Russian Federation reference is made to the text in the TNO report, Appendix A, Impact pattern of warhead 9N314M (Appendix Y of the MH17 Crash report) page 1/9 and 9/9: This appendix contains the results of the damage matching procedure for three designs of the 70 kg warhead 9N314M with preformed fragments. () A.2 Summary The results are summarised in Table A.1. The best match with the observed damage on the airplane is found with desighn II and a SAM terminal velocity of 730 m/s. The poorest match is found with design III, a SAM terminal velocity of 730 m/s and the stated warhead orientation according to Almaz Antey [8].
Table A.1: Result of the damage matching procedure. Warhead position (X,Y, Z) and orientation (azimuth, elevation) in the reference coordinate system.
https://c.radikal.ru/c08/2002/44/fee5cdd7610e.jpg
The results show that:
It is possible to match different positions and orientations for different warhead designs; finding a single combination for the point of detonation and orientation is not possible.
The found detonation points are inside a limited solution space. The warhead postion changes only by a little across the different simulation cases. The results are sensitive for the warhead orientation. This is due to the close proximity of the point of detonation.
The Dutch Safety Board concludes that on the basis of the arguments put forward, there is no new and significant evidence.

7

RF

The new important fact is that the location, dimensions and boundary of the damage, the number and density of penetration holes on the wreckage and especially the nature of damage to the frame of the Boeing 777 aircraft are not consistent with the warhead detonation point and missile orientation as presented in the final report. As a result, the possible launch area was calculated incorrectly.

DSB

For the response to the arguments of the Russian Federation regarding this point, reference is also made to the text and assessment mentioned above, as well as the text in Appendix L of MH17 About this investigation report: Ref.: MH17 About the investigation, Appendix L, Response to the comments of the Russian Federation, page 103, third column: The Russian Federation based its calculations on an incorrect detonation point and orientation of the weapon, resulting in an incorrect missile trajectory. Furthermore, for the response to the arguments of the Russian Federation regarding this point, reference is made to the text in Appendix V of the MH17 Crash report in response to the Russian Federations comments on section 3.8 of the draft Final Report: Ref.: MH17 Crash, Appendix V, Consultation Part A: Causes of the crash, page 16/21: () The simulation run by JSC Concern Almaz-Antey with a launch area near Zaroshchenskoye resulted in a fly-past configuration that would create a damage pattern that did not match the observed damage on the aeroplane or the associated detonation location. The Dutch Safety Board concludes that on the basis of the arguments put forward, there is no new and significant evidence.

9

7.03.15

Next of kin visits wreckage MH17
533 relatives of 151 victims of flight MH17 visited the wreckage of the aeroplane. Among them were relatives of victims from other countries. Groups of next of kin were taken around the three locations where the wreckage is located; the hangar where the investigation is taking place and the two shelters where the remaining pieces of wreckage are stored. These visits went well.

In the shelters, relatives could touch a number of pieces of wreckage. In the hangar where the actual investigation is taking place, they could view the wreckage from a raised platform. In addition, there was a site set up where flowers could be left.

The great majority of the next of kin were pleased to have been offered the opportunity to visit the wreckage. To actually see the pieces of wreckage is important, said Safety Board Chairman Tjibbe Joustra.

Reconstruction begins
In the past months the pieces of wreckage have been carefully checked, sorted and investigated. In February, the team of international investigators performed, among other matters, fracture investigation, investigated the failure mechanism and investigated the impact patterns. Now that the visits by the next of kin have taken place, work on the three-dimensional reconstruction will begin. The reconstruction will focus on the exterior of the cockpit and a part of the business class section. Once the reconstruction is complete the next of kin will receive an invitation to see this.

Investigation
At the Air Force base in Gilze-Rijen both the Dutch Safety Board and the Public Prosecutor are investigating the wreckage. In addition to the investigation into the cause of the accident, the Safety Board is also investigating the release of passenger name lists and the decision processes regarding flight routes. The Public Prosecutors criminal investigation aims to bring those responsible for the accident before a judge.   



19.03.15
Reaction to Dutch broadcast RTL News about MH17 investigation ("" )
In the investigation to the accident to flight MH17, the Dutch Safety Board wants to be able to confirm the final conclusion against multiple sources. This is a complex and time-consuming process. As a part of this, the link to the Malaysian Airlines aeroplane has to be demonstrated for each source, in part because the aeroplane crashed in an area of civil conflict.

The investigation into the cause of the accident is ongoing and is focusing on many more sources than just the pieces of shrapnel. Additional material for investigation is welcome for this, but it is important that it be irrefutably demonstrated that there is a relationship between any material and the aeroplane that crashed. The Dutch Safety Board will accept any such material and include it in the investigation.



10

07.05.15

International aviation investigators MH17 conclude meeting
This afternoon, the team of international aviation investigators who investigate the cause of the crash of flight MH17 concluded an investigation meeting at Gilze Rijen air force base.

During the team's first meeting (at the end of February) the members shared the findings of the investigation to date. The second meeting focused on the progress of the investigation as a whole and on the preliminary results of the forensic investigation. The participants also received further details on the work being carried out to reconstruct the aircraft. The meeting is part of the procedure for international aviation investigations laid down by the ICAO Convention. During the meeting, good progress has been made.

The investigators represent the countries involved in the MH17 investigation headed by the Dutch Safety Board: Ukraine, Malaysia, Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation.

11

1.07.15

Progress of the MH17 investigation
The Dutch Safety Board has reported on the progress of the investigation into the MH17 crash to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO ). Such a report is required by Article 6.6 of ICAO Annex 13, which obligates the Dutch Safety Board to release an interim statement one year after the occurrence. In this interim statement, the Dutch Safety Board briefly clarifies which steps have been taken in the past year and when the final reports are expected to be published.

The Dutch Safety Board has reported on the progress of the investigation into the MH17 crash to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO ). Such a report is required by Article 6.6 of ICAO Annex 13, which obligates the Dutch Safety Board to release an interim statement one year after the occurrence. In this interim statement, the Dutch Safety Board briefly clarifies which steps have been taken in the past year and when the final reports are expected to be published.

Below is the full text, which was sent to ICAO on 1 July 2015.

Progress of the MH17 Investigation
The Dutch Safety Board is investigating the crash of flight MH17, which happened on Thursday, 17 July 2014, in the Donetsk area (Ukraine). The Board is making every effort to give as clear a picture as possible of the cause of the crash. With 17 July 2015 coming up soon, a year after the crash, the Dutch Safety Board is reporting on the progress of the investigation in accordance with Article 6.6 of Annex 13 to the convention on International Civil Aviation.

The investigation is being carried out on the basis of the standards and recommended practices as described in the aforementioned ICAO Annex 13. The State in which the incident occurred (Ukraine) has delegated the investigation to the Dutch Safety Board. The Dutch Safety Board is therefore in charge of the investigation and directs the international team of investigators. The investigation team is composed of specialists from Malaysia, Ukraine, the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, Australia and the Netherlands.

In addition to the international investigation into the cause of the crash, the Dutch Safety Board is also investigating the decision-making process pertaining to safety when determining flight routes, as well as the availability of passenger information.

The Dutch Safety Board published a preliminary report containing its first findings regarding the crash of flight MH17 on Tuesday, 9 September 2014. The preliminary report contains the initial data from the investigation into the cause of the crash based on the sources that were available to the Dutch Safety Board.

The draft final reports on the investigation into the crash and the investigation pertaining to flight routes were made available to the accredited representatives of the participating States on Tuesday, 2 June. In accordance with ICAO Annex 13, they have sixty days to submit comments on the reports. The Dutch Safety Board will then assess the submitted comments and draw up the definitive final reports. The consultation period the investigation into the availability of passenger information has ended. The Board expects to publish the final reports in the first half of October 2015.

12

10.08.15
International aviation investigators MH17 meet
This morning the team of international aviation investigators who investigate the cause of the crash of flight MH17, started a meeting that will last for a number of days. During this meeting, lead by the Dutch Safety Board, the team will discuss the progress of the investigation and will visit air force base Gilze-Rijen to view the reconstruction of a part of the aircraft.

Last year, several meetings were held to discuss the progress of the investigation and to carry out further research. These meetings are part of the procedure for international aviation investigations laid down in the ICAO Convention.

The team of investigators, headed by the Dutch Safety Board, represent the countries which are involved in the MH17 investigation: the Netherlands, Ukraine, Malaysia, Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation.



11.08.15

Investigation into possible Buk-missile-parts
In cooperation with the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) investigates several parts, possibly originating from a Buk surface-air-missilesystem. These parts have been secured during a previous recovery-mission in Eastern-Ukraine and are in possession of the criminal investigation team MH17 and the Dutch Safety Board.

The parts are of particular interest to the criminal investigation as they can possibly provide more information about who was involved in  the crash of MH17. For that reason the JIT further investigates the origin of these parts. The JIT will internationally enlist the help of experts, among others forensic specialists and weapon-experts. 

At present the conclusion cannot be drawn that there is a causal connection between the discovered parts and the crash of flight MH17.

The JIT conducts the criminal investigation and the DSB the investigation into the cause of the crash. Both investigations are conducted separately but JIT and DSB occasionally share material. In its final report the Dutch Safety Board will report on the discovered parts.



27.08.15

Announcement of the publication of the MH17 final report
Today, the Dutch Safety Board informed relatives and the accredited representatives to the investigation that the Board will publish the final report on the investigation into flight MH17 on 13 October 2015. Prior to the official publication of the report, the relatives will be informed about the conclusions of the investigation during a closed information meeting. In September, the relatives will receive an invitation to the information session containing details of the location, the time and how they can register.

At a later date, the Dutch Safety Board will release further information about the location and the way in which the reports will be made available to the public and media on 13 October 2015.



13

13.10.15
Dutch Safety Board: Buk surface-to-air missile system caused MH17 crash
The crash of flight MH17 on 17 July 2014 was caused by the detonation of a 9N314M-type warhead launched from the eastern part of Ukraine using a Buk missile system. So says the investigation report published by the Dutch Safety Board today. Moreover, it is clear that Ukraine already had sufficient reason to close the airspace over the eastern part of Ukraine as a precaution before 17 July 2014. None of the parties involved recognised the risk posed to overflying civil aircraft by the armed conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine.

In response to the crash of flight MH17 the Dutch Safety Board has conducted various investigations, which have been published in two reports. The first report is on the causes of the crash and the issue of flying over conflict areas. The second report is on the compilation of the passenger list and the process of informing the relatives of the Dutch victims. The rationale behind the investigations has been published separately.

Buk missile system
The investigation has shown that flight MH17 progressed normally up to the moment when the aeroplane was flying over the eastern part of Ukraine. At 13.20 UTC (Coordinated Universal Time) a 9N314M warhead, launched by a Buk surface-to-air missile system from a 320-square-kilometre area in the eastern part of Ukraine, detonated to the left and above the cockpit. The forward section of the aircraft was penetrated by hundreds of high-energy objects coming from the warhead. As a result of the impact and the subsequent blast, the three crew members in the cockpit were killed immediately and the aeroplane broke up in the air. Wreckage from the aeroplane was distributed over various sites within an area of 50 square kilometres. All 298 occupants were killed.

The Dutch Safety Board has established the cause of the crash on the basis of several sources. For example, the weapon system used was identified on the basis of, among other things, the damage pattern on the wreckage, the fragments found in the wreckage and in the bodies of crew members, and the way in which the aircraft broke up. The findings are supported by the data on the flight recorders; the Cockpit Voice Recorder picked up a sound peak during the final milliseconds. In addition, traces of paint on a number of missile fragments found match the paint on parts of a missile recovered from the area by Dutch Safety Board. Other potential causes, such as an explosion inside the aeroplane or an air-to-air missile, have been investigated and excluded. No scenario other than a Buk surface-to-air missile can explain this combination of facts. The 320-square-kilometre area from which the missile was launched has been determined on the basis of various simulations. Additional forensic investigation will be needed to establish the exact launching location; however, such an investigation lies outside the scope of the Dutch Safety Boards mandate.

The airspace over the eastern part of Ukraine
The airspace over the eastern part of Ukraine was much in use: between 14 and 17 July 2014, 61 operators from 32 countries routed their flights through this airspace. On the day of the crash, until the airspace was closed, 160 commercial airliners flew over the area. Malaysia Airlines prepared and operated flight MH17 in accordance with regulations. As the state of departure, the Netherlands had no responsibility to advise Malaysia Airlines (or KLM, as its code share partner) with regard to the chosen flight route.

On 17 July 2014 an armed conflict was taking place in the eastern part of Ukraine. In the preceding months, the conflict had expanded into the airspace: from late April the number of military aircraft downed increased. According to statements by the Ukrainian authorities, in two cases long-range weapons were used. In the Dutch Safety Boards opinion, Ukraine had sufficient reason to close the entire airspace over the eastern part of Ukraine as a precaution. Instead, on military grounds flying at lower altitudes was restricted. The same turns out to apply to conflict areas elsewhere in the world: it is rare for a state to close its airspace because of an armed conflict.

Flying over conflict areas
The Dutch Safety Board has noticed that the current system of responsibilities with respect to flying over conflict areas is inadequate. Operators assume that unrestricted airspaces are safe. When assessing the risk, the operators do usually take into account the safety of departure and arrival locations, but not the safety of the countries they fly over. When flying over a conflict area, an additional risk assessment is necessary. Therefore, the Dutch Safety Board considers it extremely important that parties involved in aviation including states, international organisations such as ICAO and IATA, and operators exchange more information about conflict areas and potential threats to civil aviation. When processing and interpreting this information, more attention should be paid to the development of the conflict, including any increase of military activity and shootings from the ground. States involved in an armed conflict should receive more incentives and better support to safeguard the safety of their airspace. In addition, the Dutch Safety Board is of the opinion that operators should give public account for their flight routes.

Passenger information
After the crash of flight MH17 was reported, many relatives gathered at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol , hoping to obtain more information there. At the end of the evening an initial passenger list was made public. It then took two to four days before all of the surviving relatives received confirmation from the Dutch authorities. When gathering information related to the passenger list and determining the identity of the occupants and their surviving relatives, the information that various parties gathered about the victims and their relatives was not combined.  The Dutch crisis organisation failed to function properly and the government authorities involved lacked direction. In order to improve information provision after a crash, the Dutch Safety Board recommends among other things that passengers nationalities be registered on passenger lists. The Dutch Safety Board also recommends that the Dutch government make provisions to improve direction in case of a disaster abroad with a large number of Dutch victims.

Reconstruction
Over the past months, a reconstruction of the forward part of the aeroplane was assembled at the Dutch air base of Gilze-Rijen. The reconstruction clearly shows the effects of the impact and subsequent blast, and has been important for verification and additional substantiation of the investigations results.




» MH17: ? »  DSB JIT » : DSB